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FACULTY COMMENT
THE ULTIMATE NIGHTMARE:
WHAT IF TERRORISTS

Go

NUCLEAR? ....

Robert A. Friedlander

I

Professor Friedlander discusses "the possible global consequences" of how
international nuclear proliferation and the phenomenon of an international
arms race have created opportunities for terrorists to utilize nuclear weaponry. Focusing upon several nuclear terrorist attacks which have taken
place over recent years, the author notes that "the basic question rvlating
to the nuclear threat is no longer if, but when an episode of mass destruction will occur." Professor Friedlander observes that "[T]errorists emulate
states," and then concludes that the international legal system has not provided remedies which deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. This is so
because a sizeable number of nation-states have voiced their support for
terrorist activities, thus splitting the ranks of any international legal order.
However, international safeguards may potentially include sanctions
against those nations who sponsor terrorist groups as well as direct counterforce response to individual nuclear terrorist attacks. In closing, Professor
Friedlander notes that because the world community has failed to develop
strong and effective means of controlling terrorists and their mastery of nuclear weapons, nations are "on a collision course with scientific
catastrophe."

ARTICLES
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITH FOREIGN NONDISCLOSURE LAWS:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE Vetco CASE .......... David K. Pansius
This article focuses upon the dilemma which exists in United States courts
when U.S. discovery law and foreign nondisclosure law conflict. This situation, it is noted, most commonly arises in the international context when a
foreign nation forbids a litigant to disclose those documents which are demanded and required under U.S. discovery law in order for a United States
court to resolve the case at hand. Mr. Pansius chooses to highlight the conflict by means of a discussion of the Vetco case which was recently decided
by the Ninth Circuit, The Court's decision to enforce a subpoena which had
been issued by the IRS to a Swiss company was correct, the author concludes, but the reasoning which was employed may lead to considerable
confusion and a different outcome if re-litigated in the future. This is so
because the Court employed the "balancing test" of section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Foreign Relations without any showing
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by Vetco that "a genuine conflict between U.S. discovery procedures and
foreign nondisclosure laws" existed. By reaching its decision in the manner
in which it did, the Ninth Circuit implied that treaty procedures which deal
with discovery rules are not exclusive, and that in fact, the IRS has the
power to subordinate treaty provisions to its own procedures. The relationship of the balancing test and treaties which deal with discovery are given a
thorough treatment in a discussion of various cases which have employed
both procedures. The conclusion which Mr. Pansius reaches requires that
"the existence of a treaty weighs against U.S. disclosure rules that are contrary to the reasonable expectations of the other signatory to the treaty."
The express or implied provisions of the treaty must take precedence
"[wihere the [public] policies of the two countries are . . . in direct conflict." It is only in those instances in which the competing interests are not
in balance where "the balancing test applies in favor of that sovereign
whose public policy is unambiguously involved."
ON LIVING TOGETHER IN NORTH AMERICA:
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
RELATIONS .............
John E. Carroll and Newell

B. Mack
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The traditional means for resolving disputes between the United States and
Canada has been through negotiation and ad hoc accommodations. However, the authors contend in their article that the recent problem of transboundary pollution has rendered the ad hoc approach inadequate, mainly
because of the absence of predictability. Observing that there is a need for
some form of "rules" which will govern future decision-making between the
two countries, the author's offer several different options which the countries might choose. First, options are proposed in order to choose an agreement which establishes the rules, and second, alternatives which utilize the
rules and actually resolve the conflicts are examined. The option which the
authors propose as being the most practical is one in which an arbitral tribunal would be established and composed of citizens from each country,
and given broad binding authority. In this way, "a satisfactory balance between authority and advice could eventually be reached." The actual implementation of such a tribunal would require the support of constituencies
consisting of corporations, environmentalists, and local governments, and
such support may prove to be a substantial obstacle. However, the authors
conclude that such a mechanism, using agreed-upon rules, may be the only
way in which environmental relations between the U.S. and Canada may
consistently improve and eventually reach a state of mutual satisfaction.

STUDENT COMMENT
WHO'LL STOP THE RAIN?:
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR
U.S.-CANADAN TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION

DISPUTES ................ John Pickering and Gina L. Swets
This Comment addresses the problem of transboundary pollution between
the United States and Canada, and it examines selected mechanisms for
the resolution of environmental disputes which arise between the two countries. The authors select four areas in which potential resolution mechanisms exist, with particular regard to the problem areas of acid rain and
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water pollution. These legal mechanisms consist of: 1) limited territorial
sovereignty as a basis for liability in transboundary pollution disputes; 2) a
remedy to the acid rain dispute under section 115 of the U.S. Clean Air Act;
3) the effectiveness of current mechanisms for resolving disputes over the
Poplar River and Garrison Diversion projects; and 4) the draft treaties proposed by a Joint Working Group of the American and Canadian Bar Associations dealing exclusively with the resolution of disputes between the
United States and Canada. After a thorough discussion of the means by
which each mechanism may be employed to successfully resolve transboundary environmental disputes wholly on the legal merits, the authors
conclude that the willingness of either government to utilize any such
mechanism is not likely. Rather, the traditional ad hoc means of settlement
through diplomatic channels appears to be favored by Canada and the U.S.
because of its emphasis upon a variety of approaches in dispute settlement
as opposed to the strict legalistic approach which is endorsed in the four
dispute settlement mechanisms.

DEVELOPMENTS
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FACULTY COMMENT

The Ultimate Nightmare:
What If Terrorists Go Nuclear?
ROBERT

A. FRIEDLANDER*

The sudden Israeli air attack upon the Baghdad Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981 served to dramatize, more than any other event since the
first thermonuclear bomb explosions, the dangers inherent in an international nuclear arms race and the possible global consequences of nuclear
proliferation.'
Burgeoning European opposition to nuclear armament last summer
swelled into a mass of demonstrations by October 1981.' Four prominent
American political and intellectual figures created a mild sensation in the
spring of 1982, advocating a last resort approach to nuclear weapons
while simultaneously arguing for their prevention and against their utilization. 3 During the same time, a growing anti-nuclear movement in the
United States reached immense proportions,' and a national best-seller,
brooding about the nuclear extinction of humankind, continues to engender intense and bitter debate over the use of nuclear weaponry.'
01982 by Robert A. Friedlander
*Robert A. Friedlander is a professor at the Pettit College of Law at Ohio Northern
University and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy.
1. Le Monde, June 10, 1981, at 1, cols. 1-6; N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at 1, col. 6. For a
legal justification of the Israeli action, see Friedlander, Might Can Also Be Right: The Israeli Nuclear Reactor Bombing and InternationalLaw, 28 CHrrrv's L.J. 352 (1980) and
D'Amato, Imagining a Judgment in the Case of Iraq v. Israel, Washington Star, June 15,
1981, at A-8, col. 3. For a contrary view, see Davis, The Politics of Begin's Baghdad Raid, 35
NAvAL WAR C. Rav. 33 (Mar.-Apr. 1982).
2. Laqueur, Hollanditis:A New Stage in European Neutralism, in COMMENTARY, Aug.
1981, at 19, 23-25; THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1981, at 11-13, 47-48.

3. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,
60 FOREIGN An. 753 (1982).
4. See The Nuclear Nightmare, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 26, 1982, at 23-30; Thinking About
the Unthinkable: Rising Fears About the Dangers of Nuclear War, TIME, Mar. 29, 1982, at
10-26; Montgomery, Throngs Fill Manhattan to Protest Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. Times,
June 13, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
5. See C. BRowNE & R. MUNROz, TIME BoMi: UNDESTANDING THE THREAT o0 NUCLEAR

PowzR (1981); N. CALDEE, NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO PossmL WARS
(1980); Mandelbaum, The Bomb, Dread and Eternity, 5 INT'L SECURTY 3 (1980). See also
Howard, An Incredible Strategy, Tim NEW YORK REvIEw Or BOOKS, Jan. 21, 1982, at 12;
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A "doomsday" simulation exercise carried out by high U.S. Government officials was declared a success in March 1982, despite its ominous
results. 6 The lead article in the first issue of the 1982 Naval War College
Review examines the possibility of naval nuclear warfare and concludes
that "our putative enemy leaves us no choice but to think about, plan for,
and develop a capability to fight a tactical nuclear war at sea." As the
British-Argentinian conflict grew in intensity, the president of Argentina's Atomic Energy Commission expressed fear that Great Britain
would resort to tactical nuclear weapons to resolve the Falkland Islands
crisis, notwithstanding the fact that Argentina is generally suspected of
trying to achieve a similar nuclear capability.8
None of these developments gives any indication of the increasing
concern among scientists, political analysts, and Western security agencies as to the means most likely to unleash what President Ronald Reagan has termed "the ultimate nightmare." A number of popular novels
written by well-informed authors in both Great Britain and the United
States have dramatically demonstrated the possibility, if not the
probability, of nuclear terrorism initiated by terrorist governments, terror
organizations, and crazed or corrupt physicists. 10 Pope John Paul II's prophetic warning to the world community about "the dark fascination of
violence and warfare," delivered shortly before his departure for Portugal"1 and the second attempt on his life,12 applies equally to nation-states
and non-state actors. The recent statement by Richard Perle, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, is much more specific and much more ominous: "I can imagine a situation where a nuclear
weapon was in the hands of a terrorist, in which case you might want to
evacuate a city . .

.

s

The Bologna railway station bombing," the Munich Oktoberfest
Kennan, On Nuclear War, id., at 8-12; Krauthammer, In Defense of Deterrence: How To
Prevent Nuclear War, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 28, 1982, at 15-20; Lerner, Visions of the
Apocalypse, id., at 26-29. The same arguments in capsule form were made decades earlier
by Bazelon, A New Kind of War, 29 PARTisAN REv. 543, 544-46 (1962). See also the extravagant claim of French novelist J. BRUNE, CzrrE HAINE QUI RESSEMBLE A L'AMOUR 451 (1961),

that "there is no difference between Hiroshima and the Nazi extermination camps."
6. The Doomsday Exercise, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1982, at 31.
7. Parker, Theatre Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy, 35 NAVAL WAR C. REv. 3
(Jan.-Feb. 1982).
8. The Intelligencer (Wheeling, W.Va.), Apr. 30, 1982, at 4, col. 4. See also the statement of the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, which predicts that Argentina will test a nuclear device by the mid-1980's and may possess a nuclear arsenal by 1990.
The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), May 14, 1982, at 12-A, col. 1.
9. Cable News Network, Evening News, May 9, 1982.
10. See L. COLLINS & D. LAP"IERE, THE FIFTH HORSEMAN (1981); G. HOUSEHOLD, HosTAGE: LONDON (1977); F. HOYLE & G. HOYLE, THe WESTMINsTER DISASTE.R (1977); A.
MACLEAN, GOODBYE CALIFORNIA (1977).
11. National Public Radio Morning News, WGTE-FM, Toledo, Ohio, May 12, 1981.

12. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), May 13, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
13. NEWSWEEK, Apr. 26, 1982, at 29.
14. Tan ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1980, at 15-16; L'ExPRss, Aug. 16, 1980, at 38-39.
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bombing,18 and the Rue Copernic bombing in Paris's have demonstrated
clearly and convincingly that terrorists of both the left and the right are
now willing to escalate the threshold of violence to levels previously believed to be unattainable because of alleged terrorist concern over possible public outrage. Two events which occurred during the first several
months of 1982, although serious but not catastrophic, nevertheless may
be harbingers of a more lethal future for the international social order.
On January 18, 1982, five rockets were fired from across the Rhone River
into the concrete walls surrounding the French Creys-Malville nuclear facility. Fortunately only minor damage resulted. An organization calling
itself the Pacifist and Ecological Committee took credit for the attack. 7
On May 5, 1982, Spanish ETA terrorists machine-gunned the director of"
a Basque nuclear plant located at Lemoniz, in an attempt to prevent the
$2 billion dollar, 930 megawatt reactor, from becoming operational."'
In the eleven years from 1966 to 1977, there were ten serious incidents of theft and violence directed against European nuclear installations.19 During April 1979, a French nuclear reactor at La Seyne-sur-Mer
suffered $20 million damage and was sixty percent destroyed by a terrorist attack by an organization which identified itself as the Group of
French Nature Protectors. 0 Between 1969 and 1975, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration reported 288 threats of violence or actual incidents relating to nuclear facilities or offices. This included 240 bomb threats and fourteen
bombings and attempted bombings."1
Robert Kupperman, former chief scientist of the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, warns that terrorists are raising their technological competence to highly sophisticated levels. Moreover, "physicists,
chemists, engineers and biologists are joining their ranks ... . ' With
respect to nuclear terrorism in any conceivable form, the real issue is not
one of possibility, but merely one of credibility. "That terrorists may not
behave differently from states""8 is one expert's motivational explanation
15. NEwswFEK, Oct. 13, 1980, at 71.
16. THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1980, at 41-42; The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Oct. 4,
1980, at 5-A, col. 4.
17. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), Jan. 19, 1982, at 1, col 1.
18. Id., May 6, 1982, at 6, col. 6.

19. Lz Nouvs

OBsERvATEuR,

Apr. 14, 1979, at 44.

20. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), Mar. 15, 1980, at 4, col. 4. The German magazine, Stern.
later claimed that this attack was the work of the Israeli Mossad, seeking to prevent a nuclear technology transfer to Iraq. Id. The English version of the Mar. 13 & 20, 1980 Stern
articles are reprinted in Follath, Israel's Elite Intelligence Corps, WORLD PwasS Rzv. May
1980, at 29-31. See also The Miami Herald, Apr. 15, 1979, at 4-A, col. 1.
21. L. BzIngs, APoCALYPsE NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE iN WORLD PoLrics 182-83 (1980)

[hereinafter cited as

APOCALYPSE].

22. Glasser, SophisticatedArms Reflect New Dangers of Terrorism, The Miami Herald, Apr. 3, 1980, at 10-D, col. 1.
23. Jenkins, The Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL POLrCAL EFFECTS OF THE SPREAD OF NucLEAR WEAPONS 85 (J. King ed. 1979).
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for the threat of a quantitative leap in terrorist technology. According to
Rand Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins:
[TJerrorists emulate states. If a nuclear device becomes a widely
perceived symbol of state power, terrorists may be more inclined to go
domain-for exnuclear, or at least to carry out actions in a nuclear
4
ample, attacking or seizing nuclear reactors.2
More than 15 years ago an ad hoc Panel on Safeguarding Nuclear
Material reported to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission that safeguards
were needed for the protection and security of nuclear materials, and that
the present programs were largely inadequate to meet these ends.25 Particular concern was manifested over potential criminal diversion of materiel, misuse of explosives, the aiding and abetting of foreign governments
through shipment of illicit supplies, arranging the transfer of nuclear substances into the hands of unauthorized parties, and the potential construction of a nuclear weapon .2 Several years later, two distinguished
scholars, one a physicist and the other a law professor, published a detailed study of how and why an incident of nuclear terrorism could occur,
warning that "[s]cenarios of nuclear hijackings or bomb threats might become self-fulfilling prophecies.' '1 7 The few voices originally raised over
fear of a nuclear terrorist incident in the late 1960's and early 1970's have
been slowly swelling into a chorus of despair."8
British security agencies now frankly admit that a potential terrorist
nuclear incident is undeniably credible, and that the basic question relating to the nuclear threat isno longer if, but when an episode of mass
destruction will occur.' 9 The truth of the matter is that catastrophe theory cannot permit a single miscalculation when governments are required
to think the unthinkable. "The world is pregnant with apocalyptic
possibilities."' 0
The nature of these possibilities is the concern of a recent doomsday
analysis by political scientist Louis Ren6 Beres."' He envisions three
roads to Armageddon: (1) nuclear war between superpowers; (2) nuclear

24. Id.

25. Report to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Ad Hoc Panel on Safeguarding
Special Nuclear Material, Mar. 10, 1967 reprinted in 2 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DocuMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOcAL CONTROL 431-57 (1979).
26. Id. at 436, 444, 452-54.
27. M. WI.LRCH & T. TAYLOR, NucsKAR THmr. RISKS AND SAFEGuARIs 2 (1974); See
also J. McPHE=, THE CURvE OF BINDING ENERGY 1-4, 87-100, 143-51 (1974).
28. L. BERES, TERiOsmM AND GLOBAL SzcuRITY: THE NucLEAR THREAT 15-52 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as TERROmSM]; R. CLARK, TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM 7-103 (1980);
Greenwood, Non-State Entities, in T. GREENWOOD, H. FEIVESON, & T. TAYLOR, NucLEAR
PROLIFERATION: MOTIVATIONS, CAPABIXTZS, AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL 99-107 (1977); R.
KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, TERRORISM: THREAT, REALITY, RESPONSE 58-62, 104-05 (1979);
Flood, Nuclear Sabotage, The Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1977, at C1, col. 1 & C4, col. 1.
29. Private information discussed with the author, London, Feb. 20, 1980.
30. T RRORSM, supra note 28, at 45.
31. APOcALYPSE, note 21 supra.
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war resulting from proliferation; and (3) a nuclear holocaust initiated by
8 2
terror-violence.
As a corollary, Beres adds a further category-"the use of nuclear
technology in a civil war."8 8 Although seriously concerned over the first
two classifications, his ultimate fear is that nuclear terrorism is both credible and practicable, either by means of nuclear explosives, radiological
weapons, or sabotage of nuclear reactors."
Some experts who previously had been skeptical of terrorist nuclear
threats, such as Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, 5 have shifted
their position toward acceptance of those potential dangers. By the beginning of the current decade, Jenkins was conceding that terrorism "has a
built-in requirement for escalation, if not bloodshed, at least in audacity,
drama, or magnitude of the threat." 86 Social scientist Thomas Schelling
warns: "[slome time in the 1980's an organization that is not a national
government may acquire a few nuclear weapons.' 7 If this is so, then the
question of who and how become quintessential issues.
In developing his chamber-of-horrors hypotheticals, Beres has listed
some factors giving credence to these grim prophecies:
(1) Ease of access "to nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants and nuclear waste storage facilities."
(2) Ready "availability of weapons resources."
(3) Terrorist willingness for self-sacrifice "renders them insensitive to
ordinary threats of retaliation."
(4) Cooperation and collaboration among terrorist groups has been
amply documented.
(5) A tolerant attitude within the world community toward terrorism
and terrorists has substantially vitiated "the enactment of effective
counter-measures."' u
Terrorism is the theater of the unexpected. Although there have been
many unhappy surprises played out on the global stage during the "Terror Decade" of the 1970's and the "Dangerous Decade" of the 1980's,
nothing will be more cataclysmic in terms of shock value than an actual
terrorist nuclear incident.
There are some critics who argue that since we still lack adequate
"knowledge of terrorist motivations," conclusions about possible terrorist
intentions "would be counter-productive."' 9 Although Beres is likewise

32. Id. at 17-116.
33. Id. at 14.

34. Id. at 175.
35. See Brown, Nuclear Facilities and Materials in LEGAL AsPzcTs or INTERNATIONAL
156 (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978).
36. Quoted in Glasser, note 22 supra. See also Jenkins, supra note 23, at 89-91.
37. Schelling, Thinking About Nuclear Terrorism, 6 INT'L SEcURTY 61 (1982).
38. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 14-15.
39. Crenshaw, The Prospect of CatastrophicTerrorism, 8 Aim=D FORCES AND SOcIETy
156-57 (1981). This claim is,
however, misleading at best. See, for example, R. FIRDLANDEz,
TERORIsM
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reticent to suggest the existence of a "terrorist mind," and instead postulates "a potpourri of ideas, visions, methods, and objectives" on the part
of terrorist actors,4" he does roughly identify specific types of terrorist
groups: guerilla, criminal, secessionist, and ideological." But he avoids
the kind of typology and taxonomy that are delineated in his previous
study.4 2
Warning is one thing; prevention is something else. Beres correctly
points out that possible remedies provided by the international legal system have not kept pace with the political convolutions of the world community. "In certain instances, the split sympathies of states on the question of terrorism have impaired extant norms.

'4 3

On the one hand, he

urges sanctions applied to those states "which sponsor or support terrorist groups and activities."44 But although he advocates state compliance
with the basic instruments governing the international protection of
human rights, 45 he does not advocate the last resort, a counterforce response.46 Yet at times, force must be met with force, and terrorist groups
or their state protectors must be subject to retribution which will prevent
further killing. There are occasions when those who live by the sword
47
must be made to realize that they will also die by the sword.
In his earlier and at times eloquent assessment, entitled Terrorism
and Global Security, Beres takes a pessimistic view of the terrorist actor's willingness to limit the upward spiral of terrorist harm. Since perpetrators of terror-violence have shown themselves to be insensitive to those
constraints which are the traditional means of maintaining order among
nation-states, "threats of deterrence might have little or no bearing on
the terrorist decision concerning the use of nuclear force.' ' If this is true,
then the issues become: 1) what can the nuclear terrorist do; and 2) how
easily can it be done?
The staff director of the U.S. National Advisory Committee Task
TERRORISM: DocuMENTs OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 49-70 (1979); F. HACKER,
CRUSADERS, CRIMINALS, CRAzms: TEROR AND TERRORISM IN OuR TiME 3-101 (1976); Cooper,

The Terrorist and the Victim, 1 VxcrMoLoGy: AN INT'L J. 229 (1976); Horwitz, Political
Terrorism and State Power, 1 J. PoL. & MiL. Soc. 147, 148-50 (1973); Russel & Miller,
Profile of a Terrorist, 1 TERRORIsM: AN INT'L J. 17 (1977).
40. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 250-51.
41. Id. at 251-56.
42. TERRoRsM, supra note 28.
43. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 117. See also, Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: What Is Being Done, 8 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 383 (1977).
44. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 260.

45. Id. at 262-63.
46. Id. at 117-18.

47. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has analogized the successful capture of a hijacked Tanzanian airplane at Stansted Airport near London in February 1982 to British

actions in the Falkland Islands crisis. A forcible response, she declared, is the only way "to
really stand up for international law against international anarchy." TIME, May 10, 1982, at
24. See also Green, Rescue at Entebbe: Legal Aspects, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 312 (1976).
48. TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 33.

1982

THE ULTIMATE NIGHTMARE

Force on Disorders and Terrorism has bluntly asserted that "[ailmost
certainly, some terrorists today have the formal capability to make, deliver, and detonate a nuclear device. 49 Other analysts differ only in degree. Journalist Ovid Demaris concludes his well researched, highly detailed study of international terrorist organizations by boldly stating:
"Nuclear terrorism is the wave of the future."5 0 Even physicist Edward
Teller, the man most responsible for developing the hydrogen bomb, admits that although a terrorist group is unlikely to make its own atomic
weapon, "I don't dare say that something of this kind is absolutely
impossible."51
When a workable atom bomb can be designed by a C minus
Princeton University undergraduate student from readily available scientific information, and when a Pakistani diplomat offers to buy the plans"
(Pakistan need no longer be interested-it is close to having its own
atomic weapon),58 then danger lurks everywhere. Similar independent efforts were successfully carried out by students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) and Harvard University, the former commissioned by National Educational Television." And one need not build a
bomb in order to develop an explosive nuclear device.5 5 Two M.I.T. physicists have warned that "the destruction of a reactor with a nuclear
weapon, even of relatively small yield, such as a crude terrorist device,
would represent a national catastrophe of lasting consequences." 5 1
Nearly all experts and commentators are agreed that nuclear reactors
constitute the prime terrorist targets of the future.5 7 According to Beres,
49. H.H.A.

COOPER, EVALUATING THE TERRORIST THREAT. PRINCIPLES OF APPLIED RISK

ASSESSMENT 15 (Bureau of Operations and Research, Int'l Ass'n. of Chiefs of Police, 1979).

50. 0.

DEMARIS,

BROTHERS IN BLOOD: THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORK
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(1977).
51. Teller, The Spectre of Nuclear Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE-PROCEEDINGS OF THE JERUSALEM CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TER-

141 (B. Netanyahu ed. 1980).
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28, at 24-25; R. KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, supra note 28, at
58; A. NORTON & M. GREENBERG, UNDERSTANDING THE NUCLEAR TERRORISM PROBLEM 7 (Bureau of Operations and Research, Int'l Ass'n. of Chiefs of Police, 1979). A journalist for the

Progressivemagazine stated that the best source of his story on the hydrogen bomb, which
the U.S. Government tried unsuccessfully to suppress, was the National Atomic Museum at
Kirkland Air Force Base. The Miami Herald, Apr. 15, 1979, at 30-A, col. 1.

55. R.

KUPPERMAN

& D.

TRENT,

supra note 28, at 58-60.

56. Quoted in Schell, Reflections: The Fate of the Earth, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 1,
1982, at 47, 88.
57. APOCALYPSE, supra note 28, at 104-06; 0. DEMARiS, supra note 50, at 417-23; Jen-

kins, supra note 23, at 99; R. KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, supra note 28, at 104-05;
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Back in the Bottle: U.S. Controls Over Sensitive Nuclear Technology, 16 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON.

65, 82-85 (1981).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

"[tihere have already been at least 94 incidents involving threats of violence or acts of violence to licensed nuclear facilities in this country since
1969."11 If this is not sufficient attraction for various scenarios of terrorist
sabotage, then what can one conjecture about the alleged 2300 operational errors, mechanical failures, and other mishaps which Critical Mass,
an anti-nuclear group, claims occurred during the year 1979?59 In such
circumstances, even if the actual number is reduced by two-thirds, the
potential for theft, sabotage, and mechanistic destruction is not exactly
miniscule.
Rand Corporation expert Brian Jenkins postulates a terrorist team of
three to six individuals, dedicated, probably well-trained, armed with automatic weapons, grenades, and explosives, who would have the capability
of mounting a successful attack upon a U.S. nuclear power plant.60 Recognition of this possibility has led to increased security measures being
taken at U.S. nuclear power stations throughout the country, such as the
Davis-Besse plant in northwest Ohio, which maintains approximately one
hundred trained employees solely for security." Yet, the majority of
plants are still far from secure. A U.S. Government mock combat exercise
held at the end of 1980 at a Southern nuclear facility resulted in the assault team penetrating to the core of the secured installation in only nine
minutes.6 2
Even before the Three Mile Island accident, bomb threats against
that Metropolitan Edison plant were made in September 1972, March
1973, and November 1973.13 Security analyst H.H.A. Cooper writes:
"Most terrorist organizations operate on at least a rough and ready cost/
benefit basis. The value of the operation is assessed in terms of the cost,
tangible and intangible, of attaining the objectives sought.""
In light of the Three Mile Island affair, all kinds of possiblities related to sabotage and nuclear theft have arisen, and the potential for

58. TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 28.

59. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), July 14, 1980, at 2, col. 1.
60. Glasser, note 22 supra.
61. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), May 16, 1982, Sec. B., at 1, col. 1 and Sec. B, at 8, col. 1.
For private American security firms involved in overseas nuclear protection services, see
The Miami Herald, Feb. 16, 1981, at 30F, col. 1.
62. Private information, Washington, D.C., Jan. 22, 1981. See also TERRORISM, supra
note 28, at 28. The ready availability of information useful for such attacks is graphically
described by A. MACLEAN, supra note 10, at 23-24. On September 9, 1982, Sen. John Glenn
(D.-Ohio) declared that serious security problems which exist at federal nuclear weapons
plants may encourage incidents which could paralyze the country and threaten countless
lives. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 10, 1982, at 1-A, col. 5.
63. TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 28.
64. H.H.A. CooPER, supra note 49, at 13. But see Norton, Introduction, in STuDIes IN
NUCLEAR TERRORISM 20 (A. Norton & M. Greenberg eds. 1979) fhereinafter cited as STuIEs], who observes: "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any attainable terrorist objective that
could not be achieved with a more efficient and less costly use of organizational assets than
the nuclear gambit would require."
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damage must be considered enormous. 0 ' Moreover, the discovery that unqualified, unskilled workers have assisted in the construction of nuclear
power plants throughout the United States, including that of Three Mile
Island, raises serious implications about a widespread breach of security
and easy access, via misrepresentation, to these facilities." Diversion of
enriched plutonium from commercial reprocessing centers represents a
further and potentially more serious problem. "The U.S. position has
been that commercial reprocessing plants are difficult to safeguard effectively and, therefore, constitute a serious proliferation risk. ''0 7 Beres,
along with many other experts, advocates hardening the target, 68 although he is not altogether persuaded
by the knee-jerk "search for a
69
mechanical/technological fix."
Any international safeguards, Beres properly argues, must include coercive penalties aimed at those who aid and abet transnational wrongdoers. Thus, global "arrangements for counter-nuclear terrorist cooperation
must include sanctions for states that sponsor or support terrorist groups
and activities. '7 0 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,7 1 signed in October 1979 but not yet entered into force, is a first step in that direction,
but no more than a step. In addition, as Ovid Demaris has caustically
noted, "[t]he IAEA inspection system is totally inadequate against a
country determined to build atomic weapons. 7 2 The IAEA also has no
power over a national system of controls.
Beres's suggestion of a world order approach as the best way to confront the terrorist threat is the weakest aspect of his otherwise excellent
study. 73 It may even be argued in the current state of renewed Cold War
adversity between the United States and the Soviet Union that Thomas
Schelling's proposal of elimination of nuclear weapons is laudable but not

65. Nuclear Accident and Recovery at Three Mile Island: A Special Investigation,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
66. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), May 12, 1982, at 1, col. 1. Illegal purchase of
union cards would, of course, aid the creation of a false identity. On March 31, 1982, after
one year of employment, a quality control inspector of the North Perry Village Nuclear
Power Plant in northeast Ohio was fired because of false credentials. The Blade (Toledo,
Ohio), May 24, 1982, at 6, col. 4.
67. Ausness, supra note 57, at 84.
68. TERRORIsM, supra note 28, at 66-67. See also R. KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, supra
note 28, at 86-92.
69. TmROmsm, supra note 28, at 65.
70. Id. at 95.
71. Reprinted in 3 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DocumENTs OF INTERNATiONAL AND LoCAL CONTROL 593-601 (1981).
72. 0. DEMAms, supra note 50, at 411. Certainly, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, signed in July 1970, has provided almost no significant arms control limitations. For an assessment of the treaty's potentialities and deficiencies, see Comment, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and its Control, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 159 (1976).
73. TERRoRISM, supra note 28, at 105-34.
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very practicable.7 4 Nuclear weaponry will continue to proliferate, and the
number of states possessing a nuclear military capacity will continue to
increase if current projections are at all accurate. 75 Small wonder that legalist Benjamin Ferencz pessimistically comments that "[a]s long as sovereign states are not prepared to take the logical steps necessary to re'
strict the use of violence, anarchy will continue. 1"
What are the chances that terrorists can somehow obtain a nuclear
weapon? Former Deputy Secretary of Energy Donald Kerr has indicated
that if a nuclear weapon happened to fall into the hands of a terrorist
group, he could not guarantee that it would not be used. 7 As for terrorists producing a workable nuclear device, an effective design by a
M.I.T. chemistry major in 1975 produced an 800-pound weapon with a
15-pound plutonium core for about $10,000.78 Worse yet, according to the
U.S. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, unaccounted
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium have disappeared and "[t]ons
7
have been lost." 9
Richard Clark rings the tocsin of impending doom in his fast-paced
study of technological terrorism. His horrifying scenarios are constructed
on a grand scale and serve to warn that if terrorists "can control a nuclear
energy plant, or even a railroad train carrying nuclear wastes, they can
hold whole cities and countries for ransom."80 If that is not enough to
worry about, Clark quotes a Harvard University physicist as saying that
high-powered lasers might also be adapted as a terrorist weapon, in addition to being utilized for a uranium separation into weapons-grade plutonium. 81 Clark is particularly harsh on government bookkeeping controls,
and he is especially critical of the "losses" at the Apollo, Pennsylvania
nuclear facility.8s "Given the materials and about six months time, a
skilled group of five or six people could develop an atomic bomb of crude
,,s3 Radioactive materials alone would be
design that might work ....

74. Schelling, supra note 37, at 76-77.
75. Ausness, supra note 57, at 69-72.
76. Ferencz, When One Person's Terrorism is Another Person's Heroism, 9 Hum. RTs.
38, 42 (1981).
77. A. NORrON & M. GREENERG, supra note 54, at 11.
78. 0. DEmARis, supra note 50, at 389. Norton & Ben-Gal, Terror by Fission:An Analysis and Critique, 27 CHrrrv's L.J. 268, 271 (1979) scientifically rates the MIT students' ef-

forts as "a qualified success" at best and indicates there would be serious difficulties in
translating the design into an actual weapon.
79. 0. Dzw ius, supra note 50, at 392. See CLARK, supra note 28, at 66-77. The government security group responsible for determining the credibility of a nuclear terrorist threat
is the Nuclear Emer-Search Team (NEST). For a description of its functions and activities,
see Collins, Combatting Nuclear Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1980 (Magazine), at 38.

80. R. CLARK, supra note 28, at 190. In 1974, radioactive pharmaceuticals were actually
dispersed on Austrian passenger trains. Brown, supra note 35, at 161.
81. R. CLARK, supra note 28, at 42.
82. Id.
83. Norton, The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, in NATiONAL DEFENSE, Oct. 1980, at 44,
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enough to poison the water supply of a major city with disastrous
consequences.
Yet, "[tlo many experts the prospect of biological terrorism is the
most frightening of all."'" Toxic biological and chemical substances can
be manufactured inexpensively, with comparative ease and ready asportation, and can be utilized with deadly effectiveness. The technology for
biological and chemical terrorism already exists, and it is impossible to
defend against them for any successful length of time, let alone to detect
these substances before they are unleashed.8s For those critics, such as
the CIA,8 6 the BDM Corporation,'8 and security expert Robert Mullen,s
who do not believe that nuclear terrorism currently presents a credible
threat, Clark's sometimes breathless treatment of technological terrorism
posits an ominous alternative.
What becomes frighteningly clear, from these studies and others like
them, is that the world community is on a collision course with scientific
catastrophe if stronger means are not developed to contain and control
terrorist actors. To say that all peoples are equally secure in their mutual
insecurity is to avoid the issue. To say that there are some weapons which
no sane or rational individual would ever let loose upon humankind is to
shun reality.
When historian Theodore White writes of "a world of new states led
significantly by madmen and resentful puppets of bizarre historical background,"'" he also indicates the darkening shadows of barbarism drawing
ever closer to the center of civilized nations. Perhaps philosopher JohnPaul Sartre in his play, The Condemned of Altona, discerned the real
monster at the gates: "The [twentieth] century would have been good if
only man hadn't been watched over by his cruel, timeless enemy, the carnivorous species which had sworn to destroy him, the hairless evil animal,
"90
man ....
We have already seen a vision of the demon which would destroy
us-it comes from within ourselves.

84. R.

CLARK,

supra note 28, at 137. See R. KUPPERiAN & D. TRENT, supra note 28, at

66, 68.
85. Norton, Nuclear Terrorism and the Middle East, in STUDIES, supra note 64, at 278,
287.
86. Brown, supra note 35, at 160.
87. Id. at 158.
88. Mullen, Subnational Threats to Civil Nuclear Facilitiesand Safeguards Institutions, in RESPONDING TO THE TERRORIST THREAT. SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 134,
166-67 (R. Schultz, Jr. & S. Sloan eds. 1980).
89. Quoted in Sherril, America in Search of Itself, N.Y. TnMEs BOOK REviEw, MAY 9,
1982, at 27.
90. Quoted in Wilbur, Book Review, 29 PARTISAN REV. 603, 606 (1962).
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Resolving Conflicts with Foreign
Nondisclosure Laws:
An Analysis of the Vetco Case
DAVID

K. PANSIUS

*

The conflict between U.S. discovery rules and foreign nondisclosure
laws is, and has been, one of the most perplexing issues for U.S. courts.1
The court must consider, on the one hand, the need for a strong policy in
favor of discovery procedures. 2 This need is perhaps greatest in the international setting where witnesses and documents are beyond the easy
reach of the adversary who seeks discovery. On the other hand, the court
subconsciously, if not consciously, recognizes that it is a denial of due
process to impose penalties on a litigant for failing to produce documents
which another nation genuinely and legitimately forbids him to disclose.'
The seemingly insoluble nature of the dilemma begs for some kind of
structured analysis that will guide the court in reaching a fair and equitable resolution of the discovery conflict. The need for a more ordered form
of analyzing the conflict with foreign nondisclosure laws is highlighted by
* David K. Pansius practices law in San Jose, California. B.A., University of North
Carolina, 1969; M.A., University of North Carolina, 1973; J.D., University of Denver, 1978;
L.L.M., New York University, 1979; Member, California and Colorado Bars.
1. The issue has been the subject of a number of provocative commentaries. See, e.g.,
Onkelinx, Conflict of InternationalJurisdiction:Ordering the Productionof Documents in
Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 487 (1969); Note, Limitations on the
Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1441
(1963); Note, OrderingProductionof Documents From Abroad Contrary to Foreign Law, 31
U. CHi. L. REv. 791 (1964); Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation:Recent Developments in the Law Concerning ForeignIllegality Excuse for
Nonproduction,14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1969); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the
Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1033 (1978).
3. In Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 210 (1958), the Court stated that the striking of a complaint due to
plaintiff's legal inability to comply with a production order provoked "substantial constitutional questions." However, where constitutional objections were made as one of the major
defenses against enforcement of a grand jury subpoena contrary to foreign law, these objections were rejected. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the recent Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Vetco, Inc.4 There
is little doubt that the Ninth Circuit was correct to enforce an Internal
Revenue Service subpoena of documents allegedly barred from disclosure
by Swiss law. However, by employing the wrong reasoning in reaching the
decision, substantial confusion may be created in the future if the same
general issue is relitigated, but with different facts.
I.

THE SUBPOENA IN

Vetco

Vetco is a U.S. corporation which manufactures offshore drilling
equipment. Vetco International, A.G. (VIAG) is a wholly owned Swiss
subsidiary of Vetco which sold Vetco's product. If the product were
shipped to and sold directly to VIAG by Vetco, then Vetco would suffer
substantial additional tax liability due to the creation of Subpart F income.' To avoid this result, Vetco shipped the product to two other Swiss
companies: Wiedex, A.G. and Zanora, A.G. 6
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) argued that the interposition of
these two intermediary companies was but a subterfuge for avoiding the
taxing rules of Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, and that the two
companies should be ignored for serving no business purpose. In order to
prove its contention, the IRS subpoenaed certain business records of
Vetco located in Switzerland, and it also subpoenaed certain records of
the Swiss office of Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells (DH&S), one of Vetco's accountants. Vetco refused to comply with the subpoena and ordered
DH&S to refuse to comply as well.7
The basis for Vetco's refusal to comply with the subpoena was Swiss
nondisclosure law. Vetco alleged that to reveal the documents in question
would be a violation of article 273 of the Swiss Penal code.' That provision, as it was quoted in Vetco, provided in part:
Whoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to
a foreign governmental agency or a foreign organization or private enterprise or to an agent of any of them; shall be subject to imprison4. 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981).
5. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(A) & (d)(1)(1954 & Supp. 1981). Subpart F income is certain income of a foreign corporation controlled by certain U.S. persons which is imputed back to
the U.S. shareholder regardless of whether the foreign corporation has made any distribu-

tions to the U.S. shareholder. How and to what extent these rules apply is perhaps one of
the most complex portions of the Internal Revenue Code. A number of articles, books and
treatises analyze these provisions. An appropriate source for aid in understanding these
rules is R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, INCoMz TAXATiON OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS
(1981). The general purpose of the Subpart F rules is to minimize the use of foreign corporations in low-tax jurisdictions for the principal purpose of tax avoidance.
6. Income earned from the sale of products purchased from these independent Swiss
companies would not be Subpart F income and would therefore create no immediate adverse tax consequences to Vetco.
7. 644 F.2d at 1327.
8. Id. at 1329; Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (STGB); Code p6nal suisse (C.P.);
Codice penale svizzero (COD. P9N.), art. 273.
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ment and in grave cases to imprisonment in a penitentiary. The imprisonment may be combined with a fine."
Swiss law defined the term "business secret" to include "all facts of Swiss
life to the extent that there are interests worthy of protection in keeping
them confidential." 10
The crux of the Ninth Circuit's decision to enforce the subpoena despite Swiss law is based upon a reliance on the balancing test. Like a
number of courts before it, Vetco applied the rules of sections 39 and 40
of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Foreign Relations. Section
39(1) of the Restatement provides that "A state having jurisdiction to
prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not precluded from exercising its
jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in
conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having
jurisdiction with respect to that conduct.""1
The U.S. courts have the international jurisdiction to enforce discovery procedures in matters over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction where the person against whom discovery is sought is under the
personal jurisdiction of the court, and that person has control over the
documents or data which are being sought by the court.' On the other
hand, a foreign government has enforcement jurisdiction to bar release of
documents or data located within the territorial jurisdiction of that government.' 8 When the IRS sought documents from Vetco which allegedly
could not be released under Swiss law, the conflict in enforcement jurisdiction described in section 39 of the Restatement becomes applicable.
Section 39(2) of the Restatement directs inquiry to section 40 of the
Restatement for factors to consider in minimizing the conflict in enforcement jurisdiction. Section 40 sets forth a general rule of international
comity and then amplifies that with five factors to evaluate:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules
of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,

9. 644 F.2d at 1329.
10. Id. See also Swiss Federal Attorney v. A., 98 BG IV 209 (Sept. 7, 1972).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 39
(1965).
12. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (N.D. IMI.1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). See also SEC v. Minasde Artemisa,
S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
13.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

17

(1965); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
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(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed
by that state."'
The Vetco court did a most admirable job in attempting to fit the
facts of the Vetco case into the framework of the factors of the Restatement. With respect to national interests, the court noted the strong U.S.
interest in collecting taxes; the court also noted the interest of the Swiss
Government in preserving the secrecy of business documents."6 The court
found, however, that the interest of U.S. law was superior. First, the court
noted that the persons from whom documents were sought are subsidiaries of U.S. companies, not Swiss parent companies. Second, the court
noted that the penalties of the law are not imposed where the information concerned involves only private interests, and the party whose business secret is being divulged consents to the disclosure. Presumably,
Vetco could have consented to the disclosure or could have otherwise obtained the necessary consents. The court also noted that the IRS is under
a duty to keep information confidential and therefore no real "disclosure"
is occurring." With respect to hardship, the court expressed serious
doubts whether Vetco would suffer any penalties under Swiss law for disclosing the information in question. 7 The court concluded as well that
interests of nationality and location did not weigh in favor of the Swiss
law.'" Also to be considered was the importance of the documents to the
IRS investigation. 1 '
Finally, the court considered the availability of alternate means of
compliance. A tax treaty was then, and is now, in force between the
United States and Switzerland.2 0 This treaty provides for mechanisms
whereby the two Governments can exchange information relevant to tax
investigations. The treaty would seem to provide a reasonably efficient
means for the IRS to obtain its information without having to resort to
enforcing a subpoena in alleged violation of Swiss law.
However, the court noted that in the Swiss-U.S. treaty, Switzerland
reserved the right not to disclose business secrets.2 1 The court also stated
that the Swiss were notoriously reluctant to assist U.S. authorities in the

14. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

(1965).
15.
16.
17.
18.

OF FOBMGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES

§ 40

644 F.2d at 1331.
Id.
Id. at 1331-32.
Id. at 1332.

19. Id.
20. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Sept. 27,
1951, United States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751; T.I.A.S. No. 2316, art. XVI [hereinafter
cited as Income Tax Convention].
21. 644 F.2d at 1333.
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investigation of tax fraud cases.' 2 Therefore, the court ruled that the
treaty provided an inadequate alternative means for obtaining the documents2 8 Other alternative means of discovery were likewise rejected as
impractical." By applying the factors of Restatement section 40, the
court concluded that it was appropriate for the court to impose sanctions
on Vetco for failing to comply with the IRS subpoena. Having balanced
the relevant factors in view of the interests
of comity, the U.S. interest in
25

enforcing the subpoena proved superior.

Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit reached the correct result but for
the wrong reason. There was no need to employ a balancing test as there
was never any showing by Vetco that a conflict with Swiss law existed.
Moreover, where there is a genuine conflict between U.S. discovery procedures and foreign nondisclosure laws, the so-called balancing test of Restatement section 40 is, in most instances, ill-equipped to resolve the conflict. Additionally, by analyzing the case as if a conflict of law existed, the
Ninth Circuit made the strong implication that the provisions of existing
treaties are not the exclusive means for obtaining discovery. The Ninth
Circuit implied that the IRS can go beyond treaty procedures even when
to do so would require the person subject to discovery to violate the law
of the foreign state which signed the treaty. Under the balancing test, a
treaty must be considered whenever a genuine conflict of law takes place.
II.

THE RULES OF Societ.

Before any kind of balancing need take place, a determination must
first be made whether a genuine conflict of law exists. The rules developed by the United States Supreme Court in Soci~t6 Internationalepour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers's are
designed to force the party subject to discovery to determine if a genuine

22. Id. The complaint of the Vetco court concerning the lack of Swiss cooperation in
tax investigations is perhaps exaggerated. The court cites X & Y Bank v. Swiss Fed. Tax
Admin., 76-1 U.S.T.C. 9452 (Swiss Fed. Sup. Ct., May 16, 1975). In that case the IRS had
requested information concerning the dealings of a certain American citizen with a Swiss
bank. The Swiss Federal Tax Administration conducted an investigation and summarized
its results in an official report that was transmitted to the IRS. The IRS, however, considered the official report to be inadequate as evidence in U.S. courts and requested certified
originals of the documents in question. The Swiss Supreme Court ruled that the IRS request should be rejected. The obligations of the Swiss Government under the treaty were to
supply information, not to provide legal assistance in the prosecution of foreign tax fraud
cases.

Perhaps the Swiss Supreme Court's decision evidences a reluctance to prosecute foreign tax fraud cases. However, the court only ruled that original documents would not be
provided. The information desired by the IRS had been provided pursuant to the terms of
the treaty. See X v. The Fed. Tax Admin., 711 U.S.T.C. 9435 (Swiss Fed. Sup. Ct., Dec. 23,
1970).
23. 644 F.2d at 1333.
24. Id. at 1332-33.
25. Id. at 1333.
26. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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conflict with foreign law exists.27 If the burdened party makes a good
faith effort to comply with the discovery order, and yet is still barred by
foreign law, the approach of the courts seems to have been to engage in a
balancing of necessity. However, it is the rare case which reveals a genuine conflict with foreign law. In most instances the conflict, if any, is superficial, and can be resolved if the party subject to discovery makes reasonable efforts to obtain permission to disclose the documents in
question.
The situation posed in Soci&t presents the dilemma of what to do
where foreign nondisclosure law is in direct conflict with a U.S. discovery
order. The plaintiff in Soci~tk brought suit to recover assets confiscated
by the U.S. Government pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act2 8
that was imposed during World War II. The issue was whether a Swiss
holding company, Chemie, was so intimately connected with German interests that the U.S. Government had the right to confiscate assets owned
by it in the United States."'
The United States sought discovery in Switzerland of certain banking records that the United States thought would prove the German affiliation of Chemie. Chemie sought to comply, but many of the records were
"confiscated" by Swiss authorities. The Swiss Government ordered that
these documents could not be delivered to the U.S. courts. Because of the
plaintiff's consequent inability to comply with the court's discovery order,
the district court ordered that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.3 0
The Supreme Court reversed the district court and the court of appeals which had affirmed.81 Where Chemie was legally unable to comply
with the production order, dismissal of its suit was inappropriate. If sanctions were to be imposed, lesser sanctions had to be chosen. 2 In so concluding, Socigtg developed a two-part rule. The first rule is that the mere
existence of foreign nondisclosure laws does not preclude the issuance of
a discovery order by the court.3 It might seem that this rule provides the

27. See, e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C.
1952).
28. 357 U.S. 198 (1958); Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1941), amended
by 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (Supp. 1981).
29. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953).
30. Id. at 437-38.
31. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
32. 357 U.S. at 212-13.
33. Id. at 204-05; 644 F.2d at 1329-30. "Sociftk implies that consideration of foreign law
problems in a discovery context is required in dealing with sanctions to be imposed for
disobedience and not in deciding whether the discovery order should issue." Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1976).
Once personal jurisdiction over the person and control over the documents by
the person are present, a U.S. court has the power to order production of the
documents. The existence of a conflicting foreign law which prohibits the disclosure of the requested documents does not prevent the exercise of this power.
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district courts with a carte blanche to ignore the consequences of foreign
law in issuing discovery orders. However, such is not the case. It should
always be remembered that the court in Socitg ruled in favor of the burdened party subject to the foreign nondisclosure law. The result in Socit limits the powers of the court regarding discovery in conflict with
foreign nondisclosure laws. The purpose of the rule stating that no foreign nondisclosure law will preclude the issuance of a discovery order is to
shift the burden of proof. By permitting the discovery order to issue, a
duty has been placed on the burdened party to determine if a genuine
4
conflict of law exists.3

The second rule of Soci~tg is that if a burdened party makes a good
faith effort to comply with the order and to eliminate or minimize conflict
with foreign law, yet the foreign government still forbids compliance with
the discovery order, then the burdened party will not be unduly penalized
for his noncompliance."
It might, perhaps, be instructive to compare the efforts at compliance
made by Chemie, the burdened party, in Sociktk with the efforts at compliance made by Vetco. In Sociktk, Swiss authorities seized the documents in question and barred their production, although physical possession of the documents remained with Chemie. In order to ascertain
whether or not Chemie made a good faith effort to comply with the production order, the court appointed a Special Master. That Special Master
made the following findings: (1) Chemie had indeed made a good faith

In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1133, 1145 (N.D. I. 1979). See also In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977).
34. In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), the appellate
court ruled that the lower court could properly issue an order of discovery despite contrary
foreign law. The court also noted that, if a violation of Swiss public policy is claimed, it is
up to the burdened party t bring forward evidence that the Swiss Government objects to
these specific disclosures. Id. at 342. Ultimately the court of appeals determined that the
alleged conflict with Swiss law was more imaginary than real. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978).
Earlier cases which suggested that discovery orders could not issue contrary to foreign
law are no longer followed in this regard. Compare United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324
(9th Cir. 1981) (courts must balance competing interests in determining whether foreign
illegality ought to preclude enforcement of an IRS summons.); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (once personal jurisdiction over the person and control over the documents by the person are present, a U.S. court has power to order production of the documents.); and Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 388 (10th Cir.
1976) (the court could properly issue an order of discovery despite contrary foreign law
when alleged conflict is more imaginary than real.) with Application of Chase Manhattan
Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1961) (where compliance with subpoena duces tecurn is shown
to violate foreign law, the court could modify the subpoena, leaving it outstanding to insure
that the bank would continue to cooperate with the government, if the government asked
the foreign government to authorize production of the document.) and Ings v. Ferguson, 282
F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1960) (process of courts of any sovereign state cannot cross international boundary lines and be enforced in a foreign country.).
35. 357 U.S. at 210-13; In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563
F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
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effort at compliance; (2) there was no evidence of collusion between
Chemie and the Swiss Government; (3) Chemie's officers did their best to
obtain Swiss approval for releasing the documents; (4) there was a substantial legal basis under Swiss law for the seizure of the documents by
the Swiss Government; and (5) obtaining waivers would not have procured the release of the documents. The report of the Master was accepted by the district court.3e
In ruling that sanctions would not be imposed for failing to comply
with the discovery order, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Special
Master's findings.3 7 The Court also noted Chemie's successful efforts to
obtain the release of some documents, and its unsuccessful efforts to obtain waivers permitting release of other documents.ss Chemie also ob*tained Swiss approval of a plan whereby, through the use of a neutral
expert, certain relevant documents would be identified and released to
the Court.3 9 Because of the extensive efforts made at compliance, the dismissal of plaintiff's action for failure to comply with the discovery order
was an improper exercise of the court's powers under Rule 37.40 Although

the Court left open the door for the imposition of less stringent sanctions,
the strong implication of the Court's decision is that no sanctions should
be imposed, aside from drawing inferences unfavorable to plaintiffs."
In Vetco the Swiss Government made no effort to seize the documents as it did in Socigtg.42 There was no indication that Vetco sought a

waiver from the Swiss Government for the production of the documents. 43
There were, moreover, substantial indications that to release the documents would not be a violation of Swiss law.44 Finally, the alleged limitation of Swiss law was entirely avoidable by Vetco. 4' The Internal Revenue

Code required Vetco to maintain, in the United States, records regarding
its controlled foreign corporations. 4" Had Vetco done so, there would have
been little or no need to obtain records from Switzerland. Vetco gave
every indication that it actively sought to use Swiss law as a shield
against IRS inquiry. Although there is no published court record to ex36. 111 F. Supp. at 439-40.
37. 357 U.S. at 201.
38. Id. at 202.
39. Id. at 203.
40. Id. at 212.
41. Id. at 213.
42. "In Socikt6 the Swiss Government enjoined the plaintiff from complying with the
summons. There has been no comparable action taken by the Swiss government in this case,
even though the letters and affidavits filed reveal that the Swiss are not unaware of these
proceedings." 644 F.2d at 1330.
43. "We have no finding that appellants have made good faith efforts to comply with
the summonses." 644 F.2d at 1330. "By contrast, the district court stated at a hearing on
April 1, 1980 that the appellants were conducting 'one of the greatest delaying actions of my
recent memory.'" 644 F.2d at 1330 n.6.
44. 644 F.2d at 1330 n.7, 1332, and accompanying text.
45. I.R.C. § 964(c) (1954); Tress. Reg. § 1.9643 (1978).
46. 644 F.2d at 1332.
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amine, the facts at hand indicate that Vetco did not make a good faith
effort to comply with the discovery order, and since it was entirely unclear whether a true violation of Swiss nondisclosure law was at issue, it
was entirely proper to impose
sanctions on Vetco for its noncompliance
47
with the discovery order.

In such circumstances it was inappropriate for the Ninth Circuit to
apply a balancing test as if a conflict of law existed. If, because of the
district court's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
circuit court did not feel competent to conclude that no violation of Swiss
law was at issue, 48 the proper course for the court would have been to
remand to the district court for such findings. The Vetco decision illustrates an overreliance on the balancing test by the courts, the effect of
which is to create unnecessary confusion regarding the state of the law.
III.

THE LIMITATION OF THE BALANCING TEST

The balancing test of Restatement section 40 has a useful, but lim-

ited, role in resolving the discovery versus nondisclosure conflict. The first
rule is that a production order should issue whenever the information
sought is relevant to the suit. The effect of the production order is to
force the burdened party to make a good faith effort at compliance. This
production will reveal where genuine conflicts of law exist. Only after a
burdened party's good faith efforts have failed to produce the requested
documents is it appropriate to apply the balancing test. The balancing
test is used to determine if equivalent policy interests are at stake. If the
public policy of one government is not counterbalanced by a competing
public policy of the other government, section 40 can resolve the conflict.
If, however, the public policy of one government dictates disclosure,
and the public policy of the other government dictates nondisclosure, the
balancing test is incapable of providing a solution since equivalent interests are at stake. In such a case the court assesses the importance of the
information. If the information is necessary to the prosecution of the
case, the court applies the law of the forum and imposes severe sanctions
for noncompliance with the discovery order. If, however, the information
sought is not of critical importance, then the court is obliged to moderate
its sanctions accordingly.
The limits of the balancing test are aptly, illustrated in the Illinois
district court decision in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation." The court
in Uranium considered only the preliminary question of whether a discovery order could issue against certain defendants for documents which
were barred from production by foreign nondisclosure laws. The case had
not yet reached the stage where the court had to decide what sanction to
47. Ohio v. Finesilver, 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978).

48. The Ninth Circuit felt constrained to characterize the validity of the contempt
sanctions as a question of law rather than as a question of fact. 644 F.2d at 1327-28.
49. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. IMI.1979).
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impose, if any, in the event of noncompliance.
Following the rule in Socigtg, there would be little doubt that the
discovery order would issue, and indeed the Uranium court so ruled.
However, unlike the situation in Sociktk, the court was not faced with a
discovery order in conflict with a nation's general policy of secrecy, but
rather the court faced nondisclosure laws that were drafted for the specific purpose of thwarting the litigation in question. Westinghouse, obligated to supply uranium at fixed prices to certain customers, had sued a
number of uranium producers, arguing that an international cartel had
been formed to fix the price of uranium. In order to protect their valuable
uranium natural resource, a number of countries passed laws forbidding
the disclosure of documents related to the industry. The principal impact
of such laws was to severely restrict the ability of plaintiffs, such as Westinghouse, to obtain the data necessary to prove their cases. 50 Unlike Socigtg, the conflict with foreign law did not have to be sharpened by requiring the burdened party to attempt good faith compliance. In
Uranium the conflict was obvious. The defendants who sought to avoid
discovery orders argued that no such orders could issue as it would require action contrary to foreign law. The defendants argued that, under
the rules of comity expressed in section 40 of the Restatement, deference
had to be given to the foreign nondisclosure rules.5'
The Uranium court refused to balance the relative interests of the
United States and the foreign governments. In fact, the Uranium court
concluded that the balancing test was impossible to apply as "the competing interests . . . display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the
same plane of national policy."52 On the one hand, Westinghouse sought
to enforce long established U.S. antitrust policy by requesting the documents at issue. On the other hand, certain foreign governments consciously sought to negate such legislation by prohibiting the disclosure of
those very same documents. The court concluded that "it is simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally contradictory and mutually
negating actions." 58
Uranium sets forth the principle that once a genuine conflict with
foreign law has been identified, use of the balancing test is often impractical. Who is to say which nation's law has a superior interest over another nation's law? It is an accepted principle of international law that
the sovereign rights of nations vis-a-vis each other are equal.5 4 No nation
has more rights under international law than another. If one nation exercises its right to make public policy and directs that documents be dis-

50. Id. at 1148. See Judge Doyle's dissent in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 1000 (10th Cir. 1977).
51. 480 F. Supp. at 1148.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Sovereigns of nations are equal and their independence is absolute. The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
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closed, while another nation exercises its public policy and directs that
the same documents be kept hidden, and each nation has jurisdiction to
enforce its order, how can any true balancing take place?
IV.

THE "BALANCING"

OF NECESSITY

Although it appears on the surface that the balancing test is widely
employed, in actual practice what occurs is an evaluation of necessity. If
the discovery sought is necessary to enforce a public law of the United
States, and the party burdened is properly before the court, then discovery is enforced. The court in essence applies the law of the forum whenever the relative interests of the two sovereigns are in balance and the
documents are truly needed. 55 If, however, it is determined that the prosecution of the U.S. action can reasonably proceed without the requested
documents, then sanctions for failure to comply with the discovery order
are moderated, if not eliminated altogether. The necessity of the information will dictate the sanctions to be imposed.
Sociktg is once again an instructive example for analysis. The Supreme Court made particular mention that the plaintiff in Socigtk would
not profit by reason of his failure to comply with discovery. In that suit
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish the true ownership
of the stock at issue. The plaintiff's inability to produce certain ownership records would only tend to cast doubt upon the true ownership of
the stock and jeopardize his case. Indeed, the Court noted that it was
perhaps appropriate to make inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff because of its failure to procure the documents.55 However, any sanction to
be imposed had to be moderated to fit the information at issue. The unavailable documents were not essential to the prosecution of the case, and
therefore it was improper to dismisss the plaintiff's action because of his
legal inability to comply with the U.S. court's discovery order. In remand-

55. Procedures of the law of the forum customarily govern law suits. Neutrals as
well as citizens of the United States must meet the requirements of these procedures. It seems obvious that foreign law cannot be permitted to obstruct the

investigation and discovery of facts in a case, under rules established as conducive to the power and orderly administration of justice in a court of the United
States. Even if a foreign government were itself a party, it must conform to the
law of the forum and make discovery upon order of the court.
Soci~th Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953).

In Ghana Supply Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 83 F.R.D. 586, 589 n.3 (D. Mass.
1979), the court applied the discovery rules of the forum to require a plaintiff of Ghana, an
agency of the Ghanaian Government, to produce documents and testimony contrary to
Ghanaian law. The information sought by the defendant was essential to its defense. The
court applied the law of the forum and required that Ghana comply with discovery. In so
doing the court noted that, as plaintiff, the Government of Ghana had a choice: either make
an exception from its own nondisclosure law, or withdraw its suit. See generally Gillies v.
Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 468 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1972); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws
and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 614-15 (1979).
56. 357 U.S. at 213.
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ing, the Supreme Court granted the district court wide discretion in
resolving the case, taking into consideration genuine conflicts with Swiss
57
nondisclosure law.
In reaching its decision in Socigtk, the Supreme Court did not engage
in a balancing test of relative interests, nor did the Court suggest that a
balancing test should take place. It did, however, mention that different
58
facts and circumstances may require the balancing test to be employed.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Proceedings59 illustrates the fact that the balancing test can at times be but a mask for the
application of the rule of necessity. Anthony R. Field was the managing
director of Castle Bank and Trust Company in the Cayman Islands.
While in the lobby of the Miami International Airport he was subpoenaed
to appear before a federal grand jury investigating criminal violations of
U.S. tax law.
Field objected to testifying, based in part on his argument that any
testimony he would give would violate the bank secrecy laws of the Cayman Islands. ° Field submitted an affidavit by an expert on Cayman Islands law which stated that Field would be subject to criminal prosecution in the Cayman Islands, with penalties including imprisonment, if he
testified before the grand jury. The Government did not dispute this
claim. Therefore, for the purpose of the evidence presented to the court, a
clear conflict between U.S. and Cayman Islands law was presented."'
After rejecting Field's contention that his testimony was protected by
his Fifth Amendment rights,6 2 the court addressed the conflict of law
question. The Fifth Circuit duly applied the "balancing" test required by
the Restatement. The court examined first and foremost the relative interests of the countries involved. On the one hand, the United States had
an interest in enforcing its tax laws, while on the other hand, the Cayman
Islands had an interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens.
In balancing these interests the court found that the U.S. interest in
enforcing its tax law was superior. The court noted that, under the law of
the Cayman Islands, 3 the information which Field could not reveal to
foreign authorities could be obtained by certain officials of the Cayman
Islands Government. Since the information could have been revealed, it
was not really "secret." The court reasoned: "Since the general rule appears to be that for domestic investigations such information would be
obtainable, we find it difficult to understand how the bank's customers'
57. Id.
58. Id. at 205-06.
59. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976).
60. Id. at 460.
61. The circuit court quoted a statement by the district court predicting that Mr. Field
would be exposed to criminal charges in the Cayman Islands by reason of his testimony
before the U.S. grand jury. 532 F.2d at 406.
62. 532 F.2d at 406-07.
63. Id. at 409.
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rights of privacy would be significantly infringed simply because the investigating body is a foreign tribunal.""
In this fashion the Fifth Circuit conveniently contorted the facts so
that it could apply the balancing test and have the U.S. interest emerge
as superior. When the government's interest in pursuing criminal violations of the tax laws is weighed against bank customers' interests in having information revealed only to Cayman Islands authorities and not to
the federal grand jury, it would certainly seem that section 40 of the Restatement would require the court to enforce the grand jury subpoena.
However, the purpose of the Cayman Islands law is not merely to
provide bank secrecy. The Cayman Islands is a widely publicized and notorious tax haven.6" Only the most naive observer would believe that the
purpose of the secrecy law was anything other than an effort by the Cayman Islands Government to limit the ability of foreign governments to
impose taxes on assets located in the Cayman Islands. On the one hand,
the United States has established a public policy of taxing its citizens and
residents on their worldwide income." The Cayman Islands has a policy
that assets located in its country should not be taxed by foreign governments. To enforce its policy, the Cayman Islands has established laws
which effectively prohibit Cayman Islands banks from assisting foreign
67
taxing authorities.
The situation in Grand Jury Proceedings is directly analogous to the
situation in Uranium where U.S. policy requires discovery, and, as a policy decision, the foreign government determines that such discovery
should not take place. In such cirumstances, "totally contradictory and
mutually negating" 6 commandments are involved. As each government
has exercised its sovereign jurisdiction to effect contradictory results,
there is no room for balancing. Rather, the question is: Does the U.S.
court need the information so badly that it is willing to exercise its power
over the person burdened with the discovery order and enforce discovery
in repudiation of valid foreign law to the contrary? The fact is that the

64. Id.
65. See generally 1 W. DIAMoND & D. DuIoAND, TAx HAvNs OF THE WORLD (updated
continuously). Sanctions should be limited to fit the needs of the court. Principles of comity
require that the foreign law be recognized except in those instances where it is necessary to
employ the contrary law of the forum in order to uphold the interests of the forum. Comity
principles can be ignored, but only in cases of necessity.

Although more than mere courtesy and accomodation, comity does not achieve
the force of an imperative or an obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression
of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to international duty
own laws. Comity
and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its
should be withheld only when itsacceptance would be contrary or prejudicial
to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect.
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Id.
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subpoena was enforced as a matter of necessity. Without the testimony of
an official such as Field, it would have been virtually impossible for the
grand jury to obtain certain information regarding transactions in the
Cayman Islands. Without that information it would have been extremely
difficult for the grand jury to make informed conclusions.6 '
The importance of the necessity of the information to the U.S. proceeding is further highlighted by another of the uranium litigation cases.
In In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation,70 the Tenth Circuit faced, at the sanctions stage, the same conflict of
law addressed by the Illinois district court in Uranium at the stage where
it issued its discovery order. As directed by the rule of Socit6, the Tenth
Circuit properly assessed the good faith efforts of the burdened party to
comply with discovery orders. The court noted a decision of the Supreme
Court of Ontario which forbade the disclosure of the business records of
the Rio Algom Corporation.7' The Rio Algom Corporation was incorporated in Delaware, and operated a uranium mine and maintained its corporate offices in Canada. The court mentioned the efforts of Rio Algom to
obtain the permission of the Canadian Government for the release of the
documents requested. The court also cited Rio Algom's diligent efforts to
produce documents and materials that were not subject to the restriction
of Canadian nondisclosure laws. 72 The Tenth Circuit concluded that Rio
Algom had made a good faith effort at compliance with the discovery or78
der under the general principles set forth in Socitt.
Having therefore determined that a genuine conflict of law existed,
the court proceeded to apply the "balancing" test. To reach the conclusion it desired, the court downplayed the U.S. interest involved. Whereas
the Uranium court described U.S. antitrust policies as of primary importance, 74 the Tenth Circuit chose to describe the case as an ordinary suit
by a private litigant.7 5 When the interest of the private litigant was balanced against an official opinion of the Supreme Court of Ontario which
barred discovery, the interest favoring nondisclosure prevailed.7
Uranium indicates however, that a balancing test does not work well

69. "To defer to the law of the Cayman Islands and refuse to require Mr. Field to
testify would significantly restrict the essential means that the grand jury has of evaluating
whether to bring an indictment." 532 F.2d at 408.

70. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
71. Id at 995. See Re: Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d

273 (1977).
72. 563 F.2d at 996.
73. Id.
74. 480 F.2d at 1148. Indicative of the importance of the antitrust laws to U.S. public
policy is the eagerness with which they are applied extraterritorially. See, e.g., THE LAw OF
TRANSNATIONAL Busnam TRANSACTIONS § 10.04 (V. Nanda ed. 1981).
75. Rather than describing the interest as the enforcement of the U.S. antitrust law, the
court described the interest at stake as the private litigant's desire for adequate discovery.

563 F.2d at 999.
76. Id.
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when the public policies of two nations are in direct conflict. Judge Doyle
in his dissent in Westinghouse applied the balancing test to virtually the
same facts and concluded that Rio Algom should not be relieved of the
penalties imposed by the district court for noncompliance with the discovery order. 7 7 By weighing the importance of one interest against another, a court can reasonably reach almost any conclusion it desires. As
any interest ultimately can be cloaked with national policy, the court is
free to make any interest emerge victorious merely by the description it
puts on the interests involved.
Nonetheless, the majority in Westinghouse probably reached the correct result-but not by applying the balancing test of Restatement section 40. Westinghouse did not rule that Canadian interests in nondisclosure took precedence over U.S. antitrust laws.7 8 Rather, Westinghouse
weighed the need for the information against the prohibitive foreign law
and concluded that the information sought was really not that important.
In its brief analysis of the factors to be balanced, the court made the
following important comment:
We do note that Westinghouse's defense in the ... litigation does
not stand or fall on the present discovery order. Westinghouse has
deposed the officers of various other uranium companies, and the present discovery, though admittedly of potential significance, is still in a
sense cumulative. We are not here concerned with any grand jury
in7
vestigation, or the enforcement, as such, of the antitrust laws. '
Westinghouse's suit was to prove a restraint of trade in regard to
uranium production and sales. Westinghouse was not trying to prove,
necessarily, that Rio Algom committed a criminal violation of the antitrust law. As Westinghouse was successful in obtaining information from
a number of other sources regarding the alleged uranium cartel, the court
determined that the information sought from Rio Algom was not really
essential to Westinghouse's case. Because the information was "cumulative," the court chose to defer to the Canadian nondisclosure law.80
Future litigants seeking information barred from disclosure by foreign law should take heed of the result in Westinghouse. Westinghouse
lost its claim for discovery not so much because the foreign interest
proved superior to its own, but because it failed to convince the court
that the information sought was essential to the prosecution of its action.
If Westinghouse had successfully convinced the court that the information sought was critical in proving its allegations regarding the cartel, per-

77. Id. at 1003. (Doyle, J., dissenting).
78. So long as there is a violation of the antitrust laws it should be irrelevant if the law
is sought to be enforced by a private litigant or by the Department of Justice. In fact the
antitrust law provides for treble damages so as to encourage the private litigant to enforce
the public policy contained in the antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970 & Supp. IV 1981).

79. 563 F.2d at 999.
80. Id.
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haps the result in Westinghouse would have been different. 81
It would be wise for the litigant to emphasize the importance of the
information even before the discovery order issues. In Trade Development Bank v. Continental Insurance Co.,"' the Second Circuit ruled that
it was proper for the district court to defer to foreign law and refuse to
order the disclosure of the customers of a Swiss bank, an act that would
have been contrary to the Bank Secrecy Act of Switzerland. 83 The district
court had determined that the information sought was of only marginal
relevance and unnecessary to the proceeding." Based upon this finding, it
was proper for the district court to exercise its discretion in favor of the
foreign law."
The defendant insurance company complained that the district court
should have at least required the Swiss bank to make a good faith effort
to obtain waivers of the Swiss secrecy law. The circuit court determined
that, although it would have been proper for the district court to require
the bank to seek waivers, the district court was not obligated to do so,
particularly when the defendant failed to request that the court make
such an order." Again, the party seeking discovery bears the burden of
demonstrating to the court that the information sought is of sufficient
importance to justify interference with the foreign nondisclosure law.
By recognizing that the factors outlined in section 40 of the Restatement are for the most part inadequate for deciding discovery versus nondisclosure conflicts, the following general rules emerge: As set forth in Socit , and as further refined in a number of decisions which are not discussed here, the court always, if it chooses, has the power to issue an
order for discovery of foreign information, regardless of the nature of foreign law. The burden shifts to the person subject to discovery either to
comply with the order or demonstrate to the court that, despite every
good faith effort to comply, the discovery sought remains precluded by
foreign law. If a burdened party fails to make this good faith showing,
penalties for noncompliance will be imposed regardless of how the foreign
law ostensibly is applied. The purpose of these rules is to force the burdened party, through its efforts at compliance, to prove and clarify exactly what the conflicts are between the discovery order and the foreign
81. Even absent such a showing it is hard not to have some sympathy for Judge Doyle's
view that perhaps the law of the forum should apply and the sanctions be upheld. Unlike
Socikt#, the party burdened here by the discovery order directly profited from the nondisclosure rules of the foreign government. In fact the Canadian Government had passed those
laws for the express purpose of thwarting litigation like the suit brought by Westinghouse.
Perhaps the American court should have given the American plaintiff stronger support in
fighting these restrictions. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155,
629 P.2d 231 (1980).
82. 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
83. Id. at 39-40.
84. Id. at 40.
85. Id. at 41.
86. Id. at 40-41.
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nondisclosure law. 87
If, despite the burdened party's good faith efforts to comply, the foreign government still bars the disclosure of certain information sought by
the U.S. court, then the court must apply a form of "balancing" test. Despite the language in court opinions, the court does not balance the relative interests of the parties concerned. Where the public policies of two
nations are in conflict, there is nothing to balance, as there is a "standoff." Rather, the court weighs the need for the information or discovery
procedure sought against its knowledge that enforcing discovery will offend a public policy of a foreign sovereign, and will subject the burdened
party to sanctions in that foreign country. If the information is truly necessary to the court's proceeding, sanctions must be imposed in order to
try to compel discovery. When everything else is equal, the law of the
forum should prevail.
However, if the information is not truly necessary to the proceeding,
if substantial justice can be done without the information sought, then
the court should defer to the foreign law. In so deferring, the court makes
no finding that the policy interest of another country is superior to that
of the United States in the matter concerned. The court merely concludes
that, since the policies of the United States can be effected without the
information sought, deference to the foreign law will be permitted.
V.

APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST

The balancing test is not always ignored. Recall that the balancing
test cannot resolve situations where the public policies of two nations are
in direct conflict. But Restatement section 40 can yield results where the
public policy of one government is not at stake or where the public policies within one government are in conflict so that no clear policy opposing
the other government's policy emerges. In such instances there is no
standoff between mutually opposing public policies and the balancing test
yields a clear result.
United States v. First National City Bank 5 presented a situation
where the public policy of the United States in favor of nondisclosure was
not opposed by a foreign public policy in favor of nondisclosure. First
National City Bank of New York (Citibank) was served with a subpoena
requesting documents from its German branch. The subpoena was issued
by a federal grand jury investigating alleged violations of the antitrust
laws. 89
Citibank declined to comply with the subpoena. The bank claimed

87. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978). See
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980). Cf. First
Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959) (the bank failed to
show that Panamanian law would prevent discovery.).
88. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Ci. 1968).

89. Id. at 898.
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that to comply with the subpoena would subject the bank to civil claims
by its customers based upon the bank secrecy laws of Germany. To comply with the subpoena would leave the bank open to economic reprisals
and a potential loss of business."
The Second Circuit rejected Citibank's pleas and enforced the subpoena. The court's construction of German law was crucial to its decision.
The court determined that whatever rule may have developed in favor of
bank secrecy was not so important that the German Government was
willing to enforce it. It was up to the bank customer whose secrets were
revealed to bring a civil suit. This civil suit would not be based upon the
statutory law of Germany, but rather would be based upon an implied
contractual obligation between the bank and its customers. 91 The court
expressly concluded that the subpoena did not "conflict with the public
policy of a foreign state as expressed in legislation." 92
Since the public policy of Germany was not at stake the court appropriately applied Restatement section 40 and concluded that the U.S. interest in disclosure should be enforced. Private parties could not defeat
93
the efforts of a U.S. grand jury through use of a "contract" for secrecy.

As might be expected in cases such as First National City Bank,
where the public policy of the foreign sovereign is not really at stake, the
decision could also have also been based upon Citibank's failure to make
a good faith effort to comply with the subpoena. The district court judge
found that the bank had failed to make such good faith efforts, neglecting
to make even ordinary inquiries as part of discovery." Such a lack of
good faith alone justifies enforcement of the subpoena.
The balancing test can also be applied when the public policy of one
government conflicts internally with itself. But for the defendant's failure
to make good faith efforts to comply with the discovery order, the Vetco
case would have presented such a situation. Ordinarily, once the burdened party's efforts reveal a genuine conflict between discovery and nondisclosure, the U.S. policy in favor of discovery emerges as superior when
the information is truly necessary to the U.S. litigation. However, where
there is in existence a treaty between the United States and the foreign
government regarding the issue for which discovery is sought, and that
treaty provides mechanisms for the exchange of information, the treaty
must be viewed as the exclusive means for obtaining information whenever a genuine conflict of law exists. The existence of the treaty creates a
policy contrary to the U.S. interest in discovery and thereby tips the
scales of the balancing test in favor of the foreign nondisclosure law.
The mere existence of a tax treaty providing for the exchange of in90. Id. at 899, 904.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

899, 901, 903.
901.
905.
900 n.8.
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formation does not mean that in all cases only treaty procedures may be
used to obtain information from the foreign territory." Treaty procedures
should not be exclusive unless the treaty so provides. The Swiss-U.S. tax
treaty does not provide that the methods for information exchange are to
be exclusive. 96 Therefore, in Vetco it was entirely proper for the IRS to
issue its subpoena.
Issuance of the subpoena was proper despite the apparent conflict
with Swiss law. As the rule has developed, discovery orders should always
issue so that the burden to attempt to eliminate any conflict with the
foreign law is placed on the party subject to discovery. If the burdened
party fails to make such good faith efforts, as Vetco apparently failed to
do, then penalties must issue for noncompliance with the discovery order.
Such penalties are proper regardless of what the foreign law is claimed to
be. However, in the court's eagerness to apply the balancing test and find
for the government, the court stated that treaty procedures are not the
exclusive mechanism for obtaining discovery in tax matters." Although
often true, such a statement is incorrect whenever a genuine conflict with
foreign law is present. If Vetco had demonstrated to the court that it had
made good faith efforts to comply with the subpoena, it would have been
entirely improper for the court to impose sanctions because of Vetco's
failure to comply with the discovery sought.
Section 40 of the Restatement explains this rule. It calls for a balancing of interests and other factors of lesser significance."9 The Restatement's balancing test yields no result in a discovery versus nondisclosure
conflict, where the national interests at stake are in balance and contradict each other. However, section 40 does yield a result when the matters
subject to discovery are covered by a treaty which establishes discovery
procedures.
Where a treaty exists, the balancing test is applied as follows. On the
one hand, there is the foreign interest in nondisclosure. On the same side
of the scale is that foreign government's reasonable expectation that another nation will not ignore established treaty procedures, when to do so
would be to create a conflict with that government's disclosure policies.
On the other hand, there is the U.S. policy in favor of disclosure. However, offsetting that policy is the U.S. policy which favors upholding the
reasonable expectations of signatories to treaties with the United States.
It is contrary to the spirit, if not the actual terms, of a treaty to seek
enforcement of a discovery order contrary to foreign law where a treaty
provides procedures for releasing the desired information. If the specific
information sought cannot be released pursuant to the terms of the
treaty, and the information sought cannot be released under the foreign

95. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423, 433 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
96. Income Tax Convention, supra note 20, at art. XVI.
97. 644 F.2d at 1328. See also United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423, 433 (M.D.
Fla. 1979).
98. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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law, then it must be presumed that the parties intended that such information is not to be disclosed. Any other interpretation would require a
substantial degradation of the authority of treaties as U.S. law.
The Ninth Circuit in Vetco recited the long-established rule that a
statute and a treaty are to be read consistently, to the greatest extent
possible. 99 Although correct, this rule does riot require that all ambiguities
be interpreted in favor of the U.S. law. Where application of U.S. law
would require conduct directly contrary to the foreign law, great deference must be given to the provisions of the treaty, as that treaty establishes the common agreement of the two sovereigns whose laws are in
conflict.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The proper role of treaties in U.S. law is a subject of much interest
and complexity. A comprehensive evaluation of the subject cannot be accomplished within these pages. However, for purposes of applying the
balancing test, it is not necessary to define that role. It is only necessary
to point out that the existence of the treaty weighs against U.S. disclosure
rules that are contrary to the reasonable expectations of the other signatory to the treaty. 100
The existence of a treaty reconciles the standoff between equally legitimate policy concerns of two sovereigns. In favor of nondisclosure is
the public policy of the foreign sovereign and that sovereign's reasonable
expectations of an agreement made with the United States. Balanced
against those interests is the public policy of the United States favoring
disclosure, diminished by its implied agreement with the foreign sovereign whose law is sought to be circumvented. In such a situation the interests of the two governments are not on the same plane of policy; the
interests of the foreign sovereign in nondisclosure are clearly superior. If a
conflict with the foreign disclosure law exists, after a discovery order has
been issued and a good faith effort at compliance has been made, then
that foreign law must be given deference whenever a treaty makes provision for the disclosure of information related to the subject of the
litigation. '10
99. 644 F.2d at 1328 (Cases cited therein stand for the same proposition.)
100. The intent of the parties is persuasive in interpreting treaty provisions. Maximov
v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940);
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
101. Illustrating this principle is the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie
de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The issue in that case
was whether it was proper for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to serve an investigatory subpoena by use of registered mail. Saint-Gobainis different from the cases discussed
in the text in that the issue there was not whether certain documents were discoverable, but
whether the method of obtaining the personal jurisdiction necessary to discovery was
proper.
In ruling that the FTC acted improperly, the circuit court relied in part on two principle facts. First, the French Government objected strenuously to the method of service em-
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It is most important to recognize that, in the situation described,
where the existence of a treaty permits the application of the balancing

test, the question of the U.S. need for the information is never reached.
The Vetco court placed some importance on the reluctance of authorities

to cooperate in tax investigations1 0 ' The court also noted that in the
Swiss-U.S. tax treaty, Switzerland had reserved the right not to transmit
business secrets pursuant to the information exchange provisions of the

treaty.105 In the court's view, the anticipated inability to obtain the cooperation of Swiss authorities emphasized the need of the court to enforce
the discovery order.
However, the need for the information is only relevant when the policies of the two governments are mutually contradictory. Where, because
of a treaty, the balance of interests is upset and the foreign interest in

nondisclosure emerges as superior, the need of the U.S. court for the information becomes irrelevant. There is no legitimate basis to enforce the
discovery order regardless of what the perceived need for the information
might be.

'

In fact, the comments of the court in Vetco highlight the role of the
treaty in tipping the scales in favor of the foreign nondisclosure law. The

U.S.-Swiss tax treaty specifically provides that the Swiss Government reserved the right not to reveal business secrets.105 When the United States

accepted the treaty, the obvious implication was that the United States
promised not to require tax information over the objections of the Swiss

ployed by the FTC. In other words, in the French view the method of service was contrary
to French law. 636 F.2d at 1306 n.18, 1325-27. Second, in examining whether or not Congress intended that the FTC issue subpoenas contrary to foreign law, and possibly contrary
to international law (See 636 F.2d at 1315-18), the court interpreted the powers of the FTC
as granted by Congress as requiring in part that the agency use established diplomatic procedures. 636 F.2d at 1323. The court implied that where an existing convention applies to
the procedural matter at issue, it is improper to go beyond that convention. 636 F.2d at 1313
n.69.
The Saint-Gobain case has been cited as requiring adherence to conventions regarding
discovery when a deviation from the procedures established in the convention would conflict
with the law of the country where the requested documents are located. Pain v. United
Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Cf. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d
Cir. 1960) (Subpoena for bank documents located in Canada would not be enforced as the
Canadian law provided for procedures in Canadian courts whereby these documents could
be sought and disclosed, subject to the disclosure limitations imposed by Canadian law.).
102. See note 22 supra.
103. Income Tax Convention, supra note 20, art. XVI (1)&(3).
104. "Unless it unmistakenly appears that a congressional act was intended to be in
disregard of a principle of international comity, the presumption is that it was intended to
be in conformity with it." The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D.Conn. 1925). "[Aln act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains .... "Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804). Cf. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (deference
should be given to foreign nondisclosure law once a true conflict with that law has been
presented.).
105. Income Tax Convention, supra note 20, art. XVI (1)&(3).
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Government. Given the clear implications of the treaty regarding disclosure of business secrets, the interest of the Swiss nondisclosure law must
clearly prevail over the interest of a U.S. court or agency in obtaining the
information. The United States was under no obligation to sign the tax
treaty with Switzerland. Once it did so, the reasonable expectations of the
Swiss Government arising from that treaty had to be given deference.
Where the policies of the two governments are otherwise in direct conflict, the implied recognition of the Swiss law of business secrets by the
U.S. Government pursuant to the treaty requires that the Swiss secrecy
law take precedence.s10
The task of a court in resolving a discovery versus nondisclosure conflict need not be overly complex. The court is always permitted to issue
its discovery order and require the burdened party to make a good faith
effort to obtain release of the requested information. If it is determined
that an irreconcilable conflict with foreign law exists, the typical approach of the court is to evaluate the need for the information sought.
Where the court cannot reasonably proceed without the requested information, the law of the forum is applied and discovery is ordered.
There are exceptions to this general rule, however. The court evaluates the necessity because the competing interests of the sovereigns are in
balance. Where a public policy of a foreign sovereign is not at stake, or
where the information sought is subject to treaty procedures for disclosure, the competing interests are no longer in balance. In such instances
the balancing test applies in favor of that sovereign whose public policy is
unambiguously involved.

106. The Supreme Court has stated: "Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their
obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties
to secure equality and reciprocity between them." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
293 (1933). Applying this rule to the Swiss-U.S. tax treaty, where the Swiss Government has
preserved in the treaty its right to withhold information protected under Swiss law, that
treaty must be liberally construed to prevent the attempted enforcement of U.S. subpoenas
contrary to that Swiss secrecy law. The obligations of equality and reciprocity imply this
respect for Swiss law. Cf. United States v. Burbank, 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975) (tax treaty

regarding discovery of documents liberally construed in favor of local law of state in which
documents were sought.
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"If it works, don't fix it." This excellent advice no longer applies to
the mechanisms used in resolving environmental disputes between Canada and the United States. Those mechanisms no longer work. They
need to be "fixed." This paper contends that: (1) Canadian-U.S. environmental problems are currently resolved on an ad hoc basis; (2) the consequences of continuing this ad hoc approach are not attractive; (3) there
are alternative ways to conduct Canadian-U.S. environmental relations; it
is feasible (4) to choose an alternative approach and (5) to implement it.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE AD Hoc APPROACH
Canada's relationship with the United States, from the late eighteenth and continuing into the nineteenth centuries, was marred by intermittent war and Canadian fear of annexation.' During the first three
quarters of the twentieth century the relationship changed to one of close
friendship and cooperation. Until recently this mutual respect had endured despite Canadian resentment of the elephant-and-mouse relationship resulting from the great disparity in the sizes of the two countries'
populations, and Canadian concerns over preservation of its economic
self-determination and separate identity.
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boundary environmental problems. Environmental disputes are inevitable
between two nations which share a long boundary and large continental
"commons": air masses, rivers, the Great Lakes, and three oceans. Past
disputes, such as disagreements over the Skagit-High Ross Dam 2 the
Poplar power plant,8 and the Eastport oil refinery," have been relatively
minor. Though still unresolved, these problems are now overshadowed by
much more serious issues such as acid precipitation, toxics in the Great
Lakes, and the environmental and fisheries ramifications of the development and transport of oil and gas found in the Arctic and offshore.5 Serious environmental problems now affect vast regions, major industries,
hundreds of thousands of people, and significant sectors of the economies
of both nations.' These problems pose a greater threat to Canadian-U.S.
relations than any other difficulties experienced in recent history.
In the past the two nations have handled environmental problems by
reaching temporary accomodations; they have not agreed on rules of behavior. Their environmental relationship is thus founded on a series of ad
hoc arrangements, in contrast with a problem-solving approach based
upon commonly shared principles and guiding rules. This ad hoc approach is the key problem in the environmental relationship.
Admittedly, there have been some steps toward establishing principles to guide the relationship. (See Figure 1 below).
(Figure 1)
PAST
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Totally
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2. The Skagit-High Ros Dam is a large hydroelectric dam in the State of Washington
which backs water into Canada in order to generate cheap electricity for Seattle. A current
proposal calls for increasing the height of the dam (to generate additional electricity) thus
further inundating Canadian acreage. J. CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINATION AND PROSPEcrivE op CANADIAN-U.S. ENvIRONMENTAL RELATIONS (1982) (to be published
in 1983 by University of Michigan Press.)[hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY].

3. The Poplar power plant is a partially completed electrical production facility located
in Saskatchewan a few miles from the Montana border. It has water apportionment, water
quality and air quality impacts on the State of Montana. Id.
4. The Eastport oil refinery issue concerns a U.S. proposal to build a large oil refinery,
on the Maine-New Brunswick border, which would require large oil-carrying supertankers to
pass through dangerous and disputed boundary waters. A very large Canadian fishery is
threatened. Id.
5. For a comprehensive treatment of all the major transboundary environmental
problems involving the United States and Canada, see ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2
supra.

6. See John Carroll's study of the role of acid rain in Canada-U.S. relations: J. CARROLL, ACID RAN: AN ISSUE IN CANADIAN-AMERuCAN RELATiONS (1982)(published by the National Planning Association, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as ACID RAIN].
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The Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the
United States and Canada7 (Boundary Waters Treaty) does define
"boundary waters" and establishes priorities for using certain of the
boundary and near-boundary waters.' It also specifies that the rights of
the upstream nation may not be abridged so long as the downstream nation is not deprived of reasonable use of water.10 This philosophy was
expressed in the Harmon Doctrine" and promoted by the U.S. team
which negotiated the Treaty. Further, the Boundary Waters Treaty established the International Joint Commission (I.J.C. or Commission),
which issues rule-making procedural orders."2
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 19721 and 1978,"
while not establishing binding rules, do introduce principles guiding joint
monitoring and research in the Great Lakes ecosystem, as well as goals
for improving the Lakes' water quality and for allocating certain properties of the Great Lakes, such as sewage dilution.
Principles-but clearly not binding rules-emerged from negotiations
on the Poplar power plant issue. These principles were reflected in the
bilateral agreement to monitor jointly the air and water quality of the
Poplar River.' 5 Other principles emerged from negotiations over the

7. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters Treaty].
8. Id. preliminary art. Boundary waters are defined as those along which an international boundary runs. Also included are those waters which are upstream from and flow
across the boundary, waters tributary to boundary waters, those waters which flow from
boundary waters, and waters which are downstream from the boundary, having flowed
across it.
9. Id. art. VIII.
10. Id. art. II.
11. Named after former Attorney General Judson Harmon, the Harmon Doctrine espouses the sovereignty of each state to do as it wills with water on its side of the border. In
practice it favors the United States, which is more often than Canada the upstream nation
on important transboundary rivers. For a detailed explanation of the Harmon Doctrine, see
ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2 supra.
12. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, at arts. VII-X. The International Joint
Commission [hereinafter cited as I.J.C.J was established by the Boundary Waters Treaty to
adjudicate certain disputes over boundary waters apportionment and to make recommendations about other matters involving boundary waters and air when requested by the two
federal governments. Id. art. VII.
13. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada, 23
U.S.T. 1301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312. This Agreement was an executive agreement to work jointly
on monitoring and research of Great Lakes water pollution, and to make recommendations
to both governments on needed action. The agreement was renewed in 1978.
14. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30
U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
15. Ad hoc agreement, reached through an exchange of diplomatic notes, to establish a
committee of federal, state and provincial representatives. The committee is to monitor the
impact on air and water quality in Montana and Saskatchewan arising from the Poplar
River power plant located in Saskatchewan. ENvraoNmuwrAL DIPOMACY, note 2 supra.
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Cabin Creek-Flathead River coal mine dispute's and were reflected in the
formation of a bilateral committee for information exchange. Similar
principles have been proposed for resolving other issues, such as those
concerning Champlain-Richelieu flooding.' However, except for certain
very limited water apportionment provisions of the Boundary Waters
Treaty, none of these agreements is binding. Both nations frequently ignore their spirit, if not their letter. Further, these agreements do not, by
any reasonable definition of the term, establish rules for behavior. They
merely temper the customary ad hoc approach.
The assertion that the current approach is to consider each case on
an ad hoc basis is dramatically supported by the fact that there are virtually no institutions which deal with Canadian-U.S. environmental relations. Aside from the Departments of State and External Affairs, the entire bureaucracy consists of the I.J.C. The I.J.C. is composed of six
Commissioners assisted by small staffs in Washington and Ottawa (totaling less than thirty-five people) and by the Great Lakes regional field
staff in Windsor, Ontario, which is restricted to performing functions
specified in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 8 The only other
apparent bureaucracies are in fact examples of informal "ad hockery"
rather than formal institutionalization. These bureaucracies are the technical working groups created by the Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution (Memorandum of Intent), 9 and the monitoring
committees established to defuse a few of the border issues, notably the
Poplar, Cabin Creek and the St. John River issues. None of these committees has any full-time or even part-time personnel of its own; the
staffs are composed of individuals borrowed from federal, provincial and
state agencies. The environmental relationship has not yet become sufficiently formalized to require permanent full-time institutional structures.
Satisfactory diplomatic settlement of disputes using the ad hoc approach has been achieved only in the few cases where water apportionment and priority of use, for which rule making is mandated in the
Boundary Waters Treaty, were central issues. Examples of such disputes
0
include those concerning Lake of the Woods," Milk River or Sage Creek"2
16. The Cabin Creek-Flathead issue involves a proposed British Columbia coal mine
which would have an impact on the wilderness values of northwestern Montana and Glacier
National Park. A bilateral committee for information exchange has been established to deal
with this problem. Id.
17. The Champlain-Richelieu issue involves the flooding of the flat Richelieu River Valley of Quebec by the high waters of Vermont's Lake Champlain and the effort of Quebec to
manipulate artificially the levels of those waters at some ecological cost to Vermont. Id.
18. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, 1978-79 Annual Report (Ottawa and Washington, D.C. 1979).
19. Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, United
States-Canada, T.I.A.S. No. 9856. In the Memorandum, both federal governments pledged
to act to stem the flow of air pollutants moving across the international border. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, the precursors of acid rain, were the targets. The Memorandum also
committed the two governments to negotiate a bilateral air quality agreement.
20. Lake of the Woods is a boundary water at the juncture of Minnesota, Ontario and
Manitoba whose usage is managed under a 1912 bilateral agreement. INT'L JOINT COMM'N,
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and the single case where forced arbitration was used: the Trail Smelter
Arbitration." In addition, the Milk River decision, after many years of
acceptance, now shows signs of coming apart.2 3
The ad hoc approach has failed to resolve the Skagit-High Ross Dam
dispute for over two decades and the Garrison irrigation dispute2 4 for
nearly a decade. It has prolonged by years the resolution of other bilateral
environmental problems. Most of these issues will remain unresolved and
others, such as the Dickey-Lincoln Dam issue, will be resolved only for
domestic reasons,2 5 or will be accepted as accomplished facts for which
damage compensation claims will be made.
The ad hoc approach has, thus far, generally failed to resolve bilateral disputes. Yet these disputes have been minor compared with the
transboundary environmental issues which are now developing. If small
problems have not been satisfactorily handled through the ad hoc approach, one can hardly expect to resolve present and future disputes concerning toxic substances in the Great Lakes, or acid rain, by resorting to
the ad hoc method. What would be the consequences of continuing to
make ad hoc decisions when confronted with these far more serious
challenges?
II.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUED

AD Hoc

DECISION MAKING

Future decisions about the environment can be made in a number of
ways. The two nations can continue to make ad hoc decisions, treating
each issue without regard to any formalized "rules" for behavior. Or, they
can agree to "rules" for future behavior, and base their decisions on those
"rules." The authors use the word "rules" loosely, to include the entire
spectrum from guidelines for procedure to formal procedures rigidly
enforced.
This section discusses the consequences of continuing to make deci-

Docket 3R (Ottawa and Washington, D.C., 1912).
21. Milk River and Sage Creek are tranaboundary rivers along the Montana-Alberta
border which have been the subject of apportionment disputes regarding irrigation usage. In
1946 the I.J.C. reached a decision on this issue. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, Docket 53R (Ottawa
and Washington, D.C., 1946).
22. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905
(1949); reprinted in 35 AM J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
23. Earlier I.J.C. apportionment decisions may be threatened by local pressure from
irrigators in Alberta on the Alberta Government to construct a new dam in the area in
reaction to increasing Montana irrigation demand.
24. Garrison is a controversial irrigation project in North Dakota which would seriously
impact water quality and commercial fisheries in Manitoba. See J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN,
THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT. A CASE STUDY IN CANADIAN-U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS
(published by the C.D. Howe Research Institute, Montreal and the National Planning Ass'n,
Washington, D.C., 1980).
25. Dickey-Lincoln was a proposed hydroelectric dam in northern Maine which would
have flooded valuable forest land in Quebec. The project has been blocked by the U.S. Congress. See ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2 supra.
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sions in the absence of rules. The next section discusses the consequences
of decision making based on rules, and compares some of the results of
these two very different decision-making methods.
Any decision has consequences for several groups of people who enjoy-or suffer-its outcome. In Canadian-U.S. environmental decisions
these groups are commonly industries, governments, and "environmentalists"-those citizens concerned more with environmental consequences
than with immediate economic consequences. The political energies of
these groups are channeled through the media and finally come to bear
on officials representing the several levels of government-notably diplomats responsible only to the two federal governments.
The diplomats face a four-tier dilemma in attempting to resolve an
issue. First, the actors may not agree on what criteria-for example economic, political or environmental criteria-are to be used to assess the
consequences of a decision (Table 1).

Table I
A Few of the Criteria for Resolving a
Transboundary Environmental Issue
Are all the benefits and costs counted: health, environmental, economic,
etc.?
Do the total benefits exceed the total costs?
Are the costs and benefits justly distributed among those affected by the
decision?
Does the decision contribute to the predictability of future decisions?
Can the decision, once reached, be administered?
Is the decision politically acceptable to the major actors?
Second, even if the actors agree on assessment criteria, they may disagree over which raw data to assess. A classic example of this is the disagreement between scientists employed by coal-fired power plants and
scientists representing environmental groups over the effects of acid rain.
Third, even if all sides agree on the scientific data, each may weigh the
data very differently. The aesthetic and monetary value of an oil-fouled
duck is measured differently by the worker who drilled for the oil, the
utility whose tanker spilled the oil, the environmentalist who cleansed the
bird, and the consumer who pays for the oil. Fourth, even if none of the
above problems arises in a dispute, the disagreement is not resolved solely
on its merits, in isolation from other factors. The decision is influenced by
the larger political and economic context within which a single issue is
decided.
The ad hoc approach, it must be admitted, has some advantages. It
provides flexibility for diplomats, enabling them to respond to changes in
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political leadership and policy direction at all levels of government. It
also permits the diplomatic practice of issue "linkage," though diplomats
often deny that they use this practice.2"
The advantages of the ad hoc approach are overshadowed by its
costs. Perhaps the greatest cost in using this approach is a loss of predictability. "Ad hockery" provides no certainty as to how an issue will be
handled in the future. Each issue is disposed of separately, often in a
heated and emotional atmosphere generated by the media. All interested
parties can exert pressure and influence for any purpose and issues are
resolved in ways which achieve narrow ends without weighing broader
considerations.. Ths cost of not resolving disputes under agreed-upon
rules is the loss of a predictable, orderly resolution acceptable to the majority of those involved. Under an ad hoc approach, each party to the
dispute is a potential loser. Businesses suffer the increased cost of unpredictability, an economic threat to their long-term investments. Local
governments find it more difficult to protect long-term property values.
Environmentalists lose the chance to develop rules and regulations which
might protect the environment in future disputes. Additionally, the citizens of both nations suffer the costs of worsened diplomatic relations, for
foreign relations failures are foreign relations costs, even if rarely measured in the calculus of cost-benefit ratios.
In the present state of Canadian-U.S. environmental relations, the
value of "ad hockery" and its inherent flexibility may well have run its
course. The consequences of continuing the present ad hoc approach are
not desirable. The two nations may well have more to gain by adopting a
more structurally ordered system.
III.

ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

Canadians and Americans need not suffer the consequences of ad hoc
accomodations. They can instead adopt alternative methods of dealing
with transboundary environmental issues. In brief, they can agree upon
rules of conduct. A few options for those rules, and for the agreement,
follow. Rules governing the "input" to the decision-making process-what
environmental issues will be considered and when-and the "output" of
the process-studies or recommendations or enforced decisions-are considered first. Then possible forms for the agreement-memorandum of
understanding, treaty, etc.,-are examined.
A matrix of alternative agreements on rules of behavior is shown in
Figure 2. The rules agreed upon by the two nations are shown in the horizontal rows of Figure 2. Several options for the form of the agreement
establishing those rules appear in the vertical columns. A single form of
agreement-equivalent to choosing a single vertical column in Figure
2-is not necessary. There could be, for example, a treaty on monitoring

26. Issue linkage is the deliberate conditioning, by diplomats, of progress on one issue
in return for progress on another (perhaps unrelated) issue.
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and a memorandum of understanding on enforcement (heavy rectangles
in Figure 2). The rules and agreements of Figure 2 might apply primarily
to one aspect of the environment, as in the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, or to several aspects. Figure 2 can thus be thought of as a
two-dimensional slice through a three-dimensional cube-much as many
slices of bread make up a loaf. (Figure 3).
Figure 2
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Rules Agreed Upon

1. Input
What issues will be considered, when, under the agreement? Virtually all transboundary environmental issues can be the subject of an
agreement because at present there are almost no mandatory rules to
guide their resolution. The quantitative apportionment of water is one
exception, for it is governed by the Boundary Waters Treaty.2 7 But there
are no mandatory rules covering water quality or air quality. Other issues
have received little or no attention: groundwater, soil contamination, acid
rain and projects with "long distance" impacts that arise at points in one
nation far from its border and have effects deep within the other nation.
Such issues obviously could be dealt with in any agreement.
When should a development with transboundary impact be considered as an "issue?" Whatever the form of agreement, it must specify a
"trigger" indicating when the issue has become sufficiently important to
warrant attention. This question of timing is addressed in the Boundary
Waters Treaty. Before a party can use boundary waters it must file an
application with the I.J.C. The filing of the application sets certain procedures in motion. If a party from one nation should violate the treaty by
attempting to appropriate boundary waters without filing an application,
the other nation can insist that an application be filed, thus triggering the
2
procedural response and so bringing agreed upon rules into play.
What degree of environmental damage should trigger action? For
some environmental issues no answer is found in the federal law of either
nation, nor in state or provincial law. For other issues answers are found
in the laws of some or all of the four jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the
answers differ. Should violation of the law of only one jurisdiction trigger
action, or should more-perhaps all four laws-be violated before the
mechanism is triggered? An answer may gradually emerge as the governments adopt increasingly uniform standards.
2. Output
Once an issue has been taken up by a decision-making mechanism,
what rules govern the Canadian-U.S. response? Does the mechanism
merely monitor the problem, or make recommendations on how to deal
with it, or does it have authority to enforce its recommendations? Merely
to illustrate various degrees of authority for implementing action, three
options are considered: joint monitoring, research and reporting only; advice and recommendations; and enforcement.
Joint monitoring, research and reporting are essential. Gathering
data which both nations agree are reliable is a major step toward resolv-

27. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, at art. VIII.
28. Id.
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ing bilateral problems. Reaching accord on the interpretation of the data
is more difficult. Agreement on the data and their interpretation is more
likely if monitoring and research are carried out jointly by the two nations. Scientific cooperation is the easiest type of joint effort to achieve;
its importance is much more than symbolic. It is in this area that the
I.J.C. has achieved an admirable record over many years.2 9 Whether or
not the two nations choose to move beyond this level, they must at least
work to achieve accord on scientific facts and their interpretation.
Formulation of advice and recommendations carries the process a
step further. The I.J.C. has reached the stage of making recommendations, but there are limits to what the I.J.C. can do. As the U.S. State
Department and the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs control the
flow of work to the Commission, 0 they can easily prevent the Commission from making recommendations on controversial matters. If a recommendation which differs from diplomatic views is made public it can
threaten diplomatic maneuvering because the diplomats must then oppose the advice of an independent body. There is clearly a range of
choices as to how broadly recommendations should be publicized.
Enforcement can be carried out under binding authority which is
limited or broad. The I.J.C. exerts limited binding authority, although on
a very restricted basis. The question hindering any agreement will be:
How "limited" is this authority? The precise breadth of this limited binding authority will determine how easy it will be to achieve agreement. The
option of broad binding authority is more difficult to achieve, but more
effective than weaker options. An extreme example of the use of broad
binding authority is a high arbitral tribunal composed of three or five
distinguished citizens of the two countries who would carefully weigh
each issue and whose findings could not be appealed. The impossibility of
appeal would ensure termination and, by definition, bilateral resolution of
the issue-though not necessarily the satisfaction of all parties involved
in the judgment.
There clearly are numerous options for rules the two nations could
follow in order to predict each other's behavior and to avert or resolve
transboundary conflicts (horizontal rows in Figure 2). There are also numerous options for a formal agreement establishing these rules (vertical
columns in Figure 2).
B.

The Form of Agreement

Four possible vehicles for codifying rules of conduct, each involving a
different degree of stringency, are: (1) a memorandum of understanding;
(2) protocols to the existing Boundary Waters Treaty; (3) an executive
agreement; and (4) a treaty.

29. ENVIRONMENTAL
30. Id.

DIPLOMACY,

note 2 supra.
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A memorandum of understanding has symbolic benefits, but it is
very weak and in the past has not really influenced behavior. The Canadian-U.S. Memorandum of Intent concerning the long-range cross-border
transport of air pollutants is a case in point: it influenced behavior in
Canada but was largely ignored in the United States.3' The MichiganOntario Memorandum of Understanding on Air Pollution, signed about a
decade ago, has also proven ineffective.33 The symbolic value of these gestures is real, but may not be followed by concrete action.
The alternative of writing protocols to the existing Boundary Waters
Treaty could conceivably have the reverse outcome: action without symbolism. Such protocols would probably not be highly publicized, and so
would lack symbolic value, but could produce genuinely effective action.
This alternative deserves study because quiet action is needed, similar to
the diplomacy practiced by outstanding Canadian and American diplomats of the 1950's and 1960's such as Arnold Heeney and Livingston
83
Merchant.
An executive agreement has value but must not be overrated. Despite
all the attention given to the two Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements,
there is little in them that is binding.3 ' They have had mixed results, and
are often threatened with crisis as during the Nixon impoundment of appropriated funds of a decade ago, or today's severe Reagan Administration budget cuts." The spirit in which the letter of these agreements has
been administered leaves much to be desired. It is questionable whether
an executive agreement can produce rules for, and garner the support of,
all the border states and provinces and the legislative and executive
branches of both federal governments.
The treaty approach presents the greatest challenge and promises the
greatest reward. The approval of a treaty is a long and involved process.
Public awareness can be generated by the national debate which precedes
31. Acm RAIN, note 6 supra.
32. The Michigan-Ontario Memorandum of Understanding on Air Pollution was an

agreement between the state and the province to seek reduction in air pollutants crossing
the border. It was focused on the Detroit-Windsor area. Neither the memorandum nor the
I.J.C. study concerning Detroit-Windsor and Sarnia-Port Huron tranaborder air pollution is
binding. Given the very high economic stakes, there has been little incentive for them to be
anything but symbolic. EIRONmENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2 supra.
33. Arnold Heeney was Canadian Ambassador to the United States on two occasions in

the 1940's and 1950's. He was also Canadian Chairman of the I.J.C. Livingston Merchant
was a career U.S. diplomat who saw a number of Canadian assignments.

34. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements are executive agreements rather than
treaties and are not enforceable. Their success depends on goodwill. ENVRONMENTAL DEPLOMAcy, note 2 supra.
35. The effects of the Nixon Administration impoundment of congressionally appropri-

ated dollars destined for Great Lakes pollution cleanup, and the Reagan Administration
reduction of the Environmental Protection Agency's budget, are so substantial as to cast
doubt on the willingness of the United States to honor its commitment to Canada under the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978, and perhaps also under the Mem-

orandum of Intent.
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a treaty's ratification. The rigor of a treaty can assure the cooperation of
all levels of government.
These options for rules and agreements generate a broad range of
alternatives to the current ad hoc style of decision making. Each option,
if adopted, would yield a different set of consequences. The question is
whether the two nations will adopt one of these alternatives-and thus its
consequences-or instead maintain the status quo.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A

TRIBUNAL ON TRIAL

The choice which faces Canada and the United States is one between
the perpetuation of ad hoc decision making, or the adoption of some
other method of managing transboundary environmental problems. For
the moment the two nations have not yet made that choice and so continue to feel the consequences of ad hoc decisions. If another method is
adopted it will probably be chosen only because-and when-it becomes
politically more expensive to maintain the status quo than to shift to a
different way of handling disputes. In particular, no shift will be made
until the constituencies who have a stake in transboundary matters-namely corporations, environmentalists, government officials of
towns near the border, etc.-feel an impact and as a result start to press
for a change. This birth of political will, should it occur, will be one consequence of maintaining the status quo. Other results of continuing to
make ad hoc decisions have been discussed in section II.
The constituency, such as environmentalists, which first presses for
change will seek that alternative to "ad hockery" which best suits its interests. The search will provoke reactions from other constituencies, such
as corporations which, dissatisfied with the environmentalists' proposal,
will propose an alternative more cordial to their own corporate interests.
The debate will then no longer be over whether to continue ad hoc decision making or to agree to rules. Rather, it will be over whose rules will be
selected. Views will differ on which environmental issues should be considered and when, and on what rules should govern the joint CanadianU.S. response. Theoretically, the choices could be based on abstract and
tidy criteria for deciding transboundary issues (Table I). In fact, the decision will likely be the outcome of a political tug-of-war, with each constituency using those criteria which advance its case.
The need to deal with environmental problems in a politically realistic context suggests the desirability of an instrument with binding authority in some carefully defined areas, but which also recognizes other
areas where action would consist merely of advice and recommendations.
(Table II).
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Table II
Simplified Summary of Shifts of Functions From National Toward
International Jurisdiction
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THE CANADIAN-U.S. CASE (Program on Int'l Envtl. Issues,

H.

Center for Int'l Studies, Publication C/79-13, M.I.T., Nov.
1979).
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With experience gathered over time, a satisfactory balance between authority and advice could eventually be reached. Ideally, however, the area
of binding authority should be broader than the very narrow authority
3s
presently granted to the I.J.C.
Given the numerous options, and the complex political forces which
will generate the actual outcome, any recommendation is quite arbitrary.
Nevertheless, the authors propose an experiment with the concept of
broad binding authority: an arbitral tribunal should be established for a
trial period of perhaps ten years. At the end of that time, the tribunal
would be evaluated and then abolished or permanently or temporarily renewed. Such a tribunal could be established by executive agreement. Efforts toward treaty formulation should begin simultaneously, with implementation of a treaty by the end of the ten-year period as the goal. This
trial period would allow sufficient time for approval of the treaty, including ratification by the U.S. Senate. An experiment seems desirable because political realities currently prevent a long-term commitment to formulation of a tribunal. The precise characteristics of a tribunal are less
important than the fact-and this is the point to stress-that such a tribunal would be an experiment.
Let us examine the tribunal concept following the outline of Figure 2.
The tribunal could consider any environmental issue when raised by either federal government.37 It would enforce its decisions through broad
binding authority. Its decisions could not be appealed. At the end of the
trial period, or after one or more renewals of the trial period, the tribunal
would be established by treaty.
The three or five members of the tribunal would be distinguished
citizens appointed by each country's executive branch and approved by
its legislature. They would serve for a single term of long and fixed duration, perhaps one or two decades, and on retirement would receive a generous lifetime pension. The long fixed term and large pension would serve
to provide some of the same independence and protection from the buffeting of political winds that is enjoyed by United States Supreme Court
Justices.
Many of the other options have been tried, and each has had shortcomings. If Canadians and Americans wish to resolve environmental conflicts, they may be willing to experiment with a method which appears to
offer great long-term benefits, despite the challenges to be overcome.
Should the attempt not succeed, it would automatically terminate after a
specified period of time. Should the tribunal be abolished, the two nations would be no worse off and would have made a good faith effort.

36. The authority of the I.J.C. is narrow; it is limited only to apportionment of bound-

ary waters under a restricted set of circumstances.

ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY,

note 2

supra.
37. The letter of the Boundary Waters Treaty currently allows either country to send a
reference to the I.J.C. In practice, references come from both countries simultaneously.
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Regardless of its outcome, the experiment would benefit both peoples.
V.

IMPLEMENTATION: BUILDING THE CONSTITUENCY

Implementation of the tribunal experiment can be sought through an
age-old technique: linking a goal with the self-interests of those people
who have the power to achieve it. This method entails identifying those
who have the power to accomplish a goal, and then demonstrating how,
by achieving it, they can advance their self-interests.
The constituencies with the most to gain from a tribunal are the corporate community, the citizen environmentalist community, and local
governments near the national borders. Corporations make long-term investments, and thus gain from steps which reduce uncertainty about the
future. Even disadvantageous regulations, if they can be guaranteed not
to change for a decade or so, may be preferred to a shifting regulatory
climate in which today's investment in pollution control becomes tomorrow's wasted effort. This is especially true in the management of longterm, large-scale endeavors, such as large energy projects. Citizen environmentalists benefit from rules for environmental protection which give
environmentalists the legal recourse they now lack. Local officials of
towns near the Canada-U.S. border obviously need to respond to the interests of the residents of their towns and to protect their towns' longterm investments and credit ratings. Established rules would permit longterm planning for such local public concerns as groundwater protection,
pollution control and waste disposal.
These groups could take a concrete step toward forming a tribunal,
or some other mechanism for dispute resolution, by meeting periodically
to seek points of intersection between their interests and the goal of improved environmental relations. An informal group of industrialists, government officials and environmentalists might well be able to formulate
the outlines of a bilateral agreement more easily than could diplomats.
After a framework had been devised, attempts could be made to consult
with, and seek the support of, a broader constituency. Eventually one
would hope to gain the support of legislative committees such as the U.S.
Senate's committees on Foreign Relations and on Environment and Public Works. Resolutions of support from either or both houses of the U.S.
Congress would be valuable. Resolutions by state legislatures, with resultant pressure on U.S. senators, should also ease the way toward Senate
ratification of a treaty. Only the willingness of the national governments
to support such a tribunal, preferably with the support of provincial and
state governments, could bring it into being.
The rules may be opposed by people who fear that they will lose
profits, flexibility or power. Perhaps opponents will come to accept the
view that improvement in bilateral relations not only reduces uncertainty
but produces other benefits, including opportunities for the two nations
to work jointly in areas such as energy, economic development, and environmental research.

50

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

Environmental relations within the North American community can
improve. Decisions about transboundary environmental issues need not
be ad hoc but can instead follow guidelines agreed to by both nations,
with disputes resolved by a mechanism such as a tribunal. The values
necessary for agreement exist. What has been lacking has been the will.

STUDENT COMMENT

Who'll Stop the Rain:
Resolution Mechanisms for U.S.-Canadian
Transboundary Pollution Disputes
JOHN PICKERING*
GINA L. SWETS**

Since the signing of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817' which demilitarized the border between the United States and Canada, relations
between the two countries have been characterized by cooperation, conciliation and an awareness of a common heritage. It is this awareness which
has historically provided the framework for the successful resolution,
through negotiation and compromise, of many of the problems facing the
two nations. In light of the great strides Canada and the United States
have made by employing a cooperative approach to resolving their differences, it is especially unfortunate that the problems of transboundary air
and water pollution threaten to hinder progress toward greater cooperation. Both nations contribute significant amounts of pollutants into the
environment of the other. Thus, the problem of transboundary pollution
is bilateral in scope. A mutually satisfactory resolution of this problem is
essential to the economic and aesthetic welfare of both nations.
The discussion to follow will explore selected mechanisms for the resolution of transboundary environmental disputes between the United
States and Canada. The areas to be examined are: 1) limited territorial
sovereignty as a basis for liability in transboundary pollution disputes; 2)
a remedy to the acid rain dispute under section 115 of the U.S. Clean Air
Act;' 3) the effectiveness of current mechanisms for resolving disputes
*John Pickering is a J.D. candidate at the University of Denver College of Law. B.A.,
University of Miami, 1977.
**Gina L. Swets is a J.D. candidate at the University of Denver College of Law. B.A.,
University of Colorado, 1979.
1. Rush-Bagot Agreement, Apr. 28-29, 1817, United States-Canada, 8 Stat. 231, T.S.
No. 110 1/2. While this agreement provided only for disarmament of the Great Lakes, it was

the impetus for subsequent disarmament on land. Address by Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
Asst. Sec'y for European Affairs, before the Center for Inter-American Relations, in New
York City (Oct. 1, 1981), reprinted in Buimuu oF Pun. AFFAmS, U.S. Dzp'T ST., CuaREr
POL'Y No. 318 (Oct. 1981).
2. Clean Air Act, § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (Supp. IV 1980).
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over the Poplar River and Garrison Diversion projects;3 and 4) the draft
treaties proposed by a Joint Working Group of the American and Canadian Bar Associations dealing exclusively4 with the resolution of disputes
between the United States and Canada.
The authors conclude that despite the availability of adequate legal
mechanisms for resolving disputes, it is unlikely that either the U.S. Government or the Canadian Government will willingly employ any of these
legal mechanisms. It is far more likely that the United States and Canada
will continue to pursue negotiated settlements of these volatile issues
through diplomatic channels.
I.

LIMITED TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

Before discussing the acid rain and water pollution disputes which
are the specific focus of this Comment, it will be helpful to examine the
relevant principles of international law which form the basis of liability in
these disputes. Fundamental among these principles is the doctrine of
limited territorial sovereignty. According to this doctrine, it is the right of
every nation, free from outside interference, to make and enforce rules
respecting all activity within its territory, but it is also the obligation of
every state to respect the rights of its neighbors." As applied in the environmental context, the doctrine provides that, while both Canada and the
United States have the right to develop their economies and to utilize
their resources as they see fit, each nation also has a duty to consider and
to account for the effects of that activity outside its borders.
The first and foremost judicial expression of the principle of limited
territorial sovereignty in an environmental context is found in the Trail
Smelter Arbitration.' In that case, air pollution, in the form of sulfur di-

oxide from a smelter in Trail, British Columbia, was causing injury to
American citizens and property in Washington State. In 1928, after private efforts to resolve the dispute failed, the matter was referred to the
International Joint Commission (I.J.C. or Commission), for its investigation and report under article IX of the Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada (Boundary Waters Treaty or Treaty).7 After a three-year study, the I.J.C.
3. The Poplar River project involves the construction of a power plant in Saskatchewan

having adverse environmental impacts in Montana, and the Garrison Diversion Unit is a
large and complex irrigation project in North Dakota having adverse effects on water quality
in Canada. For further discussion see text infra at 75.

4. See ABA-CBA, SETrLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DisPuTEs BETWEEN CANADA AND THE
USA (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA-CBA SETrLEMENT TREATIES].
5. Bilder, InternationalLaw and National Resources Policies, 20 NAT. REs.J. 451, 45253 (1980).
6. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
7. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters Treaty]. The International Joint Commission (I.J.C.) was
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recommended that Canada pay the United States $350,000 in damages
and that pollution control devices be installed at the smelter.8 In 1935,
after the United States complained of continuing damage, the two countries agreed to have Canadian responsibility determined by a special tribunal.' In its final report, the tribunal proclaimed that:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.10
The Corfu Channel Case," while it did not involve environmental
issues, supports the application of limited territorial sovereignty in an environmental context. 12 The case arose as a result of a minefield explosion
which damaged British warships in Albanian territorial waters. The International Court of Justice held that, had the Albanian Government known
of the minefield's existence, it would have been obligated to notify and
warn the British warships of the danger. The Court's decision was based
primarily on the recognition that it is "every State's obligation not to
knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States." 13
The most recent major judicial declaration of the principle of limited
territorial sovereignty is found in the Lac Lanoux Case" between France
and Spain. Spain was unable to assert territorial integrity as a basis for
objection to a French decision to divert waters from Lac Lanoux for a
hydroelectric project because it could not prove that the project would
cause actual damage to Spanish waters. The Court, however, held that
principles of international law require a state to take measures to protect
its neighbor's riparian interests, and that "account must be taken of all
interests . . . which are liable to be affected by the works undertaken,
even if they do not correspond to a right."1 5

established by the Boundary Waters Treaty. For further discussion of the jurisdiction of the
IJ.C. under art. IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty, see text infra at 70.
8. 3 M. WHInTMAN, DIGEST OF INTEIRNATIONAL LAw 789 (1964).
9. Arbitblit, The Plight of American Citizens Injured by TranboundaryRiver Pollution, 8 ECOLOGy L.Q. 339, 362 (1979). The agreement is embodied in the Convention Rela-

tive to the Establishment of a Tribunal to Decide Questions of Indemnity and Future Regime Arising from the Operation of Smelter at Trail, British Columbia, Apr. 15, 1935,
United States-Canada, 49 Stat. 3245, T.S. No. 893.
10. 3 R. Intl Arb. Awards at 1965.

11. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
12. J. BARnos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 69 (1974).
13. 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
14. Lac Lanoux Case (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957), 24 I.L.R. 101
(1957).

15. 24 I.L.R. at 138.
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Territorial

Two major international agreements pertaining to environmental issues have incorporated the principle of limited territorial sovereignty.
These agreements are the Declaration of the UN Conference on the
Human Environment 16 (Declaration) and the Recommendations of the
Council for Strengthening International Cooperation on Environmental
Protection in Frontier Regions"7 (OECD Guidelines).
The Declaration recognizes that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.'

In addition, recommendation 103(a) of the Action Plan for the
Human Environment also adopted by the UN Conference on the Human
Environment (Action Plan) states that "[a]s a general rule, no country
should solve or disregard its environmental problems at the expense of
other countries."' 9 Finally, recommendation 51(b)(i) of the Action Plan,
although relating specifically to water resources, encourages states to notify their neighbors, at an early stage, of any proposed activities which
may impact adversely on the neighbor's territory.2" The purpose of the
notification requirement is to promote the best possible use of the waters
while attempting to minimize pollution in all concerned states.2 '
The OECD Guidelines encourage countries to cooperate in preventing pollution, "paying special attention to the principles of equal right of
access and nondiscrimination. 2 2 The Guidelines also mandate that environmental impact statements required by domestic law must account for
the transboundary impacts of the proposed activity and that individuals
who may be exposed to transboundary pollution be informed of the fact.22
16. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1 U.N.
GAOR (21st plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Declaration].
17. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Recommendations of the
Council for Strengthening International Cooperation on Environmental Protection in Frontier Regions, Sept. 27, 1978, Document C (78) 77 (Final) [hereinfter cited as OECD Guidelines]. Final text can be found in 17 I.L.M. 1530 (1978).
18. Declaration, supra note 16, principle 21.
19. Action Plan for the Human Environment of the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, recommendation 103(a), U.N. GAOR (21st plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.48/14/Corr.1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1421, 1462 (1972).
20. Id. recommendation 51(b)(i).
21. Id. recommendation 51(b)(ii).
22. OECD Guidelines, supra note 17, art. 11.
23. Id. arts. 11.3, 11.2.
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II.

ACID RAIN:

A

STATUTORY REMEDY

Acid rain is "the most important and outstanding difficulty between
Dur two countries."" Any changes in the U.S. Clean Air Act that would
increase transboundary air pollution affecting Canada would be "bloody
close to an act of hostility on a friendly neighbor.' 2 The Reagan Administration's proposed changes to the Clean Air Act show "a complete and
callous disregard not only for our acid rain problems, but also for the
effects these provisions would have on the United States' environment as
well."' These statements, made by Canada's senior environment officials,
reflect the attitude of the Canadian Government toward what it perceives
to be a growing lack of resolve on the part of the United States to make
the necessary political and economic sacrifices to solve the problem of
7
acid rain.
Since the signing of the Memorandum of Intent on August 5, 1980,"
24. Statement made to visiting American journalists in Toronto, Sept. 15, 1981, by Canadian Environment Minister John Roberts, reprinted in [1981] 4 INT'L ENV'T REP.(BNA)
1039 (Oct. 14, 1981).
25. Statement made to visiting U.S. journalists touring Ontario to inspect the areas
most sensitive to acid rain by Ontario Environment Minister Keith C. Norton, reprinted in
[1981] 4 INT'L ENV'T R p. (BNA) 1039 (Oct. 14, 1981).
26. Id.
27. Roger Simmons, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of the Environment and a
member of the House of Commons told a symposium of the Ohio Environment Council
September 17, 1981, that Canadians are becoming increasingly impatient with the lack of
official action on the problem of acid rain. [1981] 4 INr'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1039 (Oct. 14,
1981). The Canadian public similarly expressed its impatience with American inaction when
thousands of demonstrators protested on Parliament Hill during President Reagan's visit to
Ottawa in March 1981. [1981] 4 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 921 (July 8, 1981).
28. Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution, August 5, 1980, United
States-Canada. T.I.A.S. No. 9856. The history of this Memorandum was recently described
by Thomas M.T. Niles:
In the fall of 1978, the Congress adopted a resolution calling upon the
President 'to make every effort to negotiate a cooperative agreement with the
Government of Canada aimed at preserving [the] mutual airshed to protect
and enhance air resources and insure the attainment and maintenance of air
quality protective of public health and welfare.' As a result of that resolution
informal bilateral discussions with Canada on air pollution were begun in 1978.
Also in 1978 [the United States] organized with Canada the bilateral research
consultative group. The group, composed of U.S. and Canadian scientists, carried out preliminary surveys of research on transboundary air pollution and
... long range transport of air pollutants in 1979 and 1980 ....
In July [of 1979] the United States and Canada issued a joint statement
on transboundary air quality... announcing the intention to develop a cooperative agreement on air quality ....
[T]he United States and Canada signed a memorandum of intent in August 1980, agreeing on procedures to be followed in preparing for and negotiating on agreement on transboundary air pollution. The memorandum provided
for the creation of a U.S.-Canadian coordinating committee and under it five
joint work groups composed of U.S. and Canadian representatives from scientific, technical, and legal disciplines. The U.S. membership of about 50 is
drawn from eight different Federal agencies. The Canadian membership is
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the once high expectations of both countries have been tempered by the
reality of negotiating a mutually acceptable political, economic and environmental solution to a problem that is not fully defined. Both countrieQ
agree that much remains to be learned about the phenomenon of Long
Range Transport of Air-Borne Pollutants. Therein lies the dilemma.
Much of the damage caused by acid precipitation occurs in Canada. Accordingly, the Canadian Government urges immediate action to abate sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions to prevent further damage.2 9 The United
States, while also concerned with the damage associated with acid rain, is
reluctant to commit the vast sums of money required for cleanup until
more information is available.80 To expend millions of dollars pursuing an
ineffective solution would not only be a waste of financial resources but
also would allow the damage to continue. The need for immediate action
must be balanced against the need for sufficient data to insure the most
appropriate and cost-effective solution.
A.

The Problem of Acid Rain

Acid precipitation is the product of a four-stage phenomenon known
as the Long Range Transport of Air-Borne Pollutants: emission of pollutants; the long-range transport of the pollutants through the atmosphere;
the chemical transformation of the pollutants into acids; and the eventual
deposition of acidic pollutants into the aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems
of the victim areas.
comparable.
Statement made by Thomas M. T. Niles, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,
before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment
of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on Feb. 10, 1980; reprinted in 82 DEP'T ST. BULL.
50, 51 (April 1982) [hereinafter cited as Niles].
Negotiations on transboundary pollution resumed for the third time on February 24,
1982, in Washington. The Canadian delegation offered a draft text of an agreement based on
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Between the United States and Canada to serve
as a basis for discussion. The subjects covered in the draft included the state of scientific
knowledge and the control actions taken by both nations. The United States continued to
press for stricter domestic regulation in Canada and, contrary to the Canadian position that
immediate abatement action is needed to lessen the probability of irreparable damage to the
environment, the United States took the position that a firm foundation of understanding
upon which to determine what measures would be necessary and effective in controlling
transboundary air pollution was needed, especially in view of the enormous cost of existing
technical approaches to controls. Id.
Reports from the various joint working groups will be subject to peer review and analysis before any of the results of their research will be considered in the negotiations. Canadian Environment Minister John Roberts has said Canada is willing to cut SO, emissions in
the eastern part'of Canada by fifty percent provided that the United States takes parallel
action. Some U.S. officials have rejected the Canadian challenge as purely a political move
to win public sympathy because Roberts knows there is no chance the United States will
take up the challenge. Canada maintains that a fifty percent reduction is necessary to meet
the objectives of the draft agreement tabled by Canada. [1982] 5 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA)
122 (May 12, 1982).
29. See Niles, id. at 51.
30. Id.
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It is beyond the scope of this Comment to present a detailed analysis
of the nature of acid precipitation and its resultant effects on the earth's
ecosystems. However, before proceeding with a discussion of possible dispute resolution mechanisms, a cursory explanation of the data underlying
the dispute will be instructive.
Chemistry
Initially, large quantities of sulfur and nitrogen oxides are emitted
into the atmosphere as by-products of industrial activity. Once in the atmosphere, the pollutants are transported great distances by wind currents. During the transport, the oxides combine with water vapor in the
air and are deposited on earth in rain or snow as sulfuric and nitric acids
(wet deposition).3 1 In contrast, dry deposition occurs when the chemicals
fall to earth as dry particulate matter and complete the transition to
acids by mixing with surface moisture.3
The nature of the chemical transformation is not precisely understood but, generally, "[p]recipitation becomes acidic when pollutants,
mainly sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, are further oxidized to acid
a resultant release of hydrogen ions in solusulfates and nitric acid with
''
tion, which causes acidity. "3
The determination of the acidity of a solution is called a pH measurement. The lower the numerical measure the greater the acid content.
Distilled water has a pH of 7 and is considered neutral. The Great Lakes
are slightly alkaline with an average pH of 8.0 to 8.5." Even without the
added factor of acid precipitation, "clean" rainfall has a pH of 5.6. Although such rain is slightly acidic, it produces no adverse effects even in
lakes with limited buffering capacity. The lower pH in "clean" rainfall is
due to carbon dioxide reacting with the water vapor in the air to form a
mild carbonic acid. However, with the additional amounts of sulfuric and
nitric acids present in the precipitation, it is not uncommon for acid rainfall in some areas to have a pH of 4.0, making it forty times more acidic
than "clean" rainfall.3 5
Through a process known as "loading," the pH of many lakes, as well
as forest and agricultural areas, is gradually being lowered because of increased amounts of sulfuric and nitric acids in the precipitation. The results of increased acidity are not easily observed in the short term. It is
only through cumulative, long-term deposition that the effects of acid

31. ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, THE CASE AGAINST THE RAIN: A REPORT ON
Acmic PRECIPITATION AND ONTA O PROGRAMS FOR REMEDiAL ACriON 1 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as CASE AGAINST THE RAIN.]
32. Id.
33. UNITED STATES-CANADA RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP, THE L.R.T.A.P. PROBLEM
IN NORTH AM~mcA: A PRELIMINARY OVERVIW 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT].

34. Id.
35. Id.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

loading become apparent.8 s
The principal exception to the gradual loading process occurs during
spring run-off. Acids present in the accumulated winter snowfall are suddenly released into the streams and lakes when the snow melts in the
spring. Large quantities of sulfuric and nitric acids are thus injected into
shallow streams, raising their acid level dramatically.3 7 This phenomenon
of "acid shock" may only last a few weeks, but it can have a devastating
effect on wildlife. Even well-buffered lakes can be adversely affected.
Smaller species of fish and amphibians are particularly sensitive. Females
may be unable to reproduce, and eggs may fail to hatch when their nesting waters are saturated with high levels of acid suddenly released by the
spring run-off."
Some areas possess more natural ability to "buffer" or neutralize the
gradual infusion of acids than other areas. Areas with alkaline soil or
lakebeds containing large deposits of limestone are much better able to
cope with acid precipitation. In these areas, as the acids fall to earth, they
are neutralized by the naturally alkaline properties of the soil or
lakebeds.39
Other areas do not possess such natural buffering capacities and are
much more sensitive to the influx of additional acids. As acid precipitation continues in these areas, their neutralizing capacity diminishes and
the acid level rises. As the natural buffering abilities of these areas is depleted, continued loading causes increased and more rapid acidification.
It is generally acknowledged that lakes with a pH of 5.5 or below are in
serious danger. At present, some lakes in the Adirondacks and MuskokaHaliburton regions have a pH of 4.0 to 4.5.40
Emission Sources
Approximately two-thirds of acid precipitation results from sulfur dioxide (SO,) emissions, and nitrogen oxides (NO x ) are responsible for the
remaining one-third." In Canada the principal sources of SO, emissions
are nonferrous smelting plants such as the International Nickel Company
(INCO) located in Sudbury, Ontario.4 The INCO smelter is the largest
single source of SO, in North America and is responsible for twenty percent of Canada's sulfur emissions."' INCO possesses the tallest smokestack in the world, giving it the capability of dispersing SO, pollutants

36. Id. at 2.
37. CASE AGAINST

THE RAm,

supra note 31, at 18.

38. Id.
39.

SECOND REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES-CANADA RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP ON

THE LONG RANGE TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTANTS 3 (Nov. 1980) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP SECOND REPORT.].

40. CASE AGAINST THE RAIN,supra note 31, at 3.
41. RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP

42. Id. at 6.

43. Id.

PRELIMINARY REPORT,

supra note 33, at 1.
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over great distances. In 1980, the government of the Province of Ontario
announced plans to reduce INCO's SO, emissions from 3600 tons per day
to 1950 tons per day by 1983."" Total Canadian sulfur emissions are approximately one-fifth those of the United States. 5
In the United States, two-thirds of sulfur emissions come from coalfired utility plants that burn high sulfur coal. 4' The majority of the offending utility plants are located in the Upper Ohio Valley, including
eastern Ohio, northern West Virginia, and eastern Pennsylvania. '
Major emissions sources can be located in a general sense. However,
the sheer number of individual sources in the United States and Canada
is such that it is impractical to attempt to identify each individual source.
Instead, many smaller individual sources may be collectively categorized
as "area sources."' 8 Some large individual facilities such as Sudbury's
INCO smelter produce such a volume of pollution that they can be individualized as "point sources" and evaluated individually.4"
Based on a yearly average, it is estimated that the United States deposits three to four times as much SO into the Canadian environment as
is deposited into the U.S. environment by Canadian sources.o Sulfur
emissions originating in the United States are responsible for approximately fifty percent of sulfuric acid deposition in Ontario and Quebec.",

44. CASE AGAINST THE RAIN, supra note 31, at 13.
45. RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 33, at 6.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.

Table 2 Tranaboundary Flux Estimates
(Tg S yl, millions of metric tons of S per year)
Method of
Canada to
Estimation
USA flux
I

Statistical trajectory model
(ASTRAP) (Shannon, 1979)

USA to
Canada flux

0.5

2

0.7

2

II Simple advention and decay model
(Galloway and Whelpdale, 1979)

The above models indicate the amount of sulfur moving from the United States into
Canada ranges from four to 2.86 times the amount of sulfur moving from north to south.
The models used above are judged to be accurate within a factor of two. As atmospheric
modeling methods are further refined, confidence in the validity and accuracy in their estimates will increase.
It should further be noted that atmospheric models indicate sulfur deposition; they do
not measure the deposition of harmful sulfuric and nitric acids. However, European studies
have indicated that "a reasonable similarity exists" between strong sulfate deposition and
strong acid deposition when observed over an "annual average period." Id.
51. A Stanford Research Institute study found the following.
[T]he total sulfur deposition in Southern Ontario and Southern Quebec

calculated to be from sources in the U.S. was 50,000 and 68,000 tons S[ulfur]
respectively for January and August 1977. This amount of deposition associ-
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The transportation sector accounts for roughly forty percent of NO,
emissions in the United States. Thirty percent of the emissions come
from electric utilities and the remainder comes from other combustion
sources." In Canada, the transportation sector accounts for sixty percent
of NO, emissions, other combustion sources for twenty percent, and electric utilities for ten percent.5 3 Due to increased development of electric
utilities in the future, it is thought that NO, emissions will increase at a
greater rate than will SO, emissions."
Assuming no further regulation of emission standards, total SO,
emissions will increase ten to fifteen percent by the year 2000, while NO X
emissions will increase fifteen to thirty-five percent due to increased industrial use of fossil fuels. By the year 2000, the quantity of SO and NOX
emissions will both be thirty to thirty-four million metric tons per year."
Adversely Affected Areas
Most of eastern Canada and large areas of the northeastern United
States lack sufficient buffering capacity and are extremely sensitive to the
injection of additional acids into their ecosystems. The fresh water lakes
of Ontario's Muskoka-Haliburton area and the Adirondack region of New
York State lie on granite bedrock with little buffering capacity and are
especially vulnerable. Both areas have already sustained heavy damage.
Rainfall in the protected wilderness area of the Adirondacks has an average pH of 4.1." Approximately fifty percent of 218 lakes studied in 1975
showed significant acidification.5 7 Twenty-five percent of the area's lakes
had a critical pH of less than 5.0.58 The fish population in at least 100
lakes above 610 meters in elevation has been totally eliminated due to
acidification.5 9 A corresponding loss of one million dollars annually in the
area's tourism revenues can be attributed to the decline in sport fishing.e0
The lakes studied in the Muskoka-Haliburton region of Ontario
showed a forty to seventy percent loss in buffering capacity over a ten-

ated with U.S. sources compares with 110,000 and 100,000 tons S[ulfur] deposited within Ontario and Quebec originating with Canada. The total in U.S.

regions calculated to be from sources in southern Ontario and southern Quebec
was 38,000 and 21,000 tons S[ulfur] for January and August.
Id. at 13.
52. UNITED STATES-CANADA MEMORANDUM OF INTENT ON TRANSBOUNDARY Am PoLLuTION: WORK GROUP 1, IMPACT ASSEssMENT INTERIM REPORT 1-3 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as MOI IMPACT ASSESSMENT INTERIM REPORT, Feb. 1981].

53. Id.
54. RzsRAc:H

CONSULTATION GROUP SECOND REPORT,

supra note 39, at 3.

55. Id. at 4.
56. RESKARCH CONSULTATION GROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 33, at 17.
57. MOI IMPAT ASSESSMENT INTERIM REPORT, Feb. 1981, supra note 52, at 3-18.

58. Id. at 3-21.
59. RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 33, at 17.

60. Id.
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year period.6" As a result, Ontario's fish population has declined substantially. An Ontario Ministry of Environment study in 1978 has documented the extinction of at least one species of brook trout. It is estimated that 2000 to 4000 Ontario lakes are already overly-acidified and
that their fish populations have been eliminated.6 ' It is possible that
48,000 Ontario lakes could be lost to acidification within twenty years."s
Quebec, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland have also documented environmental damage due to acid precipitation. There is evidence that increased
loading has produced a corresponding decline in Atlantic Salmon spawning in these areas."
Damage to terrestrial ecosystems has not been as well documented.
Much of the data has been collected through laboratory testing and more
research is needed under field conditions. The adverse soil effects documented in the laboratory include the leaching of basic cations such as
magnesium and calcium, damage to the foliage of crops, and decreased
productivity of forest and agricultural areas. It is believed that acid precipitation causes comparatively high concentrations of dissolved aluminum and other potentially toxic ions to be leached from the soils and
transported to acidified lakes, resulting in the gross disturbance of normal
ionic balances, with consequent degradation of fish habitats." This leaching of aluminum from the surrounding soil and subsequent deposition
into the acidified lakes "represents an important biogeochemical linkage
between terrestrial
and aquatic environments exposed to acid
precipitation."' "
In the United States, the areas containing acid sensitive soils are the
southeastern United States, the Appalachian Highland Regions, the
Adirondack Mountains, New England and the Great Lakes States. In Canada, the most sensitive agricultural areas are in Quebec and, to a lesser
degree, Ontario and the Maritime Provinces.
B.

United States Clean Air Act Overview

To better understand the international applications of section 115 of
the U.S. Clean Air Act, it is necessary first to discuss briefly the relevant
principles and policies of that act in the context of domestic air pollution
management. The primary purpose of the Clean Air Act is to promote the
public health and welfare by insuring that air quality meets certain standards.7 These standards are referred to as National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) and are established by the Federal Government

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP SECOND REPORT,supra note 39, at 19.
CASE AGAINST THE RAI, supra note 31, at 2.
RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 33, at 17.
RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP SECOND REPORT, supra note 39, at 17.

66. Id.
67. Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
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through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).'S
Two types of standards are employed. Primary standards are
designed to protect public health.ss Secondary standards are for the protection of the public welfare.70 The air quality standards are set by federal officials, but the responsibility for conforming with the standards
rests with the individual states.7 1 The precise method of reducing the pol-

lutants is left to the discretion of the states, but to ensure compliance
with the federally promulgated standards, each state is required to submit a detailed plan demonstrating where and by how much emissions will
be reduced.72 These plans are known as State Implementation Plans
(SIPS), and must be submitted for EPA approval. The individual states
must demonstrate to the EPA that their plan will achieve compliance
with federal standards by December 13, 1982. If a state cannot meet air

quality standards, the EPA and the73 federal government may intervene
and promulgate a SIP for the state.
Through New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), 74 stringent
control over emissions from plants constructed after 1970 is possible because new plants may be required to utilize the best available emission
reduction systems. 5 Unfortunately, there is much less control over
sources built prior to 1970. Controls on the older sources are only re-

quired if it can be shown that emission reductions are necessary to
achieve the NAAQS. Through the use of extremely tall smokestacks, the
pollution can be dumped high enough into the atmosphere to allow the
NAAQS to be met locally while the pollution is being transported through
the atmosphere to lakes and rivers hundreds of miles away.
It has been estimated that power plants constructed prior to 1970
emit an average of eighty-three pounds of SO, for each ton of coal
burned. In contrast, the power plants built after 1970 are required to emit

68. Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409. The U.S. Congress amended the Clean Air
Act in 1977. Clean Air Act Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 4362, 7401-7626 (Supp. IV 1980)). The purpose of the amendments was to
achieve certain specified air quality standards in regions where the ambient concentration of
pollution exceeds national standards and to prevent deterioration of air quality in regions
already cleaner than the ambient standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-08.
69. Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
70. Clean Air Act § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
71. Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
72. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
73. Id.
74. Id. For a discussion of New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), see Lutz, Managing a Boundless Resource: U.S. Approach to Transboundary Air Quality Control, 11
ENVTL. L. 321 (1981). The NSPS requirements for certified power plants have particular
relevance to the acid rain problem since seventy-five percent of the SO, emissions in the
eastern United States and Canada come from coal-fired utility power plants. See RESEARCH
CONSULTATION GaouP PRELIMINARY REcPORT, supra note 33, at 4-6.
75. Lutz, Laws of Environmental Management:A Comparative Study, 24 Am. J. Comp.
L. 447, 518 (1976).
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no more than an average of twelve pounds of SO. per ton of coal. 7 6
Scientists from the EPA estimate that power plants built prior to
1970 still have an average of twenty years useful life remaining." Unfortunately for Canada and upper New York State, these pre-1970 power
plants are cheaper to run due to the lack of emission controls, and the
utility companies are likely to continue to use older plants to maximize
profits. 78 Furthermore, the Reagan Administration's policy of promoting
even greater coal usage is expected to encourage the conversion of oilfired plants to coal usage.7 9 The oil-fired plants currently in operation
that convert to coal will not be covered under the NSPS. 80 The NSPS will
do much to insure that newly constructed power plants will not contribute massive amounts of SO. into the atmosphere but will do very little to
control pre-1970 sources.
C.

Canadian Clean Air Act Overview

Canadian provinces enjoy a much more autonomous relationship
with the Canadian federal government than do their American counterparts. The provinces tend to make minimal use of legal solutions and prefer to emphasize government-industry cooperation in the development of
pollution controls.81
The federal government promulgates advisory, nonbinding "national
ambient air quality objectives" 2 for specific pollutants. Federal objectives
become binding only if a province independently enacts legislation and
incorporates the federal objectives into the statute.
76. Wetstone, Air Pollution Control Laws in North America and the Problem of Acid
Rain and Snow, 10 Elrv'T L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 50001, 50007 (1980), citing Costle, New
Source PerformanceStandards for Coal-FiredPower Plants, 29 J. Am PoLLUxON CONTROL
A. 690 (July 1979).
77. Id.
78. In an address to the Air Pollution Control Association in Montreal, Quebec in June
1980, EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle stated in pertinent part:
We all know that many of our older industrial plants-particularly power
plants-are either minimally controlled or not controlled at all. New plants are
being built clean. Indeed if we could afford to wait 30 to 40 years, emissions
would inevitably drop as old plants are replaced by new. It should be clear to
everyone that, environmentally, we cannot afford to wait that long. Today, retirement schedules on older plants are being stretched out, not shortened. In
the meantime, the industrial base continues to grow and, with it, the amount
of acid deposition.
Reprinted in CASE AGAINST THE RAIN, supra note 31, at 9.
79. CASE AGAINST THE RAIN, supra note 31, at 11. "The conversion of these older U.S.
utilities to coal is anticipated to increase total U.S. SO, emissions by 16 per cent." Id.; See
also [1980] 3 INT'L ENV'T Rzp. (BNA) 91 (Mar. 12, 1980). (A 10 to 15 percent increase in
acid rain is expected due to the conversion to coal.)
80. CAsE AGAINST THE RAIN, supra note 31, at 11.
81. Wetatone, supra note 76, at 50012.
82. Canadian Clean Air Act, Can. Stat., ch. 47 § 4 (1970-71) (as amended Dec. 17,
1980), reprinted in [Reference file] 1 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) § 51, at 1901, 1902 [hereinafter cited as Canadian Clean Air Act].
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The Canadian Clean Air Act sets three ranges of air quality objectives: desirable, acceptable and tolerable. 83 The "tolerable" range is the
equivalent of the American primary standard and is the level of pollution
above which it is believed that human health will be affected. The acceptable range is comparable to the American secondary level and states the
levels of pollution above which the public welfare is deemed to be affected. The desirable range is Canada's long-term goal in pollution
control."
The federal government sets national emissions guidelines that are
applied to new sources only.85 The provinces set their own policies regarding emissions standards on existing sources. In the event a question
should arise as to Canada's compliance with an international pollution
agreement, the Canadian Department of the Environment may also set
emissions standards. 86
Under the American system, the power to deal with transboundary
pollution issues is relatively centralized in the federal government. Under
the Canadian parliamentary system, the possibility of a single national
response is precluded by a lack of a single locus of power. A system of
dual control is shared by the federal and provincial legislatures with
neither entity competent to take conclusive unilateral action.87 Thus, jurisdiction to deal with acid rain rests concurrently with the federal and
provincial governments, and, in order to deal effectively with the problem
of acid rain, the federal and provincial governments must coordinate their
efforts and enact the appropriate legislation at both levels of government.
The Canadian federal government, supported by the provincial governments, has taken the lead in negotiations with the United States. For the
present, the federal and provincial governments are unified in their quest
for a solution.
D.

Canadian Access Through Section 115

In 1977 the U.S. Clean Air Act was amended to facilitate the regulation of pollution generated within the United States that adversely affects
foreign countries." From the Canadian perspective, the most significant
language of the act concerns the granting of access to the American legal
system to a damaged foreign state. Section 115 of the amended Clean Air
Act reads as follows:
Endangerment of public health or welfare in foreign countries
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Canadian Clean Air Act, Can. Stat., ch. 47 § 4(1).
Wetstone, supra note 76, at 50012-13.
Canadian Clean Air Act, Can. Stat., ch. 47 § 8.
Id. § 7(1).
The Canadian Legislative Position, a speech by T. Bradbrooke Smith to the Confer-

ence on the Transnational Implications of Acid Rain, held Mar. 28, 1981 at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio; reprinted in 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 67
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Transnational Implications of Acid Rain].
88. Clean Air Act § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415.
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from pollution emitted in United States
(a) Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys
or studies from any duly constituted international agency has reason
to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United
States causes or contributes to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country
or whenever the Secretary of State requests him to do so with respect
to such pollution which the Secretary of State alleges is of such a nature, the Administrator shall give formal notification thereof to the
Governor of the State in which such emissions originate.
Prevention or elimination of endangerment
(b) The notice of the Administrator shall be deemed to be a finding under section 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) of this title which requires a plan
revision with respect to so much of the applicable implementation
plan as is inadequate to prevent or eliminate the endangerment referred to in subsection (a) of this section. Any foreign country so affected by such emission or pollutant or pollutants shall be invited to
appear at any public hearing associated with any revision of the appropriate portion of the applicable implementation plan.
Reciprocity
(c) This section shall apply only to a foreign country which the
Administrator determines has given the United States essentially the
same rights with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution
occurring in that country as is given that country by this section.
Recommendations
(d) Recommendations issued following any abatement conference
conducted prior to August 7, 1977, shall remain in effect with respect
to any pollutant for which no national ambient air quality standard
has been established under section 7409 of this title unless the Administrator, after consultation with all agencies which were party to
the conference, rescinds any such recommendations on grounds of
obsolence.8

Thus, section 115 allows the EPA to intervene in American administrative hearings on Canada's behalf.
Canada contends that pollutants rich in oxides of sulfur and nitrogen
originate in the upper Ohio Valley and find their way into the lakes and
rivers of eastern Canada causing considerable and possibly irreparable
damage to the ecosystem of that region."° Through section 115, if a determination is made by the EPA that pollution in the United States is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare in Canada and
that Canada affords the United States essentially the same rights of access to the Canadian legal system, the EPA could employ the Ohio SIP

procedure to abate the source of the pollution.9' The EPA could also, at
89. Id.
90. RpmsARcH CONSULTATION GROUP PmznINAsY REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
91. Clean Air Act § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415.
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its discretion, direct that Ohio's implementation plan be revised and that
92
Canada could participate in related hearings.
In 1980, the I.J.C. promulgated a report confirming that the Great
Lakes basin, including most of eastern Canada and portions of the northeastern United States, were sustaining significant damage due to the effects of acid precipitation originating in the United States. 93 Then, on
December 17, 1980, the Canadian Clean Air Act was amended to grant
the United States, or any foreign country, essentially the same rights of
access to Canadian jurisprudence as granted Canada under section 115 of
the U.S. Clean Air Act.94 The Canadian amendment was intended to mir-

92. Clean Air Act § 115(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b).
93. THE 1980 SEVENTH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION REPORT ON GREAT

LAKES WATER QuALrrY 49-54, as cited in DeSaillan, Acid Rain, Canada and the United
States: Enforcing the InternationalPollution Provision of the Clean Air Act, 1 B.U. Irr'L
L.J. 181, nn.261, 263 (1982). A summary of the pertinent findings of the I.J.C. report is
reprinted in [1980] 3 INr'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) 543, 544 (Dec. 10, 1980).
94. Canadian Clean Air Act, Can. Stat., ch 47 § 21.121.2. The amendment reads as
follows:
21.1(1) Subject to this section, where the Minister has reason to believe that an
air contaminant emitted into the ambient air by any source or sources of a
particular class or classes in Canada creates or contributes to the creation of
air pollution that may reasonably be expected to constitute a significant danger
to the health, safety, or welfare of persons in any other country, then, notwithstanding anything prescribed or otherwise provided pursuant to this Act,
whether before or after the coming into force of this section, the Minister shall
recommend to the Governor in Council with respect to that source or each of
those sources, as the case may be, such specific emission standards in relation
to that air contaminant, either alone or in combination with any one or more
other air contaiminants, as he may consider appropriate for the elimination or
significant reduction of that danger.
(2) Where the Minister proposes to make a recommendation under subsection (1)
(a) notice of the proposal and of the source or class or classes of
sources referred to in subsection (1) with respect to which he proposes
to make the recommendation shall be published in the Canada Gazette
and persons in Canada who would be affected by the prescription, if
any, of specific emission standards under section 21.2 on the basis of the
recommendation shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make
representations to the Minister in respect of the subject matter of the
notice; and
(b) a reasonable opportunity shall, in a manner prescribed by the
Governor in Council, be afforded for the making, with respect to the
proposal, of representations on the part of the country other than Canada that the Minister, in proposing to make the recommendation,
takes into consideration in accordance with subsection (1).
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) authorizes the Minister to make a recommendation thereunder with respect to any source referred to therein, other
than a federal work, undertaking or business, situated in a province unless
(a) notice of any representations made pursuant to subsection (2)
has been forwarded to the government of the province;
(b) the Minister has endeavoured to determine by consultation with
such government whether, in his opinion, the danger that he takes into
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ror its American counterpart for the purpose of removing any speculation
as to the extent of reciprocity granted the United States. In reference to
the Canadian amendment, Douglas Costle, former administrator of the

EPA wrote:
In my view the amendments to the Canada Clean Air Act give adequate authority to the government of Canada to provide essentially
the same rights to the United States as Section 115 provides to Canada ....
Both statutes allow the state or province, as appropriate,
to take action to remedy air pollution affecting a foreign country. If
the state or provincial government fails to develop an adequate remedy, the federal government is authorized to establish emission
limitations."
After examining the Canadian amendment in light of the I.J.C.'s findings
and recommendations concerning acid rain, Costle concluded that the initation of the section 115 procedures was warranted.
III.

WATER POLLUTION ISSUES

Although acid rain is one of the greatest sources of contention be-

tween Canada and the United States today, transboundary water pollution issues have also caused considerable disagreement between the two
nations. This portion of the Comment focuses on two industrial projects
which have been the basis of U.S.-Canadian environmental disputes. As
with acid rain, limited territorial sovereignty is the principle of interna-

consideration in accordance with subsection (1) for the purposes of the
recommendation can be eliminated, or reduced to an extent he considers
adequate, by means of any steps that such government may cause to be
taken pursuant to the laws of the province;
(c) where the Minister determines, pursuant to paragraph (b) that
the danger can be eliminated or so reduced, he endeavours to procure
that elimination or reduction; and
(d) the Minister takes into account, for the purposes of such recommendation, any representations so made.
21.2(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in Council may prescribe as a
specific emission standard any such standard recommended by the Minister
pursuant to section 21.1 if the Governor in Council is satisfied that the country
other than Canada, taken into consideration in accordance with subsection
21.1(1) for the purposes of such recommendation, has made provisions by law
for essentially the same kind of benefits in favour of Canada with respect to
abatement or control of air pollution as is provided in favour of that country
by virtue of this act.
(2) Where paragraph 21.1(3)(c) applies in respect of danger taken into
consideration in accordance with subsection 21.1(1) for the purposes of any
recommendation thereunder, nothing in subsection (1) authorizes any prescription on the basis of such recommendation unless the Governor in Council is
satisfied that a reasonable endeavour on the part of the Minister under that
paragraph has been unsuccessful.
95. Press release issued January 16, 1981, by Douglas Costle, Administrator of the EPA
prior to leaving office, reprinted in pertinent part in Carson, The American Legislative Position, The Transnational Implications of Acid Rain, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 72 (1982).
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tional law which is applicable to such disputes. In water pollution disputes, limited territorial sovereignty is applied in the doctrine of equitable utilization. Equitable utilization dictates that each coriparian state
has equal and similar rights in the use of shared waters. Witaschek best
expresses the doctrine: "The equitable utilization doctrine purports to
weigh the benefit to one state in use of water against the injury which
might result to another because of such use . .

.

A. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses Of InternationalRivers
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Rivers 97 (Helsinki
Rules) incorporate the doctrine of equitable utilization. Article IV of the
Helsinki Rules declares: "Each basin State is entitled, within its territory,
to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial use of the waters of
an international drainage basin." 8 Article V lists eleven factors which together determine what constitutes a "reasonable and equitable share" in
any given case, and advocates a weighing and balancing of all factors in
arriving at a final determination."
96. Witaschek, International Control of River Water Pollution, 2 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'v 35, 50 (1972). In apportioning the uses of water the goal is to maximize the benefit
and minimize the detriment to each coriparian. Id.
97. Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/274,
reprinted in INT'L L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE Fwir-SxcoND CONFERENCE AT HELSNIu 484
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules].
98. Id. art. IV. An international drainage basin is defined as "a geographical area extending over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters,
including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus." Id. art. II.
99.
(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article
IV is to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular
case.
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the
drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of
water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular
existing utilization;
(e)the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin
State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic
and social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the
basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the cobasin States
as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a cobasin State.
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Equitable utilization as it applies to transboundary water pollution
disputes, is given perfect expression in article X:
[A] State must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing water pollution in an international
drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of
a co-basin State, and . .. should take all reasonable measures to
abate existing water pollution in an international drainage basin to
such an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the territory of
a co-basin State ....
The rule applies to water pollution originating
.. . within the territory of the State, or. . . outside the territory of
the State, if it is caused by the State's conduct.'"
The comment to article X indicates the article finds its theoretical support in the principles enunciated in the Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel,
and Lac Lanoux cases. '
B. The Boundary Waters Treaty And
Commission

The International Joint

The Boundary Waters Treaty remains the instrument most directly
applicable to U.S.-Canadian transboundary water pollution disputes. The
Treaty's declared purpose is "to prevent disputes regarding the use of
boundary waters. . . and to make provision for the adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may. . arise. '' ' °0 The Treaty makes the
equitable utilization doctrine applicable to all water pollution disputes
between the United States and Canada: "[tihe waters herein defined as
boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.''1 03 In
article VIII, the Treaty states that "[tihe. . . Parties shall have, each on
its own side of the boundary, equal and similar rights in the use of the

(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is

a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.

Id. art. V.
10. Id. art. X.
101. Comment to art. X of the Helsinki Rules, reprintedin THE LAW OF INTERNATMNAL
BASINs 793 (A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited

DRAINAGE

as A.Garretson]. The comment to art. X also cites Soci6t6 Energie Electrique v. Compagnia
Imprese Elettriche Liguri, 64 Foro It. I 1036 (Corte cass., Italy, 1939) as theoretical support.
In that case, the Italian Supreme Court declared:
If this [State], in the exercise of its sovereign rights is in a position to
establish any regime that it deems most appropriate over the watercourse, it

cannot escape the international duty.., to avoid that, as a consequence of
such a regime, other (coriparian) States are deprived of the possibility of utilizing the watercourse for their own national needs.

Id. at 794.
102. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, preamble.

103. Id. art. IV.
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The drafters created the I.J.C. to further the purposes of the Treaty
and to resolve any transboundary water pollution disputes which might
arise between the two countries. 1" The I.J.C., as it operates under the
Treaty to manage transboundary water pollution disputes, is considered a
model in international cooperation. Not only is the I.J.C. regarded as having greater expertise in pollution matters than any similar international
body, " but it is also frequently commended for its nonpolitical character
which has allowed it to function independently and to remain largely invulnerable to outside political influences. 10 7 In fact, the I.J.C.'s most significant undertaking, an investigation specifically involving transboundary water pollution, resulted in the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1972.108 The agreement is seen by many as the most significant international agreement of its kind to date, as well as the most illustrative example of the successes a cooperative body such as the I.J.C. can
achieve in managing transboundary pollution problems. 10'
Referral Procedure Under the Boundary Waters Treaty
Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty provides that either country may submit a water pollution dispute to the I.J.C. for its investigation, study and report."0 The I.J.C. usually appoints a technical advisory
board to investigate the matter."' This board reports its findings to the
I.J.C., and the Commission makes its conclusions and non-binding recommendations on the basis of the information."11
Article X Jurisdiction
Article X grants the I.J.C. an arbitrative function. Under this article,
disputes are referred to the I.J.C. with the consent of both parties, and a
majority of the Commissioners may render a binding decision." s The
104. Id. art. VIII.
105. Id. art. VII.
106. J. BARntos & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 12, at 70-71; L. BLOOMFIELD & G. Frrzaan60-64, 517 (1958).
107. Arbitbit, supra note 9, at 350; Bilder, ControllingGreat Lakes Pollution:A Study
in United States-CanadianEnvironmental Cooperation,70 MICH. L. REv. 469, 519 (1972);
Note, A Primer on the Boundary Waters Treaty and the InternationalJoint Commission,
51 N.D.L. Rv. 493, 501 (1974).
108. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada,
23 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312.
109. J. BARuOs & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 12, at 71; L. BLOOMFiELD & G. FrTzGERALD,
supra note 106, at 517. The 1972 Agreement was in fact such a success that it served as the
basis for the 1978 Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United StatesALD, BouDMARv WATER PROELEUS OF CANADA AND THE UNrED STATES

Canada,
[1981] 4
110.
111.
112.
113.

30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257. Neither of these agreements is of treaty force.
Iwr'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) 927 (July 8, 1981).
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX.
Bilder, supra note 107, at 486-87.
Id.
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, art. X.
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I.J.C. has never received a referral under this Article," and the literature
is silent as to possible explanations for this fact. The most logical reason
is that Canada and the United States are reluctant to entrust a neutral,
non-political third party with final decision-making responsibility on such
contentious issues.
IV.

THE POPLAR RIVER DISPUTE

The purpose of the following discussion is two-fold: 1) to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms provided for in the Boundary
Waters Treaty to resolve transboundary water pollution disputes and to
posit reasons for the ineffectiveness; and 2) to show how, in one situation
at least, Canadians and Americans have been able to reach a negotiated
resolution of their differences based on compromise and conciliation.
In 1977, Canada and the United States requested the I.J.C. to report
on the predicted effects of a coal-fired thermal power plant under construction by the Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SPO) near Coronach,
Saskatchewan, about ten miles north of the Montana border."' SPC's
plans included the construction of an open-pit coal mine to provide coal
for power generation, as well as plans to dam the East Poplar River to
provide water to operate the plant."'
Problems arose when Montana residents discovered that fly ash from
the burning of coal would produce high boron levels in the waters of a
reservoir created by damming the East Poplar River. This polluted water
would in turn flow into the river at the international boundary, polluting
agricultural irrigation waters in Montana." 7 Construction continued despite bilateral negotiations on potential pollution and water loss injuries." O Upon referral of the matter to the I.J.C., the Commission appointed a technical advisory board of officials from the two federal
governments and the governments of Montana and Saskatchewan." 9
114. Bilder, supra note 107, at 484.
115. [1979] 2 INT'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) 622 (Apr. 11, 1979). The Saskatchewan Power
Corporation (SPC) is a Crown Corporation. Telephone interview with Michael Jay, Intergovt'l Officer with the Saskatchewan Dept. of Intergovt'l Affairs, Regina, Saskatchewan
(Oct. 8, 1981). A Crown Corporation is a "government agency" under Saskatchewan law. An
Act respecting the Administration, Planning and Use of the Water Resources of Saskatchewan, SASK. REv. STAT., ch. W-7, § 2(f)(ii) (1978) [hereinafter cited as Water Resources Act].
116. [1979 2 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 622 (Apr. 11, 1979).
117. Id.
118. Arbitblit, supra note 9, at 352. Reduced water flows and the increased demand for
water are of particular concern because the East Poplar River, although a river in name,
more closely resembles a creek in size. Telephone interview with George Rejhon, Environment Consular, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 7, 1981). Demand for increased
water quantities is an especially important factor in light of the fact the SPC has a second
unit on line and plans to construct two additional units. Telephone interview with John. E.
Carroll, Institute of Natural and Environmental Resources, University of New Hampshire
(Oct. 12, 1981).
119. Although the board members were government officials, they conducted their investigation in their individual rather than their representative capacities. Telephone inter-
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The I.J.C.'s interim report, submitted in February 1979, recommended withholding approval of the plant until further steps were taken
to reduce
boron discharges, placing responsibility for this task on the
SPC.1 2 0 In its report, the I.J.C. cited "unforeseen delays" as preventing it
from meeting the deadline set for submission of its final report. 12 1 While
this delay continued and because the two federal governments perceived
a growing need to defuse an issue rapidly becoming highly polarized and
emotional, the U.S. Department of State, the Canadian Department of
External Affairs and officials from Montana and Saskatchewan undertook
to resolve the problem independently of the

I.J.C..122

In September 1980, this group arrived at a resolution of the Poplar
dispute, one which has been deemed "innovative," "successful," "new,"
and "unique." 2" George Rejhon, Environment Consular at the Canadian
Embassy in Washington, D.C., credits the flexibility and "vagueness" of
the Boundary Waters Treaty as enabling negotiators, provided they are
operating with mutual goodwill, to devise creative and innovative solutions for these types of problems.""
The plan adopted in the resolution established a four-member Poplar
River Bilateral Monitoring Committee, consisting of public officials with
technical expertise from the two federal, the provincial and the state governments.12 The committee is to insure that data on the quality of water
flowing into Montana is exchanged at least quarterly so that unforeseen
pollution can be detected early. The committee must also report annually
to the federal governments summarizing the committee's main activities,
indicating water quality changes and making recommendations on the adview with Consular Rejhon (Oct. 7, 1981).
120. Note 116 supra.
121. [1980] 3 INT'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) 466 (Oct. 10, 1980).
122. Telephone interviews with Consular Rejhon (Oct. 7, 1981) and John E. Carroll
(Oct. 12, 1981). Professor Carroll believes the impetus for federal involvement came from
the inability of Montana and Saskatchewan to solve the problem between themselves. Originally, the federal governments had not wanted the state and the province involved in negotiations, but Montana insisted on participating. Hence, both were included. Federal government involvement served not only to provide for representation of the two local
governments most directly concerned but also to defuse somewhat the political side of the
issue.
123. Telephone interview with John. E. Carroll (Oct. 12, 1981). Professor Carroll points
out that the dispute was "resolved" rather than "solved" indicating perhaps that only a
temporary, as opposed to a permanent, settlement has been reached. He also mentions that
there are many people in Montana who would not call this arrangement a "solution."
124. Telephone interview (Oct. 7, 1981). Consular Rejhon is of the opinion that the
brief, less explicit nature of the Boundary Waters Treaty is characteristic of Canadian law,
rather than of American law. But see Note, A Primeron the Boundary Waters Treaty and
the InternationalJoint Commission, 51 N.D.L. Rav. 493, 495 (1974), which provides the
historical background of the Treaty. According to this article, the United States had far
greater bargaining power at the time of drafting than did Canada. As a result, the treaty
terms were more favorable to the United States. From this fact, it might be inferred that
the treaty is a more "American" document.
125. Telephone interview with John E. Carroll (Oct. 12, 1981).
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equacy of monitoring operations."'
The most interesting feature of the plan is its requirement that if the
monitoring committee finds, at any time, that the plant is discharging
pollutants at a higher level than is permitted under Saskatchewan law,

the Canadian Government shall immediately order the SPC to cease and
desist plant operation. Both federal governments have agreed to be bound
by the committee's findings in this regard, and to use the committee's
27
data as the basis for future decisions regarding plant operation.1

A cease and desist order is a far more stringent sanction than those

provided under the Saskatchewan Water Resources Management Act
(Water Resources Act). Under the Water Resources Act, the maximum
penalty levied on a polluting corporation is a civil fine. 28 A fine alone
provides little motivation for a polluter, especially a wealthy one, to comply with statutory obligations. It may be far less expensive to pay the fine

than it would be to develop and install proper pollution abatement devices. To this extent, the threat of a cease and desist order has much
greater likelihood of exacting compliance with provincial law. It also gives
the Poplar agreement a much needed enforcement mechanism.
When the I.J.C. finally submitted its water quality report in February 1981, its effect was to rubberstamp the creation of the bilateral committee. The I.J.C. conceded that Poplar River water quality and flows
would be adversely affected, though pollution and property damage were

not expected to be substantial." 9
The first unit of the plant began operation in July 1981, over continued American protest.8 0 As of mid-June 1982, the first unit was still the

126. Note 121 supra.
127. Telephone interview with John E. Carroll (Oct. 12, 1981).
128. The penalty provisions state:
(3) Where an offence is committed by a corporation, the corporation is
liable:
(a) for a first offence to a fine of not more than $1,000 and, in the case of
an offence under section 27 . .. to a further fine not exceeding $250 for each
day during which the offence continues; and
(b) for a second or subsequent offence to a fine of not more than $5,000
and, in the case of an offence under section 27 ... to a further fine not exceeding $500 for each day during which the offence continues.
(4) Where default is made in payment of any fine, costs or sum ordered to
be paid no imprisonment in default of the payment shall be ordered.
Water Resources Act, ch. W7, §§ 42(3)-(4). Section 27 says that "no person shall discharge,
deposit, drain or release any substance capable of changing the quality of water or causing
water pollution." Id. § 27. A cease and desist order becomes an even more stringent sanction
when one considers that the SPC has a monopoly on electrical generation in Saskatchewan.
Telephone interview with Michael Jay (Oct. 8, 1981).
129. Telephone interview with John E. Carroll (Oct. 12, 1981); [1981] 4 Ir'L ENW'T
Ru'. (BNA) 691 (Mar. 11, 1981). A report by the U.S. EPA contains the same findings.
Telephone interview with Michael Jay (Oct. 8, 1981).
130. Federal officials as well as Montana residents were among the most vocal protestors. [1981] 4 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1002 (Aug. 12, 1981).
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only one in operation. The second unit is scheduled to begin operation
sometime in the winter of 1982-1983. The SPC has not yet decided
whether to propose to the provincial government that the third and
fourth units be constructed.1 1 The Bilateral Monitoring Committee has
recently submitted its first annual report, in which it concluded that the
Poplar pollution situation was "satisfactory."' 18 ' The arrangement appears
to be working well and provides hope that similar solutions can be
reached in future disputes.
A.

Canadian Environmental Law-Impacts on the PoplarProject

Considering the potential for renewed disagreement over the Poplar
project if additional units begin operation, it is useful to assess what consideration the SPC might give to Canadian statutes and how effective
these statutes might be in resolving these potential disputes.
The Canada Water Act does not create a duty not to cause transboundary water pollution. The act specifically defines "interjurisdictional
waters, "1' 8

but provides that water quality management actions may be

taken in those waters only by joint federal and provincial initiative and
only when the water quality has become a matter of "urgent national concern.""' Therefore, it is likely that no action will be taken under this act
for alleviating the impact of water pollution in the United States unless
and until Canada, on its own initiative or under pressure from the United
States, determines that water quality in the area is a matter of "urgent
national concern."
Saskatchewan.law requires polluters to consider the possible international environmental implications of their activities. This duty only
arises, however, when a plan for development and use of river basin resources has been approved. The Minister of the Environment then has
discretion or, on occasion, may be ordered by the Lieutenant Governor in
Council, to consider the international environmental implications of the
13
plan.
131. Telephone interview with Wayne Nordguist, Director of Envt'l. Programs, SPC
(June 14, 1982).
132. Id.
133. Canada Water Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. 5, § 2.(1) (Supp. I 1970) (amended by ch.
14 (Supp. II)). "Interjurisdictional waters" are defined as "any waters, whether international, boundary or otherwise, that, whether wholly situated in a province or not, significantly affect the quantity or quality of waters outside such province." Under this definition,
the East Poplar River is an interjurisdictional water.
134. Id. § 11.(1)&(2). This section provides as follows: "Where, in the case of any interjurisdictional waters, the water quality management of those waters has become a matter
of urgent national concern. . . the Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the
Minister [of the Environment], designate such waters as a water quality management area
135. The Minister "may and when directed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council
shall... consider possible... international implications of any... project." Water Resources Act, § 10(2)(d).
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sThe Water Resources Act also gives the Minister discretion to consult and exchange information with any public, private or governmental
agency in Saskatchewan or elsewhere in order to promote coordination
between international plans for water resource development and use. " 6
These provisions will contribute little to future attempts to adjust
Canadian-U.S. differences regarding the Poplar project. The obligation to
consider transboundary effects arises only in certain limited circumstances, and at the discretion of Canadian officials. Neither the provisions
of the Boundary Waters Treaty nor of Canadian environmental law have
been as effective in controlling transboundary pollution as might have
been hoped.
V.

THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT

The successes achieved by Canada and the United States in reaching
a mutually agreeable resolution of their differences over the Poplar power
plant have, unfortunately, not been repeated in their dispute over the environmental impacts of the Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota.
The problems posed by Garrison are far more complex and controversial
than those presented by Poplar, and it is likely that the very enormity
and complexity of the issues has prevented the two countries from reaching a settlement. There are some hopeful signs, however, that an understanding may be reached in the future.
The Garrison Diversion Unit (Garrison or GDU), is a large-scale, extremely complex and highly controversial water diversion project in
North Dakota which, if construction continues as planned, will have significant environmental effects not only in North Dakota, but across the
187
border in Manitoba.

Garrison has been characterized as a "cause c6l~bre" in Canada.
Many Canadians see Garrison as a classic example of American insensitivity to Canadian problems in general, and to its environmental concerns
specifically.

8

Garrison, because of its controversial history, is an even more useful

vehicle than the Poplar situation for examining the inability of the I.J.C.
and of U.S. and Canadian domestic law to manage and to resolve transboundary water pollution disputes. The Garrison experience goes beyond
the Poplar experience to demonstrate that, when political interests are
deeply enmeshed in environmental disputes, treaty and statutory law will
be largely ignored and chances of reaching amicably negotiated settlement become vulnerable to and dependent upon the existence of positive
bilateral relations.

136. Id. § 10(3).
137. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, THF GARRISON DERSION UNr 32-33 (1980); telephone

interviews with James Payne, Esq., of Pepin, Dayton, Herman, Graham & Getts, Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 20 and Nov. 9, 1981).
138. Telephone interview with John E. Carroll (Oct. 12, 1981).
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Garrison was originally authorized in 1944 and the Garrison Dam
over the Missouri River in western North Dakota was completed in
1956.139 Congress reauthorized the project in 1965, along with plans for an
irrigation project, the Garrison Diversion Unit. 40 Construction began in
1967.141

The Garrison plan calls for the irrigation of 250,000 acres of land in
central and eastern North Dakota. Water diverted from the Missouri
River crosses the Continental Divide and eventually flows into the Hudson Bay Drainage Basin in Canada. Return flows from irrigation water
will empty into the Red and Souris Rivers, both of which flow into Manitoba and both of which also terminate in the Hudson Bay Drainage
Basin. 142
North Dakota's strong commitment to Garrison lies in the belief that
it will bring a much needed vitality to a traditionally lethargic economy.
North Dakota is a drought-prone state, three-fourths of whose income is
generated by agriculture. Its economic growth rate is slow by comparison
with that of other states and recreational activities in North Dakota are
quite limited. Greater water supplies from Garrison would increase agricultural productivity and revenues and enhance the state's recreational
resources. This would in turn promote the state's economic growth, making it a more attractive place to live. Urban communities will benefit from
more plentiful and higher
quality water supplies, which, it is hoped will
1 4
attract new business.

For the United States, Garrison's greatest drawbacks are its staggering costs and its tremendous adverse environmental impacts. The Garrison cost estimate, originally calculated at $250 million, 4 4 has now reached
$790 million,"" and critics of the project estimate the final bill may ex-

139. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 25-26. The Garrison Diversion Unit

[hereinafter cited as Garrison or GDU] was not implemented in 1944, although the Flood
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 78-534, ch. 665, § 9, 58 Stat. 887, 891 (1944) authorized it. Minnesota and South Dakota were the only two states which mounted any substantial opposition
to the measure in Congress. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 26.
140. The GDU was authorized by Act of August 5, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-108, 79 Stat.
433.
141. Note, An Analysis of the Scope of the Final Environmental Impact Statement on
the GarrisonDiversion Unit Project:Applying a Totality of CircumstancesTest, 53 N.D.L.
Rzv. 427, 431 (1977).

142. Goldberg, The GarrisonDiversionProject:New Solutions for TranboundaryPol-

lution Disputes, 11 MANITOBA L.J. 177, 178 (1981).
143. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 13?, at 9-12. Between 1930 and 1970, North
Dakota's population had dropped from 681,000 to 618,000. Id. at 10. This lowered its popu-

lation rank among the states from thirty-eighth to forty-fifth. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATsrIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 143, (1978), cited in id. at 10 n.3 An added
benefit, according to North Dakota's Dep't of Pub. Health, is that stream flows will be augmented, decreasing the concentration of pollutants during low-flow periods. J. CARROLL & R.
LOGAN, supra note 137, at 12.
144. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 12.
145. Id.
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It is argued that the cost of the project and the amount

of energy it will require are not justified when one considers the relatively
small number of farmers who will benefit from the project, and the fact
that the project will consume as much
presently productive agricultural
7
land as it will eventually irrigate."

Although Garrison's environmental impact will primarily be felt in
Manitoba, North Dakota will not be impacted lightly. Total dissolved
solids in GDU's return flows may exceed North Dakota standards. Garrison may also hurt the state's recreational waterfowl hunting industry by
reducing the waterfowl population."" Biota transfer into the American
portion of the. Hudson Bay Drainage area is an additional concern, although it affects Canada far more than it does the United States."
For Canada, Garrison's costs far outweigh any benefits to be gained.
Those limited benefits include an increase in the quantity of water entering Canada, which will in turn lower the concentration of pollutants in
the Souris River, provide more water for irrigation in southern Manitoba,
and increase minimally the hydroelectric generating capacity of certain
Manitoba plants.' 50
As for its costs, Garrison will cause increased flooding in the Souris
River Valley and substantially impair the quality of most water flowing
into Manitoba, necessitating greater water treatment expenditures. 151
However, Garrison's most destructive and controversial effect is the
transfer of foreign biota into Canadian waters. Technical devices to prevent some of this transfer are not expected to be sufficiently effective to
146 The National Taxpayers Union has pointed out that the projected cost of Garrison
is now estimated at $1,018 billion. Luoma, Water: GrassrootsOpposition Stymies Garrison
Diversion, AUDUBON, Mar. 1982, 114, 116-17.
147. For a more detailed discussion of these costs, see J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra
note 137, at 14-16.
148. Total dissolved solids (TDS) are a major water pollutant. The EPA study said
generally, in referring to the GDU, that many environmental effects of constructing and
operating the Garrison Diversion Unit will be severe and continuing. Examples of such effects include water quality degradation, flooding potentials, wetland loss through drainage,
and loss of critical wildlife habitat. With respect to TDS, the EPA predicted the GDU's
return flows might exceed North Dakota's water quality standards "during the period required to reach solid-water equilibrium in the irrigated areas, assuming full utilization of
sprinkler irrigation equipment and a high level of irrigation management." Letter from Russell E. Train, Administrator, EPA to Gilbert G. Stamm, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, dated Aug. 16, 1974, and entered at the I.J.C. hearing, Grand Forks, N.D., Nov. 19,
1975, in I.J.C. HEARINGs RECORD (Washington, D.C., 1975), cited in J. CARROLL & R. LoGAN, supra note 137, at 16 n.26.
In addition to reducing the waterfowl population, Garrison will also harm certain birds
protected under the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916,
United States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628, and the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1974). Other adversely affected wildlife include certain water-dependent terrestrial animals. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 18.
149. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 18.
150. Id. at 20.
151. Id. at 21-22.
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protect Manitoba from potential destruction of its entire commercial
fisheries industry. The costs to Manitoba of attempting to alleviate this
and other of Garrison's adverse impacts will be quite large and are of
course a major item in Garrison's overall cost-benefit ratio.15
A.

Garrison and the I.J.C.

Canada has opposed Garrison continuously since 1969. Formal Canadian complaints were lodged with the U.S. State Department in that year
and in 1971 and 1973. In response to the 1973 complaint, officials from
Canada and the United States met to discuss Canadian objections and
possible solutions. The meeting resulted in an impasse and a note from
Canada reminding the United States of its obligations under the Boundary Waters Treaty and requesting a moratorium on further construction
until the two countries agreed on measures to protect Canadian rights.
Although the United States refused to halt construction, Canada was encouraged by U.S. reassurances that, until its treaty obligations were met,
the United States would refrain from further construction which might
adversely affect waters flowing into Canada. As a result of this American
concession, Canada and the United States entered into a series of bilateral negotiations. After nearly two years of failed attempts to agree on
measures to alleviate Canadian pollution injuries, the countries finally referred the matter to the I.J.C. in October 1975.1"3
In August 1976, the two nations issued a joint communiqu6 in which
the United States again vowed to uphold its obligations under the Boundary Waters Treaty. Despite this pledge, Canada sent a Diplomatic Note
to the United States in October 1976, again requesting a moratorium and
expressing concern that as the United States spent even greater sums of
money on Garrison, it was becoming increasingly difficult to halt the momentum in support of the project. The U.S. reply promised not to proceed with Garrison until the I.J.C. submitted its report and reiterated the
pledge to uphold its treaty obligations. 5 4
In September 1977, the I.J.C. submitted its report. The Commission
was most concerned with the impact of biota transfer from the Missouri
Basin into the Hudson Bay Drainage Basin. This concern led the I.J.C. to
recommend that construction on the parts of the project affecting Canada
be halted until the problem was resolved. 55 The Commission further recommended that Canada and the United States negotiate a water quality
agreement for the Red and Souris Rivers which would set uniform quality

152. The commercial fisheries industry in Manitoba could lose as much as $6 million
annually if the sauger, walleye and whitefish populations in Lakes Manitoba and Winnipeg
were decreased by fifty percent. Of course, the losses would be much higher were the industry totally destroyed. Id. at 23. For a discussion of the total monetary losses Manitoba
stands to suffer, see id. at 23-24.
153. Id. at 29-30.
154. Id. at 35-36.
155. Id. at 37-39.
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standards for the entirety of these rivers even though they crossed an
international boundary. Professors Carroll and Logan have labeled this
"an innovative attempt to go beyond the 1909 Treaty and set a precedent
for the resolution of existing, and the prevention of future, transboundary
pollution problems."'' 6 Such an agreement would have eliminated the
need to set new standards every time a similar problem arose.15 7 Unfortunately, the negotiations never took place.'""
The United States was highly critical of the I.J.C. and its report. The
Department of State claimed the I.J.C., by declaring such one-sided disapproval of the project, had destroyed whatever bilateral negotiating leverage the United States might have had, and that the Commission had
perhaps wrongly expanded its traditional role by issuing such a harsh,
condemning report.' 5'
The I.J.C.'s recommendations for bilateral negotiations were never
acted upon, and the outcome of the dispute has been placed in the hands
of the U.S. courts, the U.S. Congress and the diplomats.
B.

The National Audobon Society Suit and the Congress

Garrison is the subject of a six-year old lawsuit in which the National
Audubon Society (NAS) has attempted to halt further land acquisition
and construction by the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), until an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which affirmatively accounts for
Garrison's impacts on Canadian waters has been approved.' 60 In May
1977, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia handed
down a stipulation which prohibited DOI from acquiring more land and
proceeding with construction until DOI filed a new EIS and proposed legislation to modify, reauthorize or deauthorize Garrison."6 '

156. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 40.
157. Id.
158. Telephone conversation with John E. Carroll (Oct. 12, 1981).
159. J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 44-45. North Dakota Governor Arthur
A. Link said of the Commission's work: "Rather than recognizing the flexibility of the
treaty, the Commission has adopted a position of absolute nondegradation. We must oppose
that concept. ... It may prohibit nearly every proposed water-related development on either side of the international boundary. This would be contrary to the national interest." Id.
North Dakota Att'y Gen. Allen I. Olson remarked:
The International Joint Commission is a product of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909. That Treaty is a product of international law. The I.J.C. must
conduct its investigations and make its recommendations within the four corners corners of the Treaty and international law. When it does not, it fails in
its responsibility to the two governments and reduces its credibility. It appears
from a first reading of this report that the I.J.C. may not have adhered to this
basic principle.

Id.
160. Id. at 42; telephone interview with James Payne (Oct. 20, 1981).
161. Telephone interview with James Payne (Oct. 20, 1981). The stipulation and order
read in partThe parties to this agreement recognize that the issues raised in the com-
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DOI submitted two new plans in 1978 and 1979, both of which were
rejected by Canada due to inadequacies in the plans' consideration of
I.J.C. recommendations. 1 12 DOI's final plan was submitted in April 1979,
with an admission that this new plan would still threaten Canadian interests. 16 3 The plan was never submitted to Congress and DOI's original
plan, authorized in 1965, is still in effect.1" 4

Regardless of the result of the NAS suit, Congress will ultimately decide whether construction proceeds. 1 65 Although the district court's injunction was in effect through most of 1981, Senate conferees attached
language overturning the injunction to an appropriations bill in Nov-

plaint are difficult and complex, and that their resolution in judicial proceedings is uncertain. A judgment entered in this case at this time may be a less
than satisfactory conclusion for the parties, or any of them, due to the range of
relief available to the court. In light of the difficulties associated with the litigation noted above and the uncertainties raised by the President's recommendations that the Garrison Diversion Unit be substantially modified, as well as
the issues pending to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between Canada
and the United States, the parties deem a stay of this judicial prodeeding to be
warranted.
Stipulation and Order, Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Cecil D. Andrus, (D.D.C., Civil No. 76-0943,
May 11, 1977), reprinted in J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 42. The agreement
set January 1, 1978, as the deadline for submission of the new Environmental Impact Statement and proposed legislation. The defendant was also required to submit a fish and wildlife mitigation plan and to include a discussion of compensation for losses resulting from
wetland drainage, stream channelization, cultivation of native prairie, creation of hazardous
nesting cover, adverse impacts on national wildlife refuges, introduction of rough fish, increased flows, and alteration of water temperatures. Id.
162. The Canadian Embassy's response stated that:
(T]he draft plan relates to the review of the proposed project being undertaken by the Administration in compliance with the stipulation entered into
and approved by the U.S. Federal District Court in May, 1977, which stayed
the suit of the Audubon Society against the Department of the Interior. As
such it does not appear specifically to consider the transboundary effects of the
project which were detailed by the International Joint Commission. Therefore,
as currently drafted, it does not address substantive Canadian concerns.
Letter from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to the U.S. Dep't of State, Mar. 31,
1978; reprinted in J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN, supra note 137, at 49. In its rejection of the
Department of the Interior's (DOI) 1979 proposal, a Canadian official said that "we were
truly disappointed to find that this latest plan is no more satisfactory in this regard than
either the 250,000 acre plan or the draft 96,300 acre plan proposed a year ago." Statement
by the Head of the Canadian Delegation at the Canada-United States Meeting on the Garrison Diversion Unit, Mar. 28, 1979, reprinted in id. at 50-51.
163. DOI conceded that interbasin transfer of fish from the Missouri River Basin to the
Hudson Bay could result from this project. As for the passage of fish into Lake Winnipeg,
"[Tlhere is presently no screening device that can be guaranteed to be 100 percent effective." Statement by the Head of the Canadian Delegation at the Canada-United States
Meeting on the Garrison Diversion Unit (Mar. 28, 1979), cited in J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN,
supra note 137, at 51 n.14.
164. Telephone interview with James Payne (Oct. 20, 1981). Mr. Payne believes continuing Canadian objections to the plan kept it from even preliminary review in the U.S. Office
of Management and Budget.
165. Luoma, supra note 146, at 117.
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ember 1981. The House of Representatives deleted this language. The result was that money had been appropriated but the injunction preventing
construction was still in effect. Then, in January 1982, the court of appeals stayed the injunction. As of mid-June 1982, construction had been
allowed to proceed and DOI had promised to consult Canada on plans -for
those portions of the project adversely affecting Canadian waters. Ad hoc
discussions were being held between DOI and officials from the Canadian
federal and Manitoba provincial governments, while neither the U.S.
House of Representatives nor the Senate had yet acted on DOI's 1982
appropriations request.1
If funds are not appropriated, momentum for Garrison may diminish.
If money is appropriated and construction continues, then it remains to
be seen how effectively DOI and Canadian officials can negotiate an arrangement which will protect Canadian interests. It will be a delicate process, but the Poplar River experience proved it is possible and the foundation may already have been laid by the discussions currently taking
place. These discussions are another hopeful sign of increased bilateral
cooperation in the future.
VI.

THE AMERICAN-CANADIAN

DRAFT TREATY PROPOSALS

At present there is no mechanism for achieving a definitive resolution
to environmental disputes between the United States and Canada. To
that end, in August 1979, the American and Canadian Bar Associations
(ABA and CBA) approved and recommended to the U.S. and Canadian
Governments, as a possible basis for negotiation, two draft treaties: a
draft treaty on a regime of equal access and remedy in cases of transfrontier pollution between the United States and Canada; and a draft
treaty on third-party settlement of disputes related primarily to the interpretation, application or operation of any treaty in force between Canada and the United States.16 7 The following is a discussion, based on the
drafters' comments, of the relevant portions of the draft treaties.
A.

Equal Access and Remedy

The thrust of this proposal is that persons in both countries should
have equal access to judicial and administrative procedures for the prevention of, and compensation for, pollution damage. The treaty proposes
not a new legal system but the "adjustment of the two countries' existing
municipal legal systems to accomodate equally residents of both in pollution disputes. ' The Joint Working Group of the ABA and CBA (Work-

166. Telephone interview with Richard Wegman, Esq., of Wellford, Wegman, Krulwick,
Gold and Hoff, Washington, D.C. (June 15, 1982).
167. King & Smith, Preface to ABA-CBA S rrLEawNT TR~iTas, supra note 4, at v.
168. REPORT TO THE ExEcuTIvE AND To THE 1979 ANNuAL MEETING OF THE CANADIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION (July 1979); reprinted in ABA-CBA SETTLEMENT TREATIES, supra note 4,
at xxxiii.
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ing Group) relied heavily on the 1977 OECD Recommendation of the
Council for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and
Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution.'"
Article 1 defines the descriptive terms to be used. It is foreseeable
that the legislatures of the two countries could use different definitions of
operative terms in pollution legislation.7I This could lead to litigation
even before the substance of the dispute is reached. The drafters voiced
their concern that the treaty contain an agreed "neutral set of
definitions."""
The main operative provisions are in article 2. The "country exposed"'' to the pollution must be granted the same rights of access in
the "country of origin" 7 as would the country of origin's own citizens in
cases of similar domestic pollution. Were Canada to pursue legal action in
the United States, it would have to be offered access to all judicial and
administrative proceedings that would be available to American citizens
pursuing a similar matter. ' The equal access guarantee applies to remedies in state and provincial courts as well as in federal courts. Quasi-judicial remedies are also available. In instances where the remedy sought
would be prospective in nature, the quasi-judicial remedies would be most
effective. The right to prevent possible future injury is equally as significant as the right to pursue an after-the-fact remedy such as damages and
abatement.
Under article 3 the right of access extends to private environmental
organizations as well as public agencies if counterparts in the other country enjoy a similar opportunity.175 A significant requirement of notice is
placed on the polluting party in article 4 which requires adequate notice
be given to the affected parties to allow them an equal opportunity to act
and take full advantage of their rights under this treaty.'7 6 For example,

169. See OECD Recommendation of the Council for the Implementation of a Regime of
Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution (442d
mtg.); reprinted in ABA-CBA STrLsEmNTREATIES, supra note 4, at 97.
The recommendation was the result of several years study. The OECD decision is in the
form of a general recommendation elaborated by ten principles. The principles include an
obligation to exchange all information relevant to transfrontier pollution. The OECD also
recommended making the remedies in the judicial system of each country available to residents of other countries. ABA-CBA SErTLEMENT TRATIES, supra note 4, at 43.
170. Draft Treaty on a Regime of Equal Access and Remedy in Cases of Transfrontier
Pollution, art. 1 [hereinafter cited as Draft Treaty on Equal Access], reprinted in ABA-CBA
SETrLEmENT TREATIES, supra note 4, at xiii. For a complete text of the Draft Treaty on
Equal Access, see Appendix A.
171. Draft Treaty on Equal Access, id. art. I; Drafters' comment in REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA-CBA JoiNr WORKING GROuP, reprinted in ABA-CBA SgIrLsENTr
TREATIES, supra note 4, at 47.
172. Draft Treaty on Equal Access, supra note 170, at art. 2.
173. Id.
174. Id. art. 2(a).
175. Id. art. 3.
176. Id. art. 4.
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if the United States were planning a new dam project or planning to relax
emission standards on coal-fired utility plants in Ohio which would adversely affect the Canadian environment, the United States would be required to give notice of the proposed changes in a timely manner to enable the Canadian Government or private Canadian environmental
organizations to intervene before the fact.1 7
Residents of the exposed country are granted the same rights as residents of the country of origin. 17 8 The treaty is not intended to create
any rights greater than those belonging to a citizen of the polluting country. The "equal access" treaty is intended to put all persons in both countries on an equal footing in any pollution proceeding in either country.
B.

Third Party Arbitration

At present there is no system in place which can assure a definite
resolution of intergovernmental disputes. Even between two countries
with relations traditionally as cordial as those between the United States
and Canada, it is unrealistic to expect all disputes to be conclusively dealt
with by negotiation. Relations between the two nations continue to grow
in complexity and become even more convoluted and interwoven. Binding
third-party arbitration is one way to ensure the manageability of
relations.
The arbitration draft treaty discussed below restricts compulsory
binding arbitration to disputes about treaty interpretation. 7 9 The proposed draft treaty is then "an appeal for a mutual commitment to the
1' s
final authority of law in the government of the two countries' affairs."
Since arbitration is an ad hoc procedure, the parties retain control
over the composition and procedure of the panel for each case." ' The
arbitration can be kept self-contained, and unrelated issues cannot be
linked to the issue at hand in order to force a resolution of the unrelated
issue.
Article 1 limits compulsory arbitration to matters involving the interpretation, application and operation of treaties binding on both countries.
In disputes involving both treaty and nontreaty legal disputes, compulsory arbitration will not extend to the non-treaty issues" 2 unless the nontreaty issues are essential to the treaty issues in dispute. Treaty interpre-

177. Id.

178. Id. art. 5.
179. Draft Treaty on Third Party Settlement of Disputes Relating Primarily to the
Interpretation, Application or Operation of any Treaty in Force Between Canada and the
United States [hereinafter cited as Treaty on Third-Party Settlement], reprinted in ABACBA SETTLEMENT TREATIES, supra note 4, at xxi. For the complete text of the Treaty on

Third Party Settlement, see Appendix B.
180. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA-CBA JOINT
printed in ABA-CBA S rrL.zNT TREATIES, supra note 4, at 58.

181. Id.
182. Id.

WORKING
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tation or application is particularly well suited for international arbitration because, as an ad hoc procedure, "the parties retain control over the
composition and procedure of the panel for each case, thus giving it the
advantages of flexibility and relative informality."' '
It is important to note that it is explicitly recognized that negotiation
is to be the first step toward arbitration.' 8 Arbitration is viewed as the
last resort, and, until all other avenues of resolution have been exhausted,
the arbitration tribunal will not accept jurisdiction.
Disputes concerning issues other than treaty interpretation may be
heard by the arbitration tribunal only through ad hoc agreement of both
countries."" Article 2 offers some examples of non-treaty issues the arbitral court has optional jurisdiction to hear. "Environment issues" is specifically mentioned. 8 "Ripeness" of an issue becomes relevant when considering the timing of an agreement to arbitrate. Once a dispute is
deemed "ripe" for settlement, it is important that arbitration proceed as
expeditiously as possible. It is specified in article 2 that an exchange of
diplomatic notes is sufficient to start the process in motion.
Under the treaty, disputes are to be resolved by a three-person arbitral tribunal or, if the parties cannot agree on its constitution within 120
days, the matter is to be referred to a special Chamber of the I.C.J. 8 1 One
national of each Party shall serve as a judge in the Chamber. The third
judge is to be chosen through ad hoc agreement of the two nations.
The scope of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is to be decided by
the tribunal itself. 8 8 It is likely that disputes between the parties will
arise as to the scope of jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear the dispute. To
avoid confusion and delay, final settlement of such points must be left to
the tribunal itself. Both countries by submitting to binding arbitration
implicitly agree to be regulated by the decision of the tribunal. 8
As the system of arbitration is designed for the sole use of the United
States and Canada, there exists a unique opportunity to develop a "North
American jurisprudence.' 10 The primary legal reference in the arbitration proceedings is to be international law. However, due to the similarities in the legal backgrounds of both countries, emphasis will be placed
on the common principles of the two legal systems. 9" Thus, if the United
States and Canada share a common interpretation of a rule of interna-

183. Id.
184. Treaty on Third-Party Settlement, supra note 179, at art. 1.
185. Id. art. 2; drafters' comment in REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA-CBA
JOINT WORKING GROUP, reprinted in ABA-CBA SETrLEMENT TREATIES, supra note 4, at 69.
186. Treaty on Third-Party Settlement, supra note 179, at art. 2.
187. Id. art. 3(a)&(b).
188. Id. art. 4.
189. Id. art. 5.
190. Id. art. 8; drafters' comment in REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA-CBA
JOINT WORKING GROUP, reprinted in ABA-CBA SETTLEMENT TREATIES, supra note 4, at 84.
191. Treaty on Third-Party Settlements, supra note 179, at art. 8.
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tional law, the tribunal will follow the Canadian-U.S. interpretation regardless of international practice. Conversely, if the two countries' international practices differ, the prime reference will be international law. If
neither of the above produces an answer, the internal practices of the two
countries will be examined. Article 8 also allows the parties to specify
their choice-of-law rules in an ad hoc agreement or to agree that no particular laws will be applied.
In addition to providing that the United States and Canada agree to
be bound by the findings of the tribunal, article 9 also provides that in
the event a domestic law or piece of legislation was violative of international law, the tribunal is empowered to specify alternative relief such as
damages ' 19 since it may not be possible for Canadian or U.S. representatives to ensure the reversal of a judicial decision or enactment of new
legislation to remedy the situation.1'8 Paragraph 2 of article 9 allows either party to request a clarification of any tribunal decision.'" However,
the parties are not granted the power to seek a revision of a judgment. It
is the reasoning of the drafters that permitting the revision of judgments
would cause uncertainty as to the resolution of a dispute and thereby de.
feat the purpose of the treaty."5
The final article allows the parties to request the tribunal to hand
down a non-binding advisory opinion. With the availability of advisory
opinions, it is expected that both countries will be more likely to make
use of arbitration procedures and to submit difficult cases to such procedures. 1"' The advisory procedure is available only through an ad hoc tribunal. The Statute of the I.C.J. would not permit the United States and
Canada to seek advisory opinions directly from the Court or a Chamber.'" It is likely, however, that should there be a need for an advisory
opinion through a special Chamber of the I.C.J., an appropriate procedure could be improvised through UN channels."99
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

Between two countries as politically and economically interrelated as
the United States and Canada, it is to be expected that disputes will
arise. The majority of these disputes have been handled satisfactorily by
the ad hoc process of negotiation.
192. Id. art. 9.

193. Id.; drafters' comment in REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA-CBA JOINT
WORKING GROUP, reprinted in ABA-CBA SwrnzumNT TmTms, supra note 4, at 87.
194. Treaty on Third-Party Settlements, supra note 179, at art. 9.
195. Id.; drafters' comment in REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA-CBA JOINT
WORKING GROUP, reprinted in ABA-CBA S-rrzMEN TREATIES, supra note 4, at 88.

196. Id. art. 10; drafters' comment in REPORT AND REcoMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA-CBA
JOINT WORKING GROUP, reprinted in ABA-CBA SrrmEzwr TRzATIES, supra note 4, at 8990.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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The present acid rain dispute has escalated into a major foreign policy issue for both countries. In any dispute, domestic or international,
there are many factors at work simultaneously. No dispute of this magnitude can be considered in a vacuum. Both countries must consider the
political, economic, sociological, and environmental implications of any
action taken. In the case of acid rain the need for immediate action to
prevent further damage must be balanced against the necessity of compiling sufficient data to be sure that the source of the pollution is correctly
identified and the most effective curative measures are taken. Aside from
the billions of dollars estimated for the cleanup, any time spent pursuing
an incorrectly identified source is not only a waste for its own sake but, in
addition, allows the pollution to continue while blind alleys are
investigated. 99
Even though the Canadian amendment essentially mirrors section
115, other factors such as the Canadian Government's practice and implementation standards must also be considered before reciprocity in fact is
determined to exist. The EPA must determine if Canadian legislation
gives sufficient authority to the Government of Canada to provide essentially the same right to the United States. It must also be determined
that Canada is exercising and interpreting that authority in a similar
manner. Negotiations required by the Memorandum of Intent signed in
August 1980 will provide a forum for clarifying the status of the two reciprocity clauses. At present, it is too early to examine Canadian policy as
to the federal government's powers granted under sections 21.1(1) and
21.2(1) of the Canadian Clean Air Act.20 0
After a period of intense dissatisfaction and frustration with the progress of negotiations, brought on by an American statement that the fifty
percent reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions proposed by Canada was
"scientifically premature and too costly for tough economic times," 0 1 Canada appears to be much more optimistic. Canada's Mark MacGuigan
met with George Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State, and was buoyed by
Schultz's positive attitude toward achieving significant progress in the
acid rain dispute. 02 Canadian hopes were further strengthened when the
U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee almost unanimously approved an amendment to the U.S. Clean Air Act requiring
thirty-one states to reduce SO, emissions by eight million tons over the
203
next twelve years.

199. Marvin Moss, director for program integration of the analysis division of the U.S.

Department of Energy, was quoted as saying, "[i]t
is not clear by any means that if you cut
emissions of sulfur dioxide in the eastern part of the United States by 50 percent that you
will see a 50 percent reduction in acid rain over the continental U.S." [1982] 5 Ir'iL ENV'T
RFP. (BNA) 280 (July 14, 1982).
200. [19811 4 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 684 (Mar. 11, 1981).
201. Note 199 supra.
202. [1982] 5 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 312-14 (Aug. 11, 1982).

203. Id.
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While bilateral water pollution disputes have not received the popular attention that has been given to the acid rain problem, water issues
are no less important, nor any easier to resolve. Both the Poplar power
plant situation and the dilemma surrounding the Garrison Diversion Unit
indicate the extent to which political considerations and the general state
of bilateral relations can complicate and confuse efforts to arrive at workable solutions to shared environmental problems. The Poplar power plant
"resolution" seems to be effective, while the future of the Garrison Diversion Unit remains uncertain. Current negotiations are a hopeful sign that
the dispute may be resolved without resort to further litigation. Experience with both these projects indicates that the chances of reaching negotiated settlements of future environmental disputes will depend in large
part on the extent to which diplomats and negotiators can separate the
environmental issues from the greater political issues.
It is possible that binding arbitration is not the most appropriate vehicle for resolution of these environmental disputes. Given the realities of
international politics, it is possible that a decision wholly on the legal
merits would be too one dimensional to provide a realistic and mutually
satisfactory resolution. Neither country may be willing to risk a binding
third party resolution and instead probably would opt for a course of continued negotiation. It is ironic that the very issues which prompted the
development of the ABA-CBA draft treaty proposals may prove to be the
same issues that neither party is willing to entrust to them.

APPENDIX A
Draft Treaty on a Regime of Equal Access and Remedy in Cases of
Transfrontier Pollution
Article 1: Definitions
For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) "Pollution" means any introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substance or
energy into the environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger
human health, harm living resources or ecosystems, impair amenities or interfere with other
legitimate uses of the environment.
(b) "Domestic pollution" means any intentional or unintentional pollution, the physical
origin of which is situated wholly within the area under the jurisdistion of one Party and
which has effects within that area only.
(c) "Transfrontier pollution" means any intentional or unintentional pollution whose
physical origin is subject to, and situated wholly or in part within the area under the
jurisdiction of one Party and which has effects in the area under the jurisdiction of the other
Party.
(d) "Country of origin" means the Country within which, and subject to the jurisdiction of
which, transfrontier pollution originates or could originate in connection with activities
carried on or contemplated in that Country.
(e) "Exposed Country" means the Country affected by transfrontier pollution or exposed to
a significant risk of transfrontier pollution.
(f) "Persons" means any natural or legal person, either private or public.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

Article 2: Rights of Persons Affected
(a) The Country of origin shall ensure that any natural or legal person resident in the
exposed Country, who has suffered transfrontier pollution damage or is exposed to a risk of
transfrontier pollution, shall at least receive equivalent treatment to that afforded in the
Country of origin, in cases of domestic pollution or the risk thereof and in comparable
circumstances, to persons of equivalent condition or status resident in the Country of origin.
(b) From a procedural standpoint, this treatment shall include but shall not be limited to
the right to take part in, or have resort to, all administrative and judicial procedures
existing within the Country of origin, in order to prevent domestic pollution, to have it
abated, and/or to obtain compensation for the damage caused.
(c) In the case of requirements for security of cost, this treatment shall at least be
equivalent to that accorded to a nonresident national of the Country of origin.
Article 3: Rights of Public and Private Organizations
(a)(1) Where the domestic law of either Party or a political subdivision there of permits
persons who are resident or incorporated within its own territory, such as environmental
defense associations, to. commence or to participate in administrative and judicial
procedures to safeguard general environmental interests, that Party or subdivision shall
grant the same rights for comparable matters to similar persons resident or incorporated in
the territory of the ot her Party, provided that these persons satisfy the conditions laid
down for persons resident or incorporated in the Country of origin.
(2) When some of the conditions concerning matters of form laid down in the Country or
origin cannot reasonably be imposed on persons resident or incorporated in the exposed
Country, these latter should be entitled to commence proceedings in the Country of origin if
they satisfy comparable conditions.
(b) When the law of a Party of a political subdivision thereof permits a public authority to
participate in administrative or judicial procedures in order to safeguard general
environmental interests, that Party shall provide competent public authorities of the
exposed Country with equivalent access to such procedures.
Article 4: Notice to Persons in the Exposed Country
(a) The Country of origin shall take any appropriate measures to provide persons exposed to
a significant risk of tranafrontier pollution with notice sufficient in form and content to
enable them to exercise in a timely manner the rights referred to in this Treaty. As far as
possible, such notice should be at least equivalent to that provided in the Country of origin
in cases of comparable domestic pollution. It shall be sent also to any authority designated
for this purpose by the exposed Country.
(b) The exposed Country may designate one or more authorities which will have the duty to
receive and the responsibility to disseminate such notice within limits of time compatible
with the exercise of existing procedures in the Country of origin.
(c) Where such an authority has been designated, notification to it shall constitute
fulfillment of the obligation of the Country of origin under paragraph (a). Failure of the
exposed Country to designate an authority under paragraph (b) in no way affects the
obligation of the Country of origin under paragraph (a).
Article 5: Limitation of Rights Granted
In no event shall the provisions of this Treaty be construed as granting, per se, any
greater rights to persons resident or incorporated in the exposed Country than those
enjoyed by persons of equivalent condition or status resident or incorporated in the Country
of origin.
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APPENDIX B
* Draft Treaty on a Third-Party Settlement of Disputes
Article 1: Compulsory Jurisdiction
In any dispute between the States Parties, any question of interpretation, application or
)peration of a treaty in force between them, which has not been settled within a reasonable
,ime by direct negotiations or referred by agreement of the Parties to the International
,ourt of Justice or to some other third-party procedure, shall be submitted to third-party
iettlement at the written request of either Party addressed to the other's cabinet officer in
-harge of foreign affairs, or by an exchange of notes between the two.
Article 2: Optional Jurisdiction
1. Any other dispute between the States Parties relating to a question or principle of
international law may be submitted to third-party settlement by special agreement between
Lhe Parties. Without limiting the generality of this principle, the Parties regard disputes
concerning the following matters as particularly appropriate subjects for such special
agreements:
a. pecuniary claims in respect of losses or damage sustained by one of the Parties or its
nationals as a result of acts or omissions of, or attributable to, the other Party;
b. immunities of States and of their agencies and subdivisions;
c. privileges and immunities of Heads of States, Foreign Ministers and other high
officials;
d. consular privileges and immunities;
e. treatment of the other Party's nationals;
f. environmental issues;
g. the management of natural resources of common interest; and
h. transnational application of civil and criminal laws.
2. The special agreements referred to in the previous paragraph shall, for each case or
group of cases, become effective through an exchange of diplomatic notes without any
legislative action.
Article 3: Organization of Third-Party Settlement
Unless the parties otherwise agree in a particular case, third-party settlement pursuant to
Article 1 or Article 2 above shall be organized in each case as follows:
(a) Within 60 days either of the receipt by the other Party of the request for third-party
settlement or of the date of signature of a special agreement, as the case may be, each of the
Parties shall appoint one member of the arbitral tribunal. Within a further period of 60
days the Parties shall, by common agreement, select a third person who shall be the
Chairman of the tribunal. If no agreement is reached on the selection of a Chairman within
this period, either Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to
make the appointment. If the latter is prevented from acting or is a national of one of the
Parties, the nomination shall be made by the Vice-President of the Court. If the latter is
prevented from acting or is a national of one of the Parties, the appointment shall be made
by the senior judge of the Court who is not a national of either Party. The time limits
specified in this paragraph may be extended or shortened by agreement of the Parties.
(b) If, for any reason, a tribunal is not constituted pursuant to the previous paragraph
within 120 days of the receipt of the request for arbitration or of the date of signature of the
arbitral agreement, either Party may, by written application, submit the dispute to the
International Court of Justice, to be decided by a Chamber thereof composed in accordance
with the following paragraph. The acceptance by the Parties of the jurisdiction of the Court
and its special Chamber is subject to the condition that the Chamber has been established
in accordance with that paragraph.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

(c) The Parties agree that either of them will be authorized to request, at the time of
submitting a dispute to the Court, that the Court form a Chamber for consideration of the
case pursuant to Article 26(2) of the Court's Statute and Articles 17 and 18 of its Rules,
consisting of three judges, one national of Canada, one of the United States, and one of
another State to be agreed upon by the Parties. If, at the time of application, one of the
States Parties does not have a national on the Court, it shall, pursuant to Article 31(2) of
the Court's Statute, nominate a person to sit as judge. If there is no agreement between the
Parties on the third member of the Chamber within 30 days of the submission to the Court
of an application pursuant to the previous paragraph, or if a Party with no national on the
Court does not nominate a person to sit as judge within such time, that member or those
members shall be elected by the Court from among its members. In any such case the
Parties may jointly request that any election be made from among judges coming from a
particular legal system or tradition.
(d) Vacancies which may occur in an arbitral tribunal composed according to paragraph
(a) above shall be filled in such manner as provided for original appointments. Vacancies
occurring in the Chamber of the Court established pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) above
shall be filled in accordance with the Statute and Rules of the Court.
Article 4: Competence
1. The arbitral tribunal or the Chamber of the Court constituted in accordance with Article
3 shall have jurisdiction in any question or dispute submitted to it in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty.
2. Any disagreement (a) as to whether such tribunal or Chamber has jurisdiction under this
Treaty or any agreement concluded pursuant thereto, or (b) as to the extent of such
jurisdiction, shall be settled by the decision of that tribunal or Chamber.
Article 5: Provisional Measures
1. An arbitral tribunal which considers prima facie that it has jurisdiction under this Treaty
or an agreement concluded pursuant thereto shall have the power to prescribe, by order, any
provisional measures which it considers appropriate to preserve the respective rights of the
Parties pending final adjudication.
2. Such provisional measures may only be prescribed, modified or revoked upon the request
of a Party and after giving both an opportunity to be heard.
3. Each order issued pursuant to this Article shall specify the time during which it is to be
in effect, which in no case shall be longer that six months. Either Party may apply to the
tribunal for renewal of an order issued pursuant to this Article.
4. Any order prescribing, modifying or revoking provisional measures shall be notified
forthwith to Parties who shall promptly comply therewith.
Article 6: Location of Proceedings
1. Arbitration proceedings commenced at the request of one Party shall take place in the
capital of the other Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree.
2. Arbitration proceedings commenced by agreement of the Parties shall take place at a
location determined either (a) by the Parties' agreement, or (b) in default thereof by the
tribunal itself.
3. Where a dispute is submitted to a Chamber of the Court pursuant to paragraphs (b) and
(c) of Article 3, the Parties may request that the Chamber sit at the capital of one of the
Parties.
4. The tribunal hearing a case may hold proceedings at locations other than its principal
seat as and when the circumstances of the case make it desirable.
Article 7: Conduct of Proceedings
1. An arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with paragraph (a) of Article 3 shall
function in accordance with the Rules or Procedure annexed to this Treaty, unless the
Parties otherwise agree.
2. At the request of a Party, the tribunal may call upon an agency, subdivision or national of
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either Party to appear to give evidence or testimony, provided that the tribunal may not
hear or receive evidence or testimony pursuant to this paragraph without the consent of the
party whose agency, subdivision or national is being called.
3. A Chamber of the Court formed pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 3 shall
function in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court
unless the Parties should, by common agreement, request otherwise.
Article 8: Applicable Law
1. In deciding any question or dispute submitted to it pursuant to this Treaty, a tribunal or
Chamber shall apply the principles and rules of international law, especially as reflected in
the treaties and practice of Canada and of the United States, as well as the two countries,
particularly those manifesting their common legal traditions.
2. If a case requires the application of the principles of substantive law in force in either of
the two countries, but in the opinion of the tribunal there exists such a divergence between
the relevant principles in force in Canada and in the United States that it is not possible to
make a final decision on that basis, the tribunal shall apply such other common legal
principles referred to in paragraph 1 as it considers appropriate, having regard to the desire
of the Parties to reach a solution just to all interests concerned.
3. The Parties may agree on particular principles or rules to be applied by the tribunal.
Article 9: Finality, Binding Force and Interpretation of Decisions
1. Subject to Article 10, the decision of a tribunal or Chamber rendered pursuant to this
Treaty is final and binding, and shall be complied with by both Parties. If the constitutional
law of a Party does not permit or only partly permits a Party's compliance with the
tribunal's decision, or if the necessary legislation has not been enacted, the Parties agree
that the judgment of the tribunal shall specify pecuniary or other equitable satisfaction for
the injured party.
2. In the event of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the decision, the tribunal or
Chamber which rendered it shall construe it upon the request of either Party.
3. The tribunal may, either proprio motu or on the request of one or both of the Parties,
correct any manifest technical or clerical error in its judgment.
Article 10: Advisory Opinions
In any particular case, the Parties may agree that, instead of a binding judgment, an arbitral
tribunal constituted in accordance with paragraph (a) of Article 3 should render an advisory
opinion.

DEVELOPMENTS

Japanese Corporations and
American Civil Rights Laws
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent case, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano,1 the
United Staies Supreme Court held that a subsidiary of a Japanese corporation that incorporated in the United States is, by the literal language of
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (Treaty or Japanese
Treaty), an American corporation.2 Therefore, the American company
could not use the Japanese Treaty as a shield against American civil
rights laws. This case directly resolved issues posed by the Second Circuit,' and provided guidance in an almost identical Fifth Circuit case,
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America).4
Plaintiffs in both cases argued that the U.S. subsidiaries are U.S. corporations, and must comply with U.S. law proscribing racial discrimination in employment. Defendants countered that the Japanese Treaty
shielded them from U.S. law. The district courts in both cases held that
American subsidiaries were not foreign corporations, and thus, they could
not invoke articles of the Japanese Treaty to avoid U.S. discrimination
laws.
These holdings raised the difficult issue of corporate nationality. Of
what nationality is a corporation that is incorporated in the United
States, yet owned by Japanese citizens? The Fifth and Second Circuits
both reversed the district courts' holdings on corporate nationality, and
held that American subsidiaries were, in essence, foreign corporations,
and could invoke provisions of the Japanese Treaty.
However, the basic issue of whether a foreign corporation could discriminate in violation of U.S. laws was not resolved. The Second Circuit
held that the Treaty does not exempt a Japanese company operating in
the United States from discrimination laws, while the Fifth Circuit held
that the Treaty shielded a foreign company from these laws. Thus, this
issue was ripe for determination by the United States Supreme Court.

1. 102 S.Ct. 2373 (1982).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Treaty or Japanese Treaty].
3. 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) aff'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
4. 469 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979); 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), 102 S.Ct. 2951 (1982).
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Deciding that a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese corporation is a U.S. corporation, the Supreme Court avoided the more difficult question of whether
or not a Japanese corporation operating in the United States can discriminate in violation of U.S. laws.
This article will focus initially on the analysis each court made to
reach its respective holding. Next, the relevant discrimination laws will be
reviewed. Finally, the Japanese Treaty, general rules of treaty interpretation, and the issue of corporate nationality will be discussed.

II. DISCUSSION OF THE CASES
Plaintiffs in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),5 who were non-Japanese employees of the defendant, brought suit alleging racially-based employment discrimination.' To support their motion to dismiss, defendants
stressed that the Treaty provided them with the absolute right to hire
executive personnel "of their choice." '7 Also, defendants argued that the
"treaty trader" test of corporate nationality was applicable.' The district
court acknowledged that the right to hire personnel "of their choice"
might be available to a foreign corporation, but denied this right to ItohAmerica. Applying the rationale of United States v. R.P. Oldham,9 the
court held that Itoh-America is an American corporation both by the
terms of the Treaty, and under settled law determining corporate nationality.1" Further, the court found that the "treaty trader" argument was
not worthy of consideration," and noted that section two of the Treaty
Protocol would be rendered meaningless if defendants' arguments were
12
adopted.
Itoh-America also asserted that it could raise the rights of its parent
corporation. However, the facts of the case law argued were distinguishable from the facts of this case,1 3 and the court denied the motion to dis-

5. 469 F. Supp. 1.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 23.
8. The "treaty trader" test uses ownership of stock as the basis for determining corporate nationality. For a discussion of the "treaty trader" test, see notes 94-97 infra, and accompanying text.
9. 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957). The court in Oldham stated that place of incorporation determined corporate nationality. For a discussion on corporate nationality and the

Oldham decision, see notes 80-100 infra, and accompanying text.
10. 469 F. Supp. at 5.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 7. Section 2 of the Protocol to the Treaty provides, in relevant part, "[t]he
provisions of Article VI, paragraph 3, providing for the payment of compensation shall extend to interests held directly or indirectly by nationals and companies of either Party in
property which is taken within the territories of the other Party." This section provides
protection against state appropriation. If these foreign corporations were already protected,

the addition of section 2 of the Protocol would have been redundant. 469 F. Supp. at 7.
13. The cases relied upon were Association of Data Processing Services Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.

1976).
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miss. However, recognizing the novelty of the issue, the court granted an
immediate appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals."'
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the Treaty history and stressed that treaties "[u]nlike domestic legislation . . must create a common ground between differing cultures . . . .'"
After reviewing many secondary
sources,"6 the court concluded that these sources supported the proposition that all foreign corporations can invoke provisions of the Treaty.
Otherwise, there would be "an unreasonable distinction between treatment of American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations on the one hand,
7
and branches of Japanese corporations on the other.'
The Fifth Circuit also held that the article VIII(a) "of their choice"
provision gave Japanese corporations the absolute right to hire and promote as they choose, irrespective of American civil rights laws.'9 The
court recognized that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
might be consistent with the Treaty if applied."9 However, reasoning that
Title VII was passed subsequent to the Treaty, and did not expressly
overrule the Treaty, the court found Title VII inapplicable.2 0
In Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, plaintiffs, past and present
female secretaries of the defendant, claimed that defendant discriminated
on the bases of sex and national origin, in violation of Title VII, and of 42
U.S.C. section 1981.21 Defendants denied that they discriminated, argued
that the Treaty shielded them from these claims, and also interposed four
22
counterclaims that arose out of the filing of the suit.

Calnetics involved antitrust violations brought against Volkswagen of America, Inc.
(VW), a U.S. incorporated subsidiary of a West German corporation, and Volkswagen Products Corporations (VPC), VW's wholly-owned American incorporated air conditioning subsidiary. The trial court had enjoined VW and VPC from importing automobiles equipped
with air conditioning. VW, VPC and the Federal Republic of Germany urged that the restriction "offends Article 16 of the German/American Treaty of 1954, and Articles I and III
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, because it restricts German manufacturers
but not American automobile manufacturers, who remain free to sell cars with factory installed air conditioning." Id. at 693. The Ninth Circuit recognized the discriminatory effect
the ban imposed and seriously questioned the prudence of granting equitable relief. Calnetics stands for the proposition that an American subsidiary has standing to raise the claim
that its parent's treaty rights may be affected by court ordered relief. However, the instant
cases are easily distinguishable in that the parent company will not be affected by a court
order to hire host country nationals. The parents do not participate in the hiring and firing
decisions of the American corporations.
14. 469 F. Supp. at 910.
15. 643 F.2d at 356.
16. Id. at 356-58. For a discussion of the secondary sources, see notes 92-100 infra, and
accompanying text.
17. Id. at 358.
18. Id. at 360-63.
19. Under Title VII, bona fide occupational qualification requirements might exempt a
Japanese corporation from complying with the antidiscrimination mandate.
20. 643 F.2d at 362.
21. 473 F. Supp. at 508.
22. Id. at 508-09.
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The district court reviewed the secondary sources, but ultimately
held that the reasoning of Oldham was applicable.2 s The court allowed
the Title VII claims to stand, but dismissed the section 1981 claims.24
The Second Circuit analyzed the case in a fashion similar to that of
the Fifth Circuit. After discussing the history of the Treaty and the purpose of the relevant articles, the court held that the Treaty granted rights
to American subisdiaries; otherwise, "a crazyquilt pattern would
emerge. ' '2 5 However, the Second and Fifth Circuits differed in interpreting the article VIII(1) phrase "of their choice." The Second Circuit construed the phrase in the light in-which it was drafted. Its purpose was "to
facilitate a party's employment of its own nationals to the extent necessary to insure its operational success in the host country ....
,,28 The
court concluded that a Title VII claim could stand on the facts of this
case.
In summary, the Fifth and Second Circuits reached opposite decisions concerning the applicability of American civil rights laws on foreign
subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. The Fifth Circuit exalted
the Treaty while the Second Circuit exalted American civil rights laws.
The Supreme Court initially reviewed rules of treaty interpretation.
Relying on Maximov v. United States,27 the Court held that the treaty
language controls unless allowing it to control would be inconsistent with
the intent of the treaty drafters. 2 Next, the Court focused specifically on
Treaty articles VIII(1) and XXII(3). Article VIII(1) provided that companies of either party shall be permitted to engage managerial personnel "of
their choice." Article XXII(3), the definitional article, provided that
"companies" means any entity, whether or not established for pecuniary
profit. Furthermore, article XXII(3) provided "[clompanies constituted
under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either
Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical
status recognized within the territories of the other Party. 2 9 (Emphasis
added).
As Sumitomo was constituted under the laws and regulations of the
State of New York, the Court held that it was a company of the United

23. Id. at 511-13. The court held that the terms of the Treaty and established rules of
law provide that the corporation is American.
24. Id. at 514. Section 1981 does not cover claims based upon sex and national origin
discrimination. See notes 37-43 infra and accompanying text.
25. 638 F.2d at 556.
26. Id. at 559.
27. 373 U.S. 49 (1963). Maximov was a case involving the interpretation of article 14 of
the income tax convention between the United States and the United Kingdom. Plaintiffs,
who were beneficiaries of a trust, asserted that they need not pay tax on capital gains because they were subjects and residents of the United Kingdom, and exempted by convention
provisions. The Supreme Court stated that the Second Circuit's interpretation "is the one
more consonant with its [the Convention's] language, purpose and intent. Id. at 51.
28. 102 S.Ct. at 2377.
29. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII, para. 3.
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States. 0 Therefore, Sumitomo could not invoke rights provided by article
VIII(l).
In support of its holding, the Court noted that this interpretation is
consistent with other Treaty provisions."' Also, the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed with this interpretation."2 The Court
simply disagreed with Sumitomo's argument that "the intent of Japan
and the United States was to cover subsidiaries regardless of their place
of incorporation," and with the Second Circuit's assertion that a "crazyquilt" pattern would emerge.88

III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
Plaintiffs in these cases brought suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.34 Title VIP is probably the most
comprehensive federal scheme directed against employment discrimination."6 It provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to
hire, or otherwise discriminate against an individual because of the individual's race,87 color, religion, sex or national origin. In these cases, the
Japanese employers allegedly discriminated against females, and Americans. Thus, to fall within the purview of Title VII, either the term
"American" must be characterized as describing a national origin, or the
evidence must show sex discrimination. 8

30. 102 S. Ct. at 2378.
31. Id. at 2378 n.8.
32. Id. at 4645. Considering the image problems that Japan has had in the United
States since the Japanese have captured the automobile and other markets, the Japanese
Government's position is not too surprising.
33. Id. at 2380-82.
34. In Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution was also brought and apparently dropped. 653 F.2d at 553
n.1. Other laws that deal with employment discrimination include: Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); The
National Labor Relations Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 141; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621; J. PEMBERTON, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYRESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, REMEDIES 172 (1975). For a list of Federal enactments pertaining

to employment discrimination, see id. at 345-51.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 as amended (1972).
36. J. PEMBERTON, supra note 34, at 9.
37. Race discrimination under Title VII requires proof that a plaintiff:
(i) belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Because Americans are not a
racial minority, it is doubtful whether a claim based on race could stand.
38. A claim of sex discrimination under Title VII will require a showing of inequality in
pay, working conditions, or opportunity for advancement. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc. 642 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980); and East v. Romine Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.
1975), for cases dealing with sex discrimination under Title VII.
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National origin discrimination was the focus of the Supreme Court's
decision in Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Company. 9 Plaintiff in Espinoza, a Mexican citizen, was denied employment at the defendant company because of the company's policy against hiring aliens. Plaintiff asserted that this treatment was discrimination based on national origin.
The Court stated that the "term 'national origin' on its face refers to the
country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from
which his or her ancestors came."'4 0 Applying this literal definition, the
Court determined that although Title VII protects against discrimination
on the basis of nationality, it does not apply where a company merely
discriminates on the basis of citizenship.4 '
In these cases, it is questionable whether national origin discrimination is present. The Japanese employers could take the position that they
have a company policy against promoting non-Japanese citizens to executive or managerial positions.'" Furthermore, the Japanese corporation can
assert that it has been deemed an American corporation, and is merely
being selective in hiring its employees. Even if the plaintiffs can later
prove discrimination, the Japanese corporations will have several defenses
available.'
Section 19811" is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 45 The Act
of 1866, an implement to the Thirteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, was aimed at ensuring that the recently freed slaves
had the same political and economic rights as other citizens. Thus section
1981 was originally held to grant protection only in actions between white
and non-white citizens.' Yet, rights under this section have been expanded. Protection has been granted to "all persons [who have a claim]
against state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because of

39. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
40. Id. at 89.
41. If the court had decided that the discrimination was based on national origin, the
claim would have been sustained. In Roach v. Dreiser Ind. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F.
Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980), the court allowed plaintiff's claim to stand, even though the
discrimination was against an individual of Acadian ancestry, and Acadia was never a
country.
42. This position is arguably supported by Espinoza, 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
43. For a discussion of the defenses available, see Note, Commercial Treaties and the
American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REv. 947
(1979).
44. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
45. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 4, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
46. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).

1982

DEVELOPMENTS

alienage or color. ' '47 Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that section 1981
proscribes discrimination on the grounds of citizenship by private employers. 48 However, claims under this section are limited, and discrimination claims based upon sex4 9 and national origin"' have been denied.
The U.S. discrimination laws will play an important role in these
cases. A possible conclusion that may be reached is that American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations can legally discriminate.
IV.

THE TREATY

In April of 1953, the United States and Japan signed the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. The Treaty was one of over one
hundred commercial treaties concluded by the United States prior to
1958.1 ' For Japan, the Treaty had special significance. For obvious political and economic reasons, many nations, including the United States, terminated relations with Japan during World War HI.5" The 1953 Treaty
represented Japan's initial step toward economic recovery; it was Japan's
first postwar commercial treaty. 5
The purpose of the Treaty was not political.54 Similar to all Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, the purpose was "to provide a
legal framework within which economic relations between the two countries [could] be developed to their mutual advantage. ' 55
The Treaty is composed of twenty-five articles and the Protocol."

47. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948).
48. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
49. Apodaca v. Gen. Elec. Co., 445 F. Supp. 821 (D.N.M. 1978); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
50. Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
51. Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Modern Treaties). Previously, Walker said that the
United States had concluded approximately 130 commercial treaties, the first treaty being
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of February 6, 1778, with France. Walker, Provisions on
Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J, INT'L L. 373, 374 (1956).
52. During the hearings, it was noted that "[pirewar commercial relations between the
United States and Japan rested upon a commercial treaty concluded in 1911." Commercial
Treaties-Treatiesof Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy,
Denmark, Greece, Finland, Germany and Japan: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
1953 Hearings].
53. Id. at 27.
54. Modern Treaties, supra note 51, at 806.
55. 1953 Hearings, supra note 52, at 27.
56. Walker stated that:
[tlhe Protocol, by serving inter alia, as a convenient vehicle in attending
to special variations or preoccupations of individual countries, reduces the
amount of deviation between treaties, with respect to general outline, basic
content and array of principles. It also serves as a bulletin board for posting
certain tenets of construction which are considered desirable to record formally
but which may lead to mischievous inferences of being substantive additions
rather than precautionary explanations, if they are integrated into the rule to
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These provisions grant personal rights to nationals of the other party, and
provide the framework within which business may be conducted. The
personal rights granted include "such fundamentals as freedom of travel
and residence, freedom of worship, freedom of communication, the right
to decent and humane treatment if in police custody, access to courts of
justice and security for property rights."5" Concerning business activities,
the Treaty provides, inter alia, that nationals of the other party shall conduct business upon as favorable terms as nationals of the host country."'
The Treaty also provides that the owner of a business has the right to
manage his own affairs, that a business in competition with a state controlled enterprise shall receive fair treatment, and that the state will provide just compensation for nationalized property and allow reasonable opportunity to repatriate earnings and capital."
Treaty articles I, VII(1) and XXII(3), the provisions at issue in the
instant cases, merit further discussion. Article I(1) provides that nationals
shall be able to enter and remain in the territories of the other Party for
the purpose of "carrying on trade. . . and engaging in related. . . activities." " Further, nationals are permitted to develop and direct "operations of an enterprise in which they have invested ....
"' Article 1(2) is
a miniature bill of rights, and permits Parties within territories of the
other Party to enjoy liberty of conscience, to hold religious services, to
gather and transmit material and to communicate with persons inside
and outside such territories.6 2

which they relate.
Modern Treaties, supra note 51, at 808 n.9.
57. 1953 Hearings, supra note 52, at 2.
58. This treatment, where a national of the other Party is accorded treatment equal to
nationals of the country, is known as "national treatment." Treaty, supra note 2, at art.
XXII(1). Contrast national treatment with "most favored nation treatment," where nationals of the other Party are accorded treatment no less favorable than other non-nationals in
the nation. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII(2).
59. 1953 Hearings, supra note 52, at 2-3. The normal content of a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty includes the elements found in the following synoptical
outline:
Preamble, general purposes; Entry, movement and residence of individuals; Liberty of conscience and communication; Protection of persons from molestation and police malpractices; Protection of acquired property; Standing in
the courts; Right to establish and operate businesses; Formation and management of corporations; Nonprofit activities; Acquisition and tenure of property;
Tax treatment; Administration and exchange controls; Rules on international
trade and customs administration; Rules governing the state in business;
Treatment of ships and shipping; Transit of goods and persons; Reservations,
definitions and general provisions; Settlement of disputes; Procedural clauses;
Protocol, an appendix of varying length, containing material construing and
clarifying the treaty text, and making accomodations to take account of individual situations.
Modern Treaties, supra note 51, at 808.
60. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1, para. (1)(a).
61. Id. art. I, para. (1)(b).
62. Id. art. I, para. (2).
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Article VII(1) provides the framework for economic relations between
the two countries. In relevant part, article VII(1) provides:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national
treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other business activities within the territories of
the other Party . . . . Accordingly, such nationals and companies
shall be permitted within such territories: (a) to establish and maintain branches, agencies, offices, factories and other establishments appropriate to the conduct of their business; (b) to organize companies
under the general company laws of such other Party; and (c) to control and manage enterprises which they have established or
acquired.3
The right of citizens of one country to form local subsidiaries under the
corporate laws of the other country, granted by this article, is a post
World War II achievement. 4
Article VIII(l), the major focus of dispute in these cases, provides in
relevant part that "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants
and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and
other specialists of their choice." (Emphasis added). Read in light of articles I and VII(1), article VIII(1) appears to give foreign subsidiaries
choice over management personnel. Unfortunately, article XXII(3)
clouded the issue. Article XXII(3) provides "the term 'companies' means
corporations, partnerships, companies and other associations. . . . Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the
territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall
have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other
Party."" Article XXII(3) appears to say that a company incorporated in
the United States is an American corporation. Thus, read together, these
articles are amenable to two conflicting interpretations. As argued in
these cases, articles I, VII(1) and VIII(1) appear to provide, even to an
American subsidiary, the right to employ management and other specialists "of their choice." However, the Supreme Court, adopting the plaintiffs' position, found article XXII(3) controlling. Article XXII(3) says
63. Id. art. VII, para. (1).
64. During the Hearings before the Subcommittee, it was noted that:
[tihe legal reason inhibiting a more extensive provision for corporations in
earlier treaties (namely, the reserved rights of the states as to the admission of
foreign corporations) has been solved in the current treaties by a formula
which equates the alien corporation to other out of state corporations, rather
than to the domestic corporation, for the purposes of national treatment in the
United States.
Commercial Treaties-Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the
United States and Columbia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. of Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1952).
65. Treaty, supra, note 2, at art. VIII, para. (1).
66. Id. art. XXII, para. (3).
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that an American subsidiary of a foreign corporation is an American corporation. Therefore, the American corporation must abide by all domestic
laws, including discrimination laws.
V.

TREATY INTERPRETATION

In 1953, the year the Treaty was executed, the world was recovering
from the effects of World War II, and civil rights, as we know them today,
were not a major concern of the Treaty drafters. The purpose of article
VIII(l)17 was simply to permit foreigners to own and operate a company
within the territory of the other country. Although the Treaty drafters
were protecting foreigners from discrimination by the host country,68 it is
questionable whether article VIII(1) was aimed at eliminating reverse discrimination. Practically speaking, it is probable that the Treaty drafters
never envisioned foreigners discriminating against nationals of the host
country. This consideration makes interpretation of the Treaty difficult,
and limits the weight that can be given to the Treaty drafters' intent.
The Supreme Court, however, looked at intent, and relying on Maximov v. United States said that "[t]he clear import of treaty language
controls unless application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectation of its signatories."19 One expectation of the Treaty drafters was that
place of incorporation should determine corporate nationality.7 0 The Supreme Court complied with this expectation and carrying it to an extreme, implying that the Treaty drafters intended that a Japanese owned
American corporation is American for all purposes, including compliance
with American civil rights laws. This interpretation avoided the issue of
the conflict between treaty and subsequent law.
In Asakura v. City of Seattle, 1 the Supreme Court said "[t]reaties
are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it

67. Id. art. VIII, para. 1.
68. Describing rights of entry and the change in treaties from the 1920's and 1930's to
postwar treaties, Walker said:
Though equal provision for subordinate investor-enterprise employees is
not yet possible owing to lack of statutory authority, such personnel is to an
extent provided for, in that management is assured freedom of choice in the
engaging of essential executive and technical employees in general, regardless
of their nationality, without legal interference from 'percentile' restrictions and
the like ....

Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present
United States Practice,5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 234 (1956). The problem that Article VIII(l)
resolved was discrimination by the host country against foreigners, not reverse

discrimination.
69. 102 S.Ct. at 2377.
70. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII, para. 3.
71. 265 U.S. 332 (1923). Asakura, a citizen of Japan, brought suit against the City of
Seattle when the City passed an ordinance prohibiting non-U.S. citizens from engaging in
the pawnbroker business. The ordinance was held to violate the treaty.
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and the other favorable to them, the latter is preferred."'" The rationale
for this rule is twofold. First, domestic courts should not make foreign
policy. Second, treaty beneficiaries must be granted all possible rights
under a treaty.78 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,7 4 the Supreme
Court described the relationship between treaties and subsequent federal
laws.7 5 In Fong, officers of the United States arrested and detained three
Chinese subjects. Under authority of the Act of 1892, 76 the United States
planned to deport petitioners. Petitioners claimed that deportation would
be in violation of the July 28, 1868 treaty between the United States and
China.7 The Court said:

In our jurisprudence, it is well settled that the provisions of an
act of Congress, passed in the exercise of its constitutional authority,
on this, as on any other subject, if clear and explicit, must be upheld
by the courts, even in contravention of express stipulations in an earlier treaty. .

.

. [Treaties are] of no greater legal obligation than the

act of Congress. By the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof
and treaties made under the authority of the United States are both
declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to one over the other. A treaty, it is true, is in its nature a
contract between nations, and is often merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to carry its stipulations into effect. Such
legislation will be open to future repeal or amendment. If the treaty
operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the power of
Congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a
legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress.
In either case, the last expression of the sovereign will must control."'
Fong permits Congress to overrule prior law, in the form of treaty or
9
7

statute.

In these cases, the applicable laws were promulgated subsequent to
the execution of the Treaty. However, Congress was not explicit, and if
the Treaty and the laws conflict, it can only be implied that the laws
control.

VI.

CORPORATE NATIONALITY

The Supreme Court noted that application of a control test could
72. Id. at 342.

73. Applying this rule, the Japanese would be allowed to discriminate. However,
Asakura is distinguishable from the instant cases. Asakura involved a city ordinance, while
these cases involved federal law.

74. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
75. Id.
76. Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons Into the United States, ch. 60, 27
Stat. 25 (1892).
77. Treaty with China, July 28, 1868, United States-China, 16 Stat. 739; T.S. No. 48.
78. 149 U.S. at 720-21.
79. The Court upheld the validity of the subsequent Act and deportation of petitioners.
149 U.S. at 735.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:'

certainly make nationality a subject of dispute. 0 The control test is ong
approach taken to'determine the nationality of a corporation. Professoi
Vagts identified various criteria used to determine corporate nationality
These include: "[tihe jurisdiction of incorporation, the principal place o
doing business, the nationality of the voting control, the nationality of th(
dominant investors, the nationality of management, [and] the nationalit3

of 'control'.

. .

.,8

These criteria are often found in combination. Majol

criteria combinations have been recognized and the following doctrine.
identified: 1) the center of administration; 2) the center of exploitation
and 3) the place of incorporation s' doctrines. Under the center of administration doctrine, nationality is determined "at the place where the commercial business is carried on, and in the case of a noncommercial legal
person, the place where its functions are discharged." ' This doctrine put,
the world on actual notice of nationality. The center of exploitation doctrine uses "the main place where the legal person executes its purpose" tc
determine nationality." This doctrine has been criticized because a company often exploits resources in more than one location, and more significantly, many of management's activities take place far from where the
exploitation takes place, and are excluded from the nationality decision.
According to the place of incorporation doctrine, "the personal law of a
legal person is the law under which that person has been incorporated. '"81
Although place of incorporation is the doctrine most often applied, 8" it is
not without shortcomings. This doctrine allows for "forum shopping,"
and companies can avoid harsh laws by incorporation in a favorable for87
eign jurisdiction.
Applying any one of these doctrines to the instant cases results in a
finding that the Japanese subsidiaries are of American nationality. The
corporations' commercial businesses are carried on in the United States

80. 102 S. Ct. at 2379-80 n.11.
81. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints of Foreign Enterprise, 74 HAnv. L. Rv. 1489, 1490 (1961).
82. M. WouF, PRIVATE INRNATIONAL LAw 297 (2d ed. 1950). Wolff noted that this
doctrine is also known as the "seige social" and "prevails in France, Germany, Italy, Spain,

Austria, Switzerland, Poland and most other continental countries." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 298. This doctrine has been applied in France and is accepted by many of
France's eminent scholars.

85. Id. at 299.
86. REsTATMsEon (SBcolD) oF FOREIGN RaLAi.ONs LAw OF THE UNTED STATES, § 27
(1965) has adopted the place of incorporation as the natibnality of a corporation.
87. See also G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF TE LAw OF CORPORAxONS AND OTHER BusiNEss
Ermu'msas § 90 (2d. ed. 1970). Henn has recognized two basic principal tests for determining corporate nationality. The aggregate test looks "to the nationality, domicile, or residence

of the individuals who control the corporation." The aggregate test is similar to Wolff's
center of administration doctrine. The second test, the entity test, looks "to the nation
where it was incorporated, where its shareholders or board of directors meetings are held, or
where it has its principal place of business. This test combines Wolff's place of incorporation

doctrine, and at least part of the center of exploitation doctrine. See note 82 supra and
accompanying text.
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in satisfaction of the "center of administration" doctrine. The business
purposes are executed in the United States, in satisfaction of the "center
of exploitation" doctrine. Finally, the corporations were incorporated in
the United States, in accordance with the "place of incorporation"
doctrine.
In determining corporate nationality, the district courts in hoth of
the instant cases recognized and applied 8 United States v. R.P. Oldham.89 Defendants in Oldham were indicted for conspiring in restraint of
trade in violation of the Sherman Act and Wilson Tariff Act. In particular, defendants, who were in the business of importing and selling wire
nails on the West Coast of the United States, were charged with restraining interstate and foreign commerce in Japanese wire nails. One issue discussed by the court was the effect of the Treaty. One of the coconspirators, Kinoshita & Co., a Japanese subsidiary incorporated in the
United States, asserted that Treaty article XVIII provided the exclusive
remedy. Article XVIII provides in relevant part, "[a]ccordingly, each
Party agrees upon the request of the other Party to consult with respect
to any such [antitrust] practices and to take such measures as it deems
appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects."' 90 The Oldham court found fault with this argument for three reasons. First, article
XVIII did not provide an exclusive remedy, because it was permissive
rather than mandatory. 1 Second, the court found the article XXII(3) definition of companies controlling." Finally, the court concluded that nationality is determined by place of incorporation and said:
Thus by the terms of the Treaty itself, as well as by established principles of law, a corporation organized under the laws of a given jurisdiction is a creature of that jurisdiction, with no greater rights, privileges or immunities than any other corporation of that jurisdiction.93
Secondary sources, such as negotiating history, unilateral statements
made by a party, subsequent practices of the parties, and change of circumstances, are often used in treaty interpretation." They played an im88. 469 F. Supp. at 4; 473 F. Supp. at 510.
89. 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
90. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XVIII, para. 1.
91. 152 F. Supp. at 823.
92. Article XXII(3) provides that "[c]ompanies constituted under the applicable laws
and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof
." Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII, para. (3).
93. 152 F. Supp. at 823. Thus, the court recognized that place of incorporation is rele-

vant in determining corporate nationality, and went on to say:
If co-conspirator Kinoshita & Co., Ltd., Tokyo had wished to retain its
status as a Japanese corporation while doing business in this country, it could
easily have operated through a branch. Having chosen instead to gain privileges accorded American corporations by operating through an American subsidiary, it has for the most part surrendered its Japanese identity with respect
to the activities of this subsidiary.
94. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1967).
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portant role in these cases, providing valuable background information.
Although the Supreme Court did not address the issue, in the courts
below defendants argued that the "treaty trader" test of corporate nationality should be applied. This argument makes use of article I, paragraph 1 of the Treaty and guidelines promulgated by the Department of
State. Article 1, paragraph 1 provides that the so-called "treaty trader"
can enter the United States for the purpose of carrying on trade.9 5 Department of State regulations require, inter alia, that a "treaty trader" be
employed "by an individual employer having the nationality of the treaty
country.. . or by an organization which is principally owned by a person
or persons having the nationality of the treaty country. . . ."0 Further,
Department of State Guidelines provide that "the nationality of the employing firm is determined by those persons who own more than 50% of
the stock of the employing corporation regardless of the place of incorporation." Under the "treaty trader" doctrine, place of incorporation becomes irrelevant, while the nationality of the shareholders gains
importance.
Application of the "treaty trader" doctrine in this case presents two
problems. First, the Department of State's regulations deal with general
immigration rules, while the Treaty deals with commerce between two
nations. The immigration rules were not necessarily written with the instant issues in mind. Second, and of greater importance, is that the
Treaty itself appears to contradict the Department of State's regulations.
Article XXII(3) says a corporation is a national of the place in which it
incorporated.
Other secondary sources offered to interpret the Treaty influenced
the Court's decision regarding corporate nationality. Relying on Kolorat
v. Oregon,9s the Court stated that "[a]lthough not conclusive, the meaning attributed to Treaty provisions by the government agencies charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." 99 In
1982, the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed that a subsidiary of a Japanese company that incorporated in the United States is
not protected by the Treaty. 100 The 1982 communications clarified the

"The Supreme Court itself has said: Of course treaties are construed more liberally than
private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words
to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties." Id. at 387.
95. See notes 82-92 supra and accompanying text.
96. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1981).
97. 9 FORMGN A". MANuAL, part II.
98. 366 U.S. 187 (1961). Kolorat involved an alien's right to take both real and personal
property by intestate succession. The Supreme Court relied in part on the interpretation
given to the treaty provision by an agency of the government.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2379.
100. Dep't of State Cable No. 026490, from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary
of State, dated Feb. 21, 1982; and Diplomatic Communication from the Embassy of Japan
in Washington to the U.S. Dep't of State, Apr. 21, 1982; relevant part reprinted in 102 S.
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confusing communications discussed at the trial court and court of appeals levels, and also simplified the Court's task. Both parties to the
Treaty agreed to an interpretation consistent with American society's
view concerning civil rights.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano, the Supreme Court
held that a Japanese owned company that incorporated in the United
States, must comply with U.S. civil rights laws. The company had argued
that article VIII(1) of the Japanese Treaty permitted it to hire executive
and managerial personnel "of their choice," without complying with U.S.
discrimination laws. The Supreme Court however, went to a different section of the Treaty and found a seemingly simple answer to the dispute.
Article XXII(3) provided that a company created in the United States is
a company of the United States. Therefore, U.S. discrimination laws
could be applied. The Supreme Court relied in part on the views of the
Governments of Japan and the United States. Both Governments stated
that where a company incorporates within the jurisdiction of the other
country, the company becomes a citizen of the other country. Thus, the
Court's decision did not upset the political community.
However, the Court did take an extremely narrow stance and avoided
many difficult issues. This case did not resolve the issue of whether a
purely Japanese corporation, operating in the United States, can blatantly discriminate in violation of U.S. laws. The Japanese Treaty was
not written to license each country's companies to discriminate. Rather,
the Treaty was written to assist foreign companies to establish themselves
in the other country's business community. Reverse discrimination was
not addressed by the Treaty, nor was it in the minds of the Treaty drafters when the Treaty was written. The Court could have taken a bolder
stance against discrimination, and held that even article VIII(1) does not
permit unfettered discrimination.
Robert M. Cooper

The New Mexican Transfer of Technology
Law
The original Mexican transfer of technology law' (Old Technology

Ct. 2379.

1. Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation
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confusing communications discussed at the trial court and court of appeals levels, and also simplified the Court's task. Both parties to the
Treaty agreed to an interpretation consistent with American society's
view concerning civil rights.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano, the Supreme Court
held that a Japanese owned company that incorporated in the United
States, must comply with U.S. civil rights laws. The company had argued
that article VIII(1) of the Japanese Treaty permitted it to hire executive
and managerial personnel "of their choice," without complying with U.S.
discrimination laws. The Supreme Court however, went to a different section of the Treaty and found a seemingly simple answer to the dispute.
Article XXII(3) provided that a company created in the United States is
a company of the United States. Therefore, U.S. discrimination laws
could be applied. The Supreme Court relied in part on the views of the
Governments of Japan and the United States. Both Governments stated
that where a company incorporates within the jurisdiction of the other
country, the company becomes a citizen of the other country. Thus, the
Court's decision did not upset the political community.
However, the Court did take an extremely narrow stance and avoided
many difficult issues. This case did not resolve the issue of whether a
purely Japanese corporation, operating in the United States, can blatantly discriminate in violation of U.S. laws. The Japanese Treaty was
not written to license each country's companies to discriminate. Rather,
the Treaty was written to assist foreign companies to establish themselves
in the other country's business community. Reverse discrimination was
not addressed by the Treaty, nor was it in the minds of the Treaty drafters when the Treaty was written. The Court could have taken a bolder
stance against discrimination, and held that even article VIII(1) does not
permit unfettered discrimination.
Robert M. Cooper

The New Mexican Transfer of Technology
Law
The original Mexican transfer of technology law' (Old Technology

Ct. 2379.

1. Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation
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Law) was replaced on February 10, 1982, by the New Law on the Control
and Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks' (New Technology Law). The New
Technology Law, as did the Old Technology Law, regulates the selection
of foreign technology to be used in Mexico and the terms of its transfer to
Mexican recipients.' This regulation is accomplished under the New
Technology Law, as it was under its predecessor, by requiring transfer of
technology agreements to be registered with the National Register of
Transfer of Technology' (Register). An agreement must be registered to
have any legal effect in Mexico,5 and before an agreement may be registered, it must meet certain standards set by the Mexican Government. 6
The registrability of transfer of technology agreements under the Old
Technology Law was determined in an almost totally ad hoc manner. 7 A
positive aspect of the New Technology Law is that it requires the promulgation of administrative procedures and guidelines for applying the law.'
Such procedures and guidelines, if adhered to, should result in more predictability in decisions as to the registrability of agreements and, thus,
greater certainty for the contracting parties.
Overall, however, the New Technology Law is a more restrictive law
than its predecessor. Under the New Technology Law more types of
agreements must be registered than under the Old Technology Law;9 foreign parties to a transfer of technology, as well as the Mexican recipient,
must now register their agreements;10 more conditions must be met before
agreements may be registered;11 sanctions for violation of the New Technology Law are substantially greater than under the Old Technology
Law; 1' and sanctions will be imposed on foreign transferors of technology

of Patents and Trademarks, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972. For an English translation, see 12 I.L.M.
421 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Old Technology Law].
2. D.O., Jan. 11, 1982, First Transitory Art. For an English translation of the New
Technology Law, see LES NouvLLEs: J. LICENSING ExEcuTrIVES SoC'Y, LES NEWS SECTION 8
(Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as New Technology Law].

3. The New Technology Law, as did the Old Technology Law, regulates transfers of
technology from Mexican transferors to Mexican recipients. Brill, Transfers of Technology
in Mexico, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 51, 54 (1974).
4. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 2-3; Old Technology Law, supra note 1,
at arts. 2, 9.
5. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 6, 11; Old Technology Law, supra note
1, at arts. 5-6.
6. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 15-17; Old Technology Law, supra note
1, at arts. 7-8.
7. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAWS AND PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA 10-11 (B. Carl ed. rev.
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER].
8. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 8-9.
9. Compare New Technology Law, supra note 2, arts. 2-3 with Old Technology Law,
supra note 1, arts. 2, 9.

10. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 5.
11. Compare New Technology Law, supra note 2, arts. 15-17 with Old Technology Law,
supra note 1, arts. 7-8.
12. Compare New Technology Law, supra note 2, arts. 11, 18-23 with Old Technology
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as well as on the Mexican recipients."3 The more restrictive nature of the
New Technology Law would seem to portend a reduction in the transfer
of technology to Mexico.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Old Technology Law was enacted in response to the feeling of
the Mexican Government that foreign suppliers of technology were in
many cases taking advantage of Mexican recipients by supplying inade-

quate and obsolete technology.14 The Mexican Government also felt that

the foreign suppliers of technology frequently charged excessively high
prices for the technology transferred and imposed improper restrictions

on Mexican recipients.1" Thus, the two main objectives of the Old Technology Law were to strengthen the negotiating position of Mexican firms
in acquiring technology and to prevent abusive licensing practices by foreign technology transferors. 0 Other objectives were to contribute to the
development of the Mexican economy and to encourage the development
17
of indigenous technology.
During the time the Old Technology Law was in effect, it was administered cautiously, flexibly, and pragmatically."8 As a consequence, substantial amounts of technology continued to be transferred to Mexico, "
Mexican firms were saved about $640,000,000 in royalties, 0 and many re-

strictive clauses were eliminated from agreements.'

Thus, the Old Tech-

nology Law seemed to be working. Mexican recipients had been put in a

Law, supra note 1, art. 6.
13. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 18-23.
14. Old Technology Law, supra note 1, Preamble; Brill, supra note 3, at 51.
15. Id. The restrictions the Mexican Government sought to eliminate included limitations on research and development, export prohibitions or limitations, limitations on the
recipient's production, distribution and marketing, and intervention by the technology supplier in the management of the recipient.
16. Old Technology Law, supra note 1, Preamble; Barrett, The Role of Patents in the
Sale of Technology in Mexico, 22 AM. J. Comp. L. 230, 234 (1974).
17. Old Technology Law, supra note 1, Preamble.
18. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 9-11; Camp & Magnon, Recent Developments Under the Mexican Foreign Investment Law and the Law Regulating the Transfer
of Technology, 8 LAW. AMER CAS 1, 8 (1976).
19. There are not enough statistics available to determine whether the rate of transfer
of technology to Mexico decreased, increased or remained constant during the time the Old
Technology Law was operative. A great amount of technology was still being transferred,
however. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 30-36. In fact, Mexico had one of the
highest volumes of applications and registrations of technology transfer agreements of any
Latin American country in the mid-1970s. Correa, Transfer of Technology in Latin
America: A Decade of Control, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 388, 405 (1981). Also, most multinational corporations continued to do business in Mexico after passage of the Old Technology
Law. Kantor, Restrictions on Technology Transfer in Latin America, 68 TRADEMARK Rw.
552, 566 (1978).
20. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 38.
21. Id. at 32-38.
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better bargaining position 22 and, as a result, were receiving more suitabl4
technology at lower cost and on more equitable terms.
Why, then, has the Mexican Government enacted a new, more re
strictive law with the potential to diminish the flow of much needed tech
nology2 s to Mexico? The answer is probably threefold. First, since the OIC
Technology Law was successful, the Mexican Government was probabl3
encouraged to try to drive an even harder bargain for the Mexican recipi.
ents of transferred technology through increased regulation of such trans.
fers. Second, it was thought at the time that the Mexican economy wa
strong,2" and the Government may have believed that foreigners would
seek out its markets for technology even if greater restrictions were imposed on the transfer of such technology. Third, and probably most important, is the spirit of Mexican nationalism.25 This
new law seems to be
' '2
one more step in the process of "Mexicanization. 1

II.

EXAMINATION OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY LAW AND COMPARISON WITH
THE OLD TECHNOLOGY LAW

A.

Who Must Register?

Under the Old Technology Law, the Mexican party 7 to a transfer of
technology agreement was required to register the agreement.25 Nonresident foreign suppliers of technology could, at their option, request regis-

22. Hyde & de la Corte, Mexico's New Transfer of Technology and ForeignInvestment
Laws-To What Extent Have the Rules Changed?, 10 Irr'L LAw. 231, 251 (1976).
23. Mexico is a semi-industrialized country, but it has not reached the level of technological development of the United States or Europe. Thus, the transfer of technology to
Mexico is necessary for its continuing development. Barrett, supra note 16, at 231; Brill,
supra note 3, at 60-61; Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth with
Foreign Investment: Controlled But ParticipatoryIndependence, 10 CAL. W.L. REy. 1, 32
(1973).
24. Mexico's rapidly developing economy put it out of the class of other third-world
nations, and made the country an attractive place for foreign investors. Barrett, supra note
16, at 231. The Mexican economy was still considered strong despite the 1976 devaluation of
the peso. Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicanization, and the New InternationalEconomic Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, 13 TEx. Lwr'L L.J. 289, 305 (1978). Recent economic
developments in Mexico, including further devaluations of the peso, the nationalization of
Mexican banks and the growing balance of payments deficit indicate that the Mexican economy is much weaker than most experts had thought it to be. The Denver Post, Oct. 2, 1982,
at 2B, col. 3.
25. Gordon, supra note 23, at 18-26.
26. Mexican ownership and control of the means of production and distribution have
been progressively increased in Mexico in a series of steps since the Revolution in 1910. This
process of increasing the limitations on foreign participation in the economy is referred to as
Mexicanization. Id. at 18-19.
27. The Mexican parties required to register were natural persons or corporations of
Mexican nationality, resident aliens, foreign corporations established in Mexico, and agencies or branches of foreign undertakings established in Mexico. Old Technology Law, supra
note 1, at art. 3.
28. Id.
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tration of agreements to which they were a party."' Under the New Technology Law, the same parties that were required to register under the Old

Technology Law are still obligated to do so, but nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations not established in Mexico must now register agreements as well.80
This new requirement that nonresident aliens and foreign corporations must register agreements to which they are a party seems an unwarranted extraterritorial extension of Mexican law,"1 especially since the law
provides that sanctions may be imposed on these nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations for failure to register and for certain other prohibited
conduct.2 This extension is presumably predicated on effects jurisdiction83 since foreigners are only required to register agreements which have
effects in Mexico."" The extraterritorial application of a nation's laws is
not without precedent. 5 However, it is still generally condemned in the
international community,86 and it seems that the goal of regulating the
transfer of technology to Mexico could be achieved without obligating for7
eigners to register. Also, since fines can potentially be extremely large,
this requirement of the New Technology Law that nonresident aliens
must register will undoubtedly make foreign technology suppliers hesitant to transfer technology to Mexico.
B.

What Agreements Must be Registered?

Under the New Technology Law, as under the Old Technology Law,
all agreements, contracts, or other documents having effects in Mexico

29. Id.
30. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 5. In addition, the New Technology Law
now requires enterprises with state participation to register their agreements. Id. Also, the
registration of agreements will now be required of the previously exempt in-bond industries.
Id., art. 4. The in-bond industries were authorized by the In-Bond Assembly Program in
1965. In order to increase Mexican employment, certain U.S. companies were authorized to
establish 100 percent U.S.-owned manufacturing plants in Mexico in areas where there is
high unemployment. Raw materials are shipped in bond to Mexico and processed. The
finished goods are returned to the United States for sale. No U.S. or Mexicaft duties are
levied on the shipments of materials or finished goods. Radway, Doing Business in Mexico:
A PracticalLegal Analysis, 14 INT'L LAw. 361, 369-70 (1980).
31. Jaime Alvarez Soberanis, former Director of the Register, acknowledged that Mexican law cannot impose obligations on nonresident aliens. Soberanis, Legal Aspects Concerning the Technology Transfer Process in Mexico, 7 GA. J. Ir'L & COMP. L. 17, 20 (1977).
32. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 18-23.
33. Under this principle, countries claim jurisdiction over persons who commit acts
outside their national territory if those acts produce effects in their territory. Akehurst, Jurisdiction in InternationalLaw, 46 BRir. Y.B. INT'L L. 105, 152-53 (1972-73).
34. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 5.
35. Particularly in the area of antitrust law, the United States, the European Economic
Community, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and other countries have asserted that
their laws have extraterritorial reach. Akehurst, supra note 33, at 190-212.
36. Id. at 181-87.
37. The fines can be as great as the entire value of the deal. New Technology Law,
supra note 2, at arts. 18-19.
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and relating to the use or exploitation of trademarks, tradenames, patents, models and designs, or to the provision of technical know-how, engineering or technical assistance in any form must be registered. 8 The New
Technology Law has added several other categories of agreements that
must now be registered. These are: assignments of patents or trademarks;
agreements relating to the operation or administration of enterprises;
agreements relating to counseling, consulting or supervision; the licensing
of copyrights which potentially may be used industrially; and agreements
relating to computer programs.39
Certain agreements need not be registered under the New Technology Law. These include four of the five categories which did not need to
be registered under the Old Technology Law, which are: agreements allowing the admission of foreign technicians to install plants or machinery
or to carry out repairs; agreements relating to the supply of designs, catalogues, and know-how which come with new equipment and which are
necessary for its installation; agreements providing for assistance with
emergency repairs; and agreements relating to technical training to be
provided to employees.40 The New Technology Law also exempts from
registration international agreements for intergovernmental technical cooperation and agreements for the exploitation of copyrights for artistic
purposes.4 1 Under the New Technology Law, the exemption provided by
the Old Technology Law for joint venture agreements is no longer
42
allowed.
C.

Administrative Procedure

The Old Technology Law established the Register. 43 The Register
subsists under the New Technology Law 4 and will continue to be headed
by the Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Development (the Secretary).4 ' There are only minor changes in the procedure for registration of
agreements under the New Technology Law as compared to the Old
e
Technology Law.4
38. New'Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 2; Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at
art. 2.

39. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 2.

40. Id. art. 3; Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 9.
41.
42.
43.
44.

New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 3.
Id.; Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 9, §5
Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 1.
New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 8.

45. The Register was originally made subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and
Trade [hereinafter Ministry]. Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 1. However, in
1977, responsibility for administration of the Old Technology Law and for the Register were
transferred to the Secretary. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 5.
46. Under the New Technology Law, technology agreements are to be submitted to the
Secretary for registration within sixty business days after their execution. New Technology
Law, supra note 2, at art. 10. If agreements are submitted within the sixty-day period, registration relates back to the date of execution. Otherwise, registration is effective only from
the date of filing of the agreement. Id. Likewise, amendments to agreements must be sub-
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Even though only minor alterations were made in the actual registra-

tion procedure, articles 8 and 9 of the New Technology Law could potentially result in major administrative changes. Article 8 provides that regulations are to be formulated to establish the organization of the Register

and the procedures to be followed in administering the New Technology
Law.4 7 Article 9 specifies what the functions of the Secretary are to be,

and these functions include formulating conditions under which agreements will or will not be registered and setting policies regulating the
transfer of technology to Mexico.4 8 The Secretary must set policies according to certain specified criteria such as the promotion and diversification of Mexican industry, acquiring technology at the lowest possible
9

price, and the promotion of Mexican research and development.

Procedures under the Old Technology Law were extremely infor-

mitted for registration within sixty business days, and notice must be given to the Secretary
within sixty business days of the early termination of agreements. Id. The only change in
these requirements as compared to the Old Technology Law is that the periods for filing
have been changed from sixty days to sixty business days. See Old Technology Law, supra
note 1, at art. 4.
The Secretary must decide within ninety business days after its filing whether an agreement meets the requirements for registration. If no decision is issued by the Secretary
within the ninety-day period, the agreement is deemed registered. New Technology Law,
supra note 2. at art. 12. Again, the period for filing has been changed from ninety days to
ninety business days. See Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 10.
If the Secretary refuses to register an agreement, a petition for reconsideration accompanied by supporting evidence may be filed with the Secretary within fifteen business days
following the effective date of the adverse decision. The Secretary is required to examine the
evidence within thirty business days after it is submitted and to make a determination on
the petition within sixty business days after all the evidence has been examined. If no determination is made within this sixty-day period, the petition for reconsideration is deemed to
have been decided in petitioner's favor. New Technology Law, art. 13. The procedure for
petitioning for reconsideration is essentially the same under the New Technology Law as
under the Old Technology Law; however, the period for filing the petition for reconsideration has been extended from eight days to fifteen business days, and the Secretary now has
a total of ninety business days to examine the evidence once it has been submitted and
decide the case, whereas under the Old Technology Law he only had forty-five days in
which to do so. See Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 14.
47. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 8.
48. Id. art. 9.
49. Id. Article 9 lists the criteria as follows:
a) Adequately orient the technological selection;
b) Determine the maximum limits of payments according to the lowest
price of the available alternative at world levels in the interest of Mexico;
c) Increment and diversify the production of prioritary [sic] goods and
activities;
d) Promote the process of assimilation and adaptation of the acquired
technology;
e) Compensate payments through export and/or import substitutions;
f) Contractually orient, investigation and technological development;
g) Foster the acquisition of innovative technology;
h) Promote the progressive reorientation of the technological demand toward internal sources and foment the export of national technology.
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mal.50 Furthermore, decisions as to the registrability of agreements were

almost entirely ad hoc,51 and there were only minimal guidelines as to
how the Old Technology Law was to be interpreted."' As a result, contracting parties could never be totally certain as to how to draft their
agreements or what agreements would be approved." Although the flexibility of this informal ad hoc approach had its positive points,54 the for-

mulation of specific standards and guidelines should provide increased
and needed certainty for suppliers and recipients of technology in

Mexico."
D.

Reasons Registration Will Be Denied

The Old Technology Law provided fourteen different conditions
under which agreements could be denied registration." These conditions
were divided into two groups: (1) if any one of six conditions was met,
denial of registration was mandatory" and (2) if any one of the other
eight conditions was met, denial of registration was not automatic, but, in
either case, if the technology was of particular benefit to Mexico, an ex-

ception could be granted." The New Technology Law likewise provides
50. TECHNOLOGY

TRANSFER,

supra note 7, at 9-10.

51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id.
54. The staff of the Register has been noted for its accessibility and its willingness to
spend considerable time with applicants and to extend deadlines. Furthermore, the staff has
been willing to develop imaginative solutions where the facts seem to warrant them. Id. at 910.
55. It should be acknowledged that under the Old Technology Law, the Register acted,
in essence, as the bargaining agent of Mexican technology recipients. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 9-10; Hyde & de li Corte, supra note 22, at 251. It is not anticipated
that the role of the Register will change under the New Technology Law. The Register can,
however, still act as a bargaining agent even though certain rules and guidelines are spelled
out in advance of the negotiations, and it is hoped that this is the approach the Register will
take.
56. Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 7.
57. Id. arts. 7-8. The six conditions for which denial of registration was mandatory
were: (1) where the technology was already available in Mexico; (2) where the licensee was
required to assign to the technology supplier patents, trademarks, developments or improvements obtained by the recipient; (3) where the exportation of goods or services produced by
the recipient was prohibited or limited; (4) where the term of the agreement was too long
(the term could never exceed ten years); (5) where the agreement was to be governed by
non-Mexican law; or (6) where limitations were imposed upon the recipient's research and
development.
58. Id. art. 8. The eight conditions for which exceptions could be granted were: (1)
where the price of the technology was excessive; (2) where the technology supplier was permitted to intervene in the management of the recipient; (3) where the recipient was obligated to acquire equipment, tools, parts or raw materials exclusively from a specified source;
(4) where the agreement restricted the use of complementary technology; (5) where the recipient was obligated to sell goods exclusively through the technology supplier; (6) where the
recipient was required to permanently use personnel designated by the technology supplier;
(7) where production volumes were limited or sale or resale prices were imposed for national
production or for the recipient's exports; or (8) where the recipient was required to enter
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conditions under which agreements can be denied registration.5 * However,
under the new law, denial of registration is never mandatory. An exception can always be granted if the technology is of particular benefit to
Mexico. 0
This is one provision of the New Technology Law which is actually
less restrictive than the corresponding provision in the Old Technology
Law, and it should give technology suppliers a new bargaining tool.e"
However, since the provision seems to be intended to allow the Mexican
Government to determine on an ad hoc basis which technology transfers
are of benefit to Mexico, some uncertainty for the contracting parties
seems likely. This provision also seems intended to give the Mexican Government a way to adapt the law to Mexico's changing technological and
economic needs.6 2 Although this ability to alter the administration of the
law as circumstances change may be desirable in some respects, it will
produce uncertainty for the contracting parties since the interpretation of
"benefit" will constantly be changing.68 Thus, despite the fact that this
provision of the New Technology Law is actually less restrictive than the
corresponding provision in the Old Technology Law and could act as an
incentive to technology transfer, the overall effect seems neutral because
of the disincentive resulting from the uncertainty as to what contracts
will be granted exceptions.
The New Technology Law provides seventeen distinct conditions
which can be grounds for refusing registration of a transfer of technology
agreement." Nine of these conditions are identical to ones which were the
basis for denial of registration under the Old Technology Law." In addiinto exclusive sales or representational contracts in Mexico with the technology supplier.
59. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 15-16.
60. Id. art. 17.
61. Thus, it may be possible for those technology suppliers who can show that transfer
of their technology will benefit Mexico to obtain higher royalties or to get relief from provisions of the New Technology Law they feel are particularly onerous.
62. Exceptions foreseeably will be granted to encourage the transfer of the types of
technology Mexico desires and transfers which produce favorable economic results. Also, the
provision could be used to encourage or discourage transfer of technology per se. Thus, if
the flow of technology to Mexico should decrease as a result of the increased restrictiveness
of the new law, more exceptions could be granted to promote technology transfer.
63. The uncertainty that may. result from changing interpretations of "benefit" and
from the ad hoc determination of which agreements will be granted exceptions may be prevented if the guidelines that are to be issued define the scope of "benefit" and if changes in
interpretations of the term are made public in advance of the use of such a changed
interpretation.
64. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 15-16.
65. Thus, under the New Technology Law as under the Old Technology Law, agreements can be refused registration if they-. (1) provide for the transfer of technology readily
obtainable in Mexico; (2) if the price is disproportionate to the technology acquired or constitutes an unjustified burden on the Mexican economy; (3) if the agreement enables the
technology supplier directly or indirectly to control or intervene in the management of the
buyer; (4) if restrictions are imposed on research and development by the buyer; (5) if the
export of goods or services produced by the buyer is prohibited or restricted in a way con-
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tion, five of the conditions are very similar to ones provided for in the Old
Technology Law,6s and the changes made are basically codifications of the
Register's interpretation of the corresponding provisions in the Old Technology Law.6 7 The New Technology Law further provides three new conditions which, if met, may result in refusal to register an agreement.68
The first of these new conditions provides that agreements may be
denied registration if the technology purchaser is obligated to maintain
the technical information in secrecy beyond the duration of the technol-

trary to the interests of Mexico; (6) if the use of supplementary technology is prohibited; (7)
if production volumes are limited or sale or resale prices are imposed on the buyer's Mexican production or exports; (8) if the period of validity of the contract is too long; or (9)
when the technology recipient must permanently employ personnel designated by the technology supplier. Id.
66. The five conditions and the changes made are as follows:
1. The obligation of the buyer to transfer to the supplier patents, trademarks or innovations or improvements with or without compensation is still
grounds for refusal to register an agreement, but an exception is made under
the New Technology Law if the obligation is reciprocal or if it is of benefit to
the buyer.
2. The obligation to acquire equipment, tools, parts, or raw materials exclusively from a specified source is a grounds for refusal to register under the
New Technology Law only if there exist alternate sources of supply in national
or international markets. The existence of other sources was not a limitation
placed on this condition under the Old Technology Law.
3. The New Technology Law provides that agreements may not be registered if an obligation is imposed to sell products exclusively to specified clients. Under the Old Technology Law only agreements requiring exclusive sales
to the technology supplier were nonregistrable.
4. Whereas under the Old Technology Law agreements could be denied
registration if they required the buyer to conclude an exclusive sales or representation contract with the supplier in Mexico, under the New Technology
Law such an obligation will be allowed if the technology supplier is in a better
position to distribute or sell the products.
5. Under the Old Technology Law, agreements could not be registered if
they required disputes arising under the agreement to be decided in foreign
courts or according to foreign law. The New Technology Law provides that
registration may be denied if lawsuits are submitted to foreign courts except
where the agreement involves the export of Mexican technology or when the
agreement is submitted to foreign arbitration and the arbiter applies Mexican
law.
Compare New Technology Law, supra note 2, arts. 15-16 with Old Technology Law, supra
note 1, arts. 7-8.
67. See TzCHNOLOGY TRANSFER supra note 7, at 12-13, 20, 30; Kantor, supra note 19, at
561.
Many of these interpretations that were codified in the New Technology Law were
those contained in the "Summary of the General Criteria of Application of the Technology
Law" [hereinafter Summary] which was issued and widely circulated by the Ministry in
December, 1974. The Summary did not have the force of an executive order or regulation,
but the purpose of the Summary was to set forth the more relevant considerations which
were to guide the Ministry in the application of article 7 of the Old Technology Law. Hyde
& de la Corte, supra note 22, at 235.
68. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 15.
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ogy transfer agreement. 69 Under the Old Technology Law, the Register
had construed transfers of technology as sales of technology.10 As a consequence, the recipient acquired unrestricted use of the transferred technology, subject only to prior perfected industrial property rights,71 and was
able to continue use of the transferred technology at the expiration of the
technology transfer agreement. 7 Also, the Register has in the past denied
the registration of agreements which imposed any type of obligation on
the recipient beyond the term of the technology transfer agreement.78
Thus, this new provision seems only to be a codification of existing practice," and, although technology suppliers will always be concerned about
having their technology kept secret, should have little impact on the flow
of technology to Mexico as compared with actual practice under the Old
Technology Law.
The second new condition provides that registration may be denied if
the agreement does not expressly make the supplier responsible for infringement of the industrial property rights of third parties. 75 This provision represents a tighter restriction on transfers of technology to Mexico
than has previously been imposed. Under the Old Technology Law, the
Register had, in some instances, compelled the inclusion of contract
clauses, which required the supplier to indemnify the recipient for a portion of damages which the recipient might have to pay for infringement of
third parties' rights if the infringement resulted from the use of the supplier's patents or know-how. 7s The language of the new provision is very
broad. Whether "responsiblity" includes both defending and paying damages or only paying damages is not clear. The responsibility of the technology supplier is not conditioned on the recipient's proper use of the
transferred technology. Also, there are no geographical limitations, and
the wording implies responsibility for infringement all over the world. Assuming such a potentially large responsibility could be a burden many
technology suppliers might not want to assume.
The third new condition makes the lack of a guarantee by the supplier of the quality and results of the transferred technology a grounds for
refusal to register an agreement.77 The nature of the guarantee that will
be necessary to satisfy this condition is not known. The Preamble to the

69. Id. The term of a technology transfer agreement can never exceed ten years. New
Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 16.
70. Camp & Magnon, supra note 18, at 15-16.
71. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 16.
72. Id. at 29.
73. Id. at 16.

74. Even if the duration of technology transfer agreements is less than ten years, the
Register has in the past allowed the technology purchaser to agree to maintain the technology in secrecy for ten years from the date it is received. Camp & Magnon, supra note 18, at

20.
75. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 15.
76. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 26.
77. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 15.
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Old Technology Law states that a goal of that law was to prevent the
transfer of obsolete and inadequate technology to Mexico. Thus, the supplier will probably, at least, have to guarantee that the transferred technology is modern and complete enough so that an end result can be
7
achieveds.
Two other Latin American countries have provisions in their
7 9
transfer of technology laws requiring that the technology be guaranteed.
Both laws provide that the supplier must guarantee that the technology
will be complete and adequate enough to ensure the attainment of the
purpose of the transfer. Also, both laws provide that the technology supplier must furnish technical assistance, if necessary, to help the technology recipient make the best use of the technology. Whether Mexico will
require similar or greater assurances in the guarantee remains to be seen.
However, whatever the nature of the guarantee, this is one further condition that must be met and will foreseeably deter at least some technology
suppliers from transferring technology to Mexico.
E.

Sanctions

Probably the most striking changes in the New Technology Law are
in the sanctions that can be imposed for violations of the law. The penalty for violating the Old Technology Law was that an unregistered agreement had no legal effect in Mexico."0 This penalty still exists under the

78. It would seem that a guarantee that the transferred technology is currently used by
the supplier and that the use of that technology results in commercially acceptable products
for the supplier should be adequate to conform to the law. Also, given the difficulty of
adapting technology to local conditions and to the special needs of specific recipients, this is
realistically all the technology supplier can promise.
79. Brazil's Normative Act Number 15 provides in part:
The agreement must:
d) contain a clause to the effect that it is compulsory for the supplier,
during the term of the agreement, to render technical assistance to the recipient, so as to ensure the best use of the transferred technology;
e) make suitable provision for the contents of the technology to be transferred to be total, complete and adequate to ensure the attainment of the established ends ....
Normative Act No. 15 of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce National Institute of Industrial Property (Sept. 11, 1975), art. 4.5.1. An English translation may be found in TEcHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 314 app.
Argentina's law provides that the technical aims which the recipient intends to achieve
should be indicated in the technology transfer agreement. Law No. 21,617 of Aug. 12, 1977,
art. 7(d). An English translation may be found in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at
344 app. The law further provides that the technology supplier must guarantee that the
technology transferred will enable the recipient to achieve his aims and that the technology
supplier will, if necessary, supply adequate training to enable the recipient to use the technology. Law No. 21,617 of Aug. 12, 1977, art. 8. An English translation may be found in
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 344-45 app.
80. Old Technology Law, supra note 1, at art. 6. An unregistered agreement produced
no legal effect and was unenforceable before any authority or court. Id. In addition, it was
necessary to present written evidence of registration to enjoy certain benefits of Mexican
law such as tax concessions. Id. art. 5; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 6.
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New Technology Law,"' but under the new law very substantial fines may
be levied for furnishing false information in connection with an application for registration with the intent to deceive the Secretary, for not registering an agreement or an amendment that should be registered, and for
refusing to furnish information requested by the Secretary. Of particular
note is the fact that the fines for failure to register or for furnishing false
information can be as large as the entire value of the bargain."' Under the
Old Technology Law, none of the above sanctions was a penalty for violation of that law. It should also be emphasized again that all these sanctions now may be imposed on a foreign technology supplier as well as on
the Mexican recipient.8 3
Finally, the New Technology Law imposes a fine on employees of the
Register who breach the article 14 requirement that they maintain in secrecy technological information to which they become privy.8" No such
fine was imposed under the Old Technology Law. The new provision is
significant since it is an additional safeguard to protect the confidentiality
of transferred technology.
III.

CONCLUSION

As a result of a fervent nationalism, Mexico seeks to achieve independence from foreign sources of capital and technology.85 Two additional goals of the Mexican Government are to raise the economic standard of its people, mainly by industrialization, and to provide jobs for its
rapidly increasing population.8 6 But to achieve this economic development, the Government recognizes Mexico's continuing need for foreign
technology and investment.8 7 Thus, any new law enacted to regulate foreign involvement in the economy must not be so restrictive that it will
reduce foreign investment and technology transfers to levels falling below
a minimum level for the achievement of positive growth of the Mexican
economy.
The New Technology Law is more restrictive than its predecessor,
and it remains to be seen whether, as a consequence of its enactment, the
flow of technology to Mexico will fall below the level needed to promote
continued Mexican economic growth. Argentina has recently had to replace its very restrictive transfer of technology law because the flow of
81. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts. 6, 11.
82. Id. arts. 18-20. The exact amount of the fine is to be determined by the Secretary
and will depend on his evaluation of the following factors: the seriousness of the infraction,
the good faith and the degree of involvement of the transgressor in the illegal act, and
whether fraud was involved. Id. art. 23. Provision is made for a hearing, and there is a right
of appeal. Id. art. 24. If more than one violation of the act has occurred, only the sanction
for the most serious violation will be imposed. Id. art. 23.
83. Articles 18-21 and 23-24 apply to any party or to any person.
84. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at art. 22.
85. Gordon, supra note 23, at 18-19, 26-27.
86. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN MExico 15 (1981).
87. Gordon, supra note 23, at 18, 32. See note 23 supra.
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technology to the country had virtually stopped.8 8 Transfer of technology
to the Andean Pact countries is reduced, 9 and in Brazil it is anticipated
that the combination of very restrictive laws, uncertainty as to how those
laws will be interpreted, and administrative delays, will cause many suppliers to question the advisability of transferring their technology to that
country. 90 Thus, a too restrictive law or a poorly administered law will
result in a decrease in the transfer of technology to a country.
Mexico's Old Technology Law was very ably administered. 91 The
New Technology Law provides that procedures and guidelines for the administration and interpretation of the law are to be similarly promulgated. 9 2 The promulgation of these procedures and guidelines will hopefully result in increased certainty for the contracting parties, and there is
no reason to anticipate that the staff of the Register will not continue its
history of competent and fair administration. Therefore, although some
decrease in the flow of technology to Mexico seems quite likely as a result
of the enactment of the new law, the decrease probably will not be sufficient to halt or severely retard Mexico's economic growth.
Wannell Baird

The Gulf of Maine
Maritime Boundary Dispute
The ratification of the Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty
(Treaty) by the Governments of Canada and the United States concludes
thirteen years of negotiation during which the two countries failed to settle the dispute over the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the
Gulf of Maine area. The Treaty signifies both a departure from the usual
course of dispute settlement between the United States and Canada and
the emergence of a new forum for the settlement of international disagreements by binding third-party adjudication. Substantively, the
Treaty will provide the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) the opportunity to further clarify existing international law in the area of continen-

88. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 218-19; Kantor, supra note 19, at 573.
89. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 82-85. The Andean Pact was formed in
1969 and is intended to be similar to the European Common Market. The current Andean
Pact members are Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Columbia. Kantor, supra note 19,
at 553.
90. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 7, at 203-04.
91. Id. at 9-10.
92. New Technology Law, supra note 2, at arts 8-9.
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tal shelf/maritime boundary delimitation. The final decision will herald
far-reaching ramifications for the settlement of future delimitations of
200-mile exclusive economic zones as well as delimitations of fishery
zones and water columns which lie above the continental shelf.
The current dispute has arisen as a result of conflicting claims of Canadian and U.S. jurisdiction within the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank
area.' Approximately 12,000 square miles of extraordinarily fertile fishing
grounds is at issue. The United States claims the region as its own, invoking the equitable principle of natural prolongation,' while Canada's
claimed boundary extends south as a result of its adherence to an "equitable-equidistance line." 3 Attempts to negotiate the dispute resulted in
the signing of the Fisheries Agreement' and the Boundaries Settlement
Treaty in 1979. Although each treaty was an agreement independent of
the other, Canada stipulated that both must be ratified in order for either
to take effect. Apparently, the linkage was insisted upon so that a balance
of interests would serve as security against a possible "winner-take-all"
decision in the adjudication of a third-party settlement.6
However, the Fisheries Agreement ran into immediate opposition
from the fishing interests of the United States, and consequently, the new

1. The source of the conflict lies in the Truman Proclamation of 1945 in which the
United States extended its jurisdiction over the adjacent continental shelf to 200 miles. The
1976 enactment of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act extended the exclusive
fisheries zone from twelve nautical miles to 200 nautical miles. The passage of the act
brought about the current situation in which both Canada and the United States have been
vying for the same portion of the resource-rich Georges Bank. For an excellent overview of
the history of the Gulf of Maine dispute, see Rhee, Equitable Solutions to the Maritime
Boundary Dispute Between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 590 (1981).
2. 41 Fed. Reg. 48,619 (1976).
3. The rationale behind the Canadian claim is based upon the 1977 Anglo-French Arbitration opinion in which the International Court of Justice stated that a land extension
could be regarded as a "special circumstance" which could have a "distorting effect" on
marine boundary delimitations. Therefore, by discounting the effect of Cape Cod and Nantucket Island, the Canadians have arrived at a very favorable "equitable-equidistance line."
112 Can. Gaz., Extra No. 79, pt. I (Sept. 15, 1978).
4. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of
Canada on East Coast Fishery Resources, Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting the Agreement of East Coast Fishery Resources with Canada, 1979, S. ExEc.
Docs. U AND V., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 9 NEW DIREcTIONS IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA, 157, 178 (M. Nordquist & K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
5. Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
U.S.T.-,
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Mar. 29, 1979, United States-Canada, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1371 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Boundary Settlement Treaty].
6. For background material relating to the linkage of the two treaties, see Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 59-60 (1979); Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty and East
Coast Fishery Resources Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 61-62 (1980).
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Reagan Administration urged Senate ratification of the Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty while concurrently withdrawing from the Fisheries
Agreement. This unilateral delinkage action by the United States severed
the two treaties as well as the dual ratification requirement which was
initially necessary to bring the agreements into effect.7 The Fisheries

Agreement is no longer operative despite Canada's strong disapproval of
the delinkage. However, in an effort to proceed with what remained of the
two original agreements, both countries exchanged instruments of ratification for the Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area.$ The
dispute that the Treaty addresses is currently before a Chamber of the
International Court of Justice awaiting adjudication.
It is significant that the I.C.J. Chamber will be used to determine the
delimitation of the Gulf of Maine maritime boundary because this particular dispute settlement format has not been utilized since its adoption in
1972. Because the goal of the new format is to simplify and expedite litigation, it has been designed to ensure the economy of proceedings before
the Court while providing the greater flexibility of an arbitration
proceeding.9
The parties involved have significant input as to who and how many
members shall constitute the Chamber. 10 Even though the Court possesses appointment and veto power, it has previously implied that the
parties maintain substantial control over the composition of the Chamber.1" If the Court had appointed judges to the Chamber who were unacceptable to both parties, the parties could have arbitrated or discontinued
the proceedings entirely.12 Two additional benefits result from this proceeding. First, the decision of the Chamber is binding upon the parties.
Second, the judgment of a fairly small Chamber is anticipated to be more
direct and clear in its expression."3
Although the traditional means of settling U.S.-Canadian disputes
7. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE MATmME BouNDARY SETTLEMENT TREATY WITH CANADA, S. ExEc. Rzp. No. 5, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981), reprintedin
20 I.L.M. 1383 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 SENATE REP.].
8. Boundary Settlement Treaty, note 5 supra.
9. The Rules of the Court provide that when the parties request the Chamber forum to
adjudicate an action, the parties shall be consulted regarding the composition of the Court,
and their approval shall be sought as to the "number of Members who are to constitute the
Chamber." This provision exemplifies a means by which the Chamber format is able to
provide a formal judicial decision while adhering to a more flexible standard of procedure.
Rules of the Court,

INTERNATIONAL COURT OP

JUSTICE, AcTs

AND

DocUMENTs

CONCERNING

art. 17 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Rules of the Court],
reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1748 (1978); See de Arechaga, The Amendments to the
Rules of Procedure of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
10. Rules of the Court, note 9 supra.
11. Discussion by R. St. J. Macdonald (1978), reprinted in 1 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 31 (1978).
12. Rules of the Court, supra note 9, at art. 88.
13. Macdonald, Settling Our Canadian-UnitedStates Differences: A Canadian Perspective, 1 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 12 (1978).
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT,
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has been through negotiation rather than through litigation, 1 4 both governments have agreed to submit this particular delimitation question to
the Chamber. This is even more unusual in light of Canada's refusal to
recognize the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in respect to "disputes arising out
of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in
respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the living resources of the sea.'" Nevertheless, Canada and the United States have
agreed to submit this particular dispute to the Chamber because of the
unique merits which this third-party proceeding possesses.
The Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty, ratified by the U.S. Senate, contains a number of technical amendments, two of which are notable. First, article IV was amended so that the Treaty could enter into
force without the ratification of the Fisheries Agreement.' Second, the
provision in the Special Agreement which allowed each party to select a
non-national judge to sit on the Chamber was deleted because the provision did not comply with article 31 of the Statute of the Court.' 7 Instead,
the Court was empowered to appoint all five members of the Chamber,
"after consultation with the Parties, and pursuant to article 26(2) and
article 31 of the Statute of the Court and in accordance with this Special
Agreement."' s The Court has adhered to this amendment by its recent
election of judges to the Chamber. 9 However, the stated purpose of the
Treaty is the same: it is "to provide for the delimitation of the maritime
boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area by a Chamber of the International
Court of Justice or, if such a Chamber cannot be constituted in accordance with the wishes of the Parties, by an ad hoc Court of Arbitration."
The Treaty consists of four articles and two annexed Agreements.
The Agreements provide for the procedures of binding third-party settlement. The Special Agreement"l sets forth the manner in which the
boundary dispute will be submitted before a Chamber of the I.C.J. If the
Chamber could not have been constituted in a manner satisfactory to the

14. Commentary by Marcel Cadieux, reprinted in 1 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19 (1978).
15. H.C. DEB. (Can.), 1970, Apr. 8 at 5623-24, noted in Macdonald, The New Canadian
Declaration of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1970).
16. 1981 SENATE REP., supra note 7, at 1389.
17. Id.; I.C.J. STAT. art. 31(4) states that the Court always elects members to the Chamber, with the one exception that a party may elect a judge if no member of the Chamber is
of the party's nationality.
18. 1981 SENATE RE., supra note 7, at 1389.
19. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.),
1982 I.C.J. 3 (Constitution of Chamber Order of Jan. 20), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 69 (1982).
Pursuant to article 31(4) of the I.C.J. Statute, Acting Judge Elias requested Judge Ruda to
assent to his replacement by Canada's chosen judge ad hoc, Professor Maxwell Cohen.
20. 1981 SENATE REP., supra note 7, at 1.385.
21. Special Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada to Submit to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Mar. 29, 1979, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 1378 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Special Agreement].
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parties within six months, then the Arbitration Agreement provided that
the dispute would have immediately passed to an ad hoc Court of
Arbitration.22
The composition of the Chamber, which is provided for in article 1(2)
of the Special Agreement, has been complied with by the recent election
of five judges to hear the case. Article II of the Treaty itself provides that
either party may terminate the Treaty if the Chamber has not been "constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Special
Agreement" within six months of the Treaty's entry into force.2 8 The purpose of these complex procedures becomes clear when examined in light
of article I of the Treaty. There, the Chamber is "deemed to have been
constituted when the Registrar of the Court has been notified of the name
or names of the judge or judges ad hoc."'2 4 The parties, in effect, maintained a veto power regarding the composition of the Chamber by reserving a delaying tactic in the notification of the judges ad hoc. After six
months had passed, the Special Agreement to submit the matter to the
Chamber would have terminated, and it would immediately have gone to
a Court of Arbitration whose members were to be "mutually agreed
upon" by the parties. 8 However, in this case, this tactic is moot since the
Court has already elected the Special Chamber of five judges, and an
elected judge has already been replaced by an ad hoc judge at Canada's
request."
Article III of the Treaty provides a further escape mechanism should
the parties become displeased with the composition of the Chamber in
the event of a vacancy. If the vacancy is not filled to the parties' satisfaction within four months time, either party may terminate the Special
Agreement and effect the Arbitration Agreement within another two
months time.27 The Court is satisfied that this provision is consonant
with the Statute of the Court since it "simply specifies the circumstances
under which the parties may exercise their right to terminate the Special
Agreement and, pursuant to article 88 of the Rules, to discontinue the
proceedings before the Court." '
The last two procedural issues which the Treaty addresses are those
of the presentation of evidence and the matter of a final, binding judgment. Article V of the Special Agreement provides that diplomatic and

22. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Governizent of
Canada to Submit to a Court of Arbitration the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Gulf of Maine Area, Mar. 29, 1979, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1380 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Arbitration Agreement].
23. Boundary Settlement Treaty, supra note 5, at 1377.
24. Id.
25. Arbitration Agreement, supra note 22, at 1380.
26. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.),
1982 I.C.J. 3 (Constitution of Chamber Order of Jan. 20), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 69, at 73
(1982).
27. Boundary Settlement Treaty, supra note 5, at 1377-78.
28. 21 I.L.M. 69, at 71.

1982

DEVELOPMENTS

confidential correspondence will not be introduced into evidence without
notification, and proposals made in the course of negotiation will not be
introduced into evidence at all. Article II of the Special Agreement accepts as final and binding the judgment of the Chamber regarding the
single maritime boundary. There shall be no recourse to third party
review.29
The substantive legal questions and limitations which are at issue in
this proceeding are addressed in the Special Agreement and in the Arbitration Agreement. Under both Agreements, article II directs the tribunal
to decide "in accordance with the principles and rules of international law
applicable in the matter between the Parties, the course of a single maritime boundary that divides the continental shelf and fisheries zones" of
the two countries. The boundary shall proceed from a specified point to a
point which shall be determined by the Chamber within a defined area
seaward of Georges Bank.8"
Article III of the Special Agreement states that the division of the
continental shelf and fishery zones of the parties is the only purpose for
the maritime boundary.
This boundary will not be recognized for any
31
other purpose.
Finally, although the Court has not been asked to delimit the boundary to its full seaward extent, article VII of the Special Agreement and
article XIII of the Arbitration Agreement establish a procedure for negotiations on the seaward extension of the boundary following the tribunal's
decision if that is desired by the parties. The question may be taken back
to the tribunal for binding third-party adjudication if a negotiated settlement is not reached within one year. 2
Since the Court has accepted the Treaty as a legitimate vehicle to
address the main issues of the dispute, and since it has elected members
of the Chamber in accordance with the Treaty provisions, it is now
obliged to analyze those issues "in accordance with the principles and
rules of international law applicable in the matter as between the
Parties.""
To resolve the questions submitted to the Court, discriminating decisions must be made regarding which principles of international law shall
govern the delimitation of a "single maritime" boundary. The maritime
boundary will certainly encompass the delimitation of the continental
shelf and the water column above, which includes the fisheries zone. Also,
although neither state has made an express claim to an exclusive eco-

29. Id. at 72.
30. Special Agreement, supra note 21, at 1378; Arbitration Agreement, supra note 22,
at 1380.
31. Special Agreement, supra note 21, at 1379.
32. Id.; Arbitration Agreement, supra note 22, at 1382.
33. Special Agreement, supra note 21, at 1378.
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nomic zone, 4 it is clear that the line to be drawn would also be the
boundary for any exclusive economic zone to be claimed in the future."
Indeed, some analysts insist that the 3boundary
delimitation is one which
6
primarily delimits the economic zone.
The dilemma lies in the fact that the parties have requested the
Chamber to set a single maritime boundary according to the principles of
international law for two separate purposes: the delimitation of fishery
zones and of the continental shelf. Should the Court find that the rules of
international law direct the delimitation of the fishery zones to result one
way and the delimitation of the continental shelf to result in another, the
Court will not be able to rely on precedent to determine which course of
action it should adopt.
Article 6(2) of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf3
governs the delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent states.
However, its strict application may be inappropriate because it does not
address the water column. There is no equivalent treaty to which Canada
and the United States are parties which provides for the delimitation of
boundaries in fishing zones." Thus, the Court may wish to draw an anal39
ogy from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
and utilize the continental shelf rule for the delimitation of the fishery
zone. However, in one instance the I.C.J. held article 6(2) of the Geneva
Convention to be somewhat distinct from the international customary law
which was previously held applicable to the delimitation of continental
shelf boundaries.4 It may be necessary to inquire as to the delimitation
of fishing zone boundaries,' and to take into account historic fisheries
and similar considerations.
Because of the amount of significant legal authority and practice

34. For a general discussion of the Gulf of Maine maritime boundary delimitation and
its application to exclusive economic zones, see Note, Adjudication of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 292 (1979).
35. Id.
36. For a case in point, see Note, Boundary Delimitation in the Economic Zone: The
Gulf of Maine Dispute, 30 ME. L. REV. 207 (1978).
37. Specifically, Article 6(2) states that:
[WIhere the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent states . . . unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by the application of the principle
of equidistance from from the nearest points of the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
38. Feldman & Colson, The Maritime Boundariesof the United States, 75 Am. J. Irr'L
L. 729 (1981).
39. See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10/Rev.3,
and Add.1 and Corrs. 16 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1131 (1980).
40. North Sea Continental Shelf (W.Ger. v. Den.; W.Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969).
41. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 2 (Judgment of July 25, 1974).
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which exists with respect to the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries, it is likely that those rules and procedures of international law will
be most fully utilized by the Court to fashion a resolution in the Gulf of
Maine dispute.4 2 The precedents which the Court shall rely upon will be
illuminating for those situations in which concave coastlines are involved
in delimitation proceedings.4 Furthermore, the Gulf of Maine decision
will contribute direction and substance to an area of maritime delimitation law which, to date, has been sparsely developed.
In conclusion, the utilization of the I.C.J. Chamber for the adjudication of international disputes should attract the attention of parties in
conflict who are in need of a more flexible process of decision making.
The Gulf of Maine decision will be the first test of this procedural device
which, hopefully, will lighten the cumbersome process of third-party adjudication. Finally, this case will provide the International Court of Justice an opportunity to develop and clarify the legal and equitable principles which are necessary for the delimitation of maritime boundaries.
Ellen K. Eggleston

The Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Prospects for the Future
On April 30, 1982, the nations of the world witnessed the adoption of
a new charter for the world's oceans by the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). After eight weeks of informal negotia42. The North Sea Continental Shelf case, and the Anglo-French Arbitration proceeding, shall most likely be the predominant case law precedents which the Court shall rely
upon to reach a decision. The North Sea decision emphasized the use of equitable procedures and the importance of the physical relationship of the land to the adjacent continental shelf, while the Anglo-French Arbitration stressed that equity is the primary issue in a
delimitation proceeding, and that there is no priority given to the principle of equidistance
as a means of boundary delimitation. Rather, the determination of whether a special circumstance exists for the purpose of achieving an equitable result depends upon "geographical and other circumstances." Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Cmnd.
7434 (1978), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
43. Article 6(2) of the Geneva Convention addresses adjacent states and sets forth the
principle of equidistance as the proper equitable solution to apply in maritime delimitation
proceedings. However, the article is careful to distinguish between its application in regard
to adjacent and opposite states. The difficulty which arises from distinguishing between the
two situations is where the equidistance principle is applied to concave coastlines, as in the
present case. Here, equidistance methods may not be equitable, and the presence of "special
circumstances" in each case may be cause for an exception to the equidistance rule. Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, note 37 supra.
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tions, the Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention) was adopted by
130 countries. Four countries were opposed to adoption, seventeen countries abstained, and four countries did not participate.' Significantly, the
United States voted against adoption, while the Soviet Union was among
the countries which abstained. These results indicate that the aim of UNCLOS III, which was to obtain an agreed balancing of interests between
all states regarding the uses of the sea and its resources,' has not yet been
achieved.
The adoption of the Convention by UNCLOS III is the culmination
of fifteen years of effort by the international community to establish an
overall legal order for ocean space.3 However, the failure to achieve a consensus on the Convention is evidence of the conflicts of interest which
have arisen throughout the negotiations. Most of the controversy centers
around the provisions of the Convention which regulate deep seabed mining. 4 The United States' objections to these provisions is the basis for its
vote against the Convention.5
In March 1981, at the Tenth Session of UNCLOS III, the United
States announced its decision to re-evaluate its position toward the Convention. Specifically, the Reagan Administration's commitment to free
enterprise kept it from voting for an agreement which would place restrictions on private corporations as to future exploration and exploitation of
the seabed.6 The seabed contains metallic nodules which are composed of
manganese, cobalt and nickel; these minerals are essential to the U.S.
steel industry. Technology for recovering these minerals from the seabed
has been developed by Western companies based primarily in the United
States. The United States objects to provisions for mandatory transfer of
technology from private mining companies to the Enterprise, which is the
mining arm of the International Seabed Authority created by the Con-

1. U.N. CHRONICLE, June, 1982, at 13.
2. See Bentham, The Third United Nations Law of the Sea -Conference: Final Act of
Failure-WhatNext?, 10 Irr'L Bus. LAW. III (1982).
3. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) began in the
United Nations General Assembly in August 1967, with Ambassador Pardo's statement that
the resources of the sea are the "common heritage of mankind." The United Nations Committee on the Law of the Sea was formally created in 1968, and texts of the Convention were
developed in each session. For a review of the history and goals of UNCLOS III, see U.N.
CHRONICLE,

supra note 1, at 14-15.

4. These provisions are especially important due to the recent discovery of the metallic
nodules which cover the ocean floor and contain fine-grain oxides of copper, nickel, cobalt
and manganese. For a discussion of the regulations of the Convention with respect to the
development of these nodules, see U.N. CHRONICLE, supra note 1, at 5-12.
5. For commentaries on this issue, see Chapman, Underwater Plunder, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 1982, at 17; Hawkins, How to Give Away Your Future, NAT'L REV., Apr. 16,
1982, at 410; Stone, The U.S. Again at Bay, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 19, 1982, at
108; Bus. WK., May 10, 1982, at 39; NEWSWEEK, May 10, 1982, at 74; U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 15, 1982, at 69.

6. Am., May 15, 1982, at 373.
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vention." Additionally, the provision allowing the mining clauses of the
Convention to be rewritten in twenty years if three-fourths of the world's
nations agree is unacceptable to the Senate, as the Senate cannot assent
to a convention or treaty that might bind the United States to changes in
the future.' Finally, the United States objects to an agreement that would
place power in the hands of the Seabed Authority, an international
agency in which the United States and other industrialized countries have
minimal influence.'
The United States has argued that the deep seabed is subject to the
legal regime of the high seas, and therefore, seabed mining by nations
with the appropriate technology is permissible as one of the freedoms of
the high seas.'0 The United States has also passed the Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act," which governs U.S. operations in the absence of
an international treaty. This act is to be superseded by any Law of the
Sea Convention which the United States ratifies. The act could possibly
serve as the basis for the development of the oceans by U.S. companies
outside the framework of the Convention, but for the United States to
allow this may be a violation of international law," since the Law of the
Sea Convention would become the international legal charter regulating
all deep seabed development.
In early December 1982, the Convention on the Law of the Sea was
opened for signature in Caracas, Venezuela. Although most observers expect that the Soviet Union will eventually sign, U.S. action is not as predictable. If the United States does not sign, it could lose its leadership
position in undersea mining. s Additionally, the Administration may ratify the Convention in order to insure the gains that will result from the
creation of the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, and rights
to navigation, overflight, offshore oil, and fisheries."' However, there are
those who argue that it would be better for the United States to have no
agreement at all rather than to accept this one.' 5 Others argue that the
provisions in the Convention have already become part of customary international law, and therefore, the United States need not sign the Convention to benefit from it." Finally, there is the question of how much
7.

THE INTERDEPENDENT, June/July,

1982, at 1.

8. Id.
9. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 412.

10. See Van Dyke and Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas":
Which Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 493 (1982).
11. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §1401-1473 (Supp. 1982).
This Act was signed into law by President Carter on June 28, 1980, and allows a potential
miner to receive interim permits to explore and exploit the seabed of the ocean. The Act
prohibits significant commercial exploitation of the seabed until January 1, 1988, but permits licensing of mine sites and preliminary investment and preparation.
12. See THE INTERDEPENDENT, supra note 7, at 6.
13. Bus. WK., May 10, 1982, at 41.
14. Id.
15. See Chapman, and Hawkins, note 5 supra.
16. See THE INTERDEPENDENT, note 7 supra.

130

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

force and effect the Convention will have without the signature of the
United States. For the United States to choose not to sign would be a
serious blow to the Convention's effectiveness as an internationally recognized legal charter, and international law would continue to be established by custom and practice of nations. It is hoped that the United
States will carefully consider the consequences of its decision before it
decides whether to sign the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
C.M.M.
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Enterprise Law of the 80's
Reviewed by Donald W. Hoagland*
RowE, F.M.,

JAcOBS, F.G., JOELSON, M.R. (eds.); EN'rssu'l
LAw OF THE 80's:
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CoMPfrrnoN AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION; ABA Press (1980); ISBN 0-89707-018-6, LC 80-67958; xviii, 254

pp.; footnotes, index.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This volume is a report of a symposium held in Luxembourg, Brussels and London from September 25-28, 1979. The sessions of the symposium were organized primarily by the editors and were attended by many
of the preeminent experts in antitrust law of the Atlantic community.
Their papers and comments represent more a set of sophisticated speculations on the evolution of competition law and organization concepts
than a survey or analysis of the state of the law on either of those two
subjects. As such, and as an opportunity to read the expert speculations
of a group of witty and highly competent participants, this volume offers
rich material for people who are concerned with the evolution of competition and industrial organization law.
As a gathering of representatives from many different nations, the
symposium offered an opportunity for discussions of comparative competition law. Comparative observations or comments will not determine
cases within any jurisdiction, but, particularly in the field of competition
law, they are valuable because of the history of the development of legal
institutions in this field on both sides of the Atlantic."

* Donald W. Hoagland is a partner at Davis, Graham & Stubbs in Denver, Colorado.
B.A., Yale University; L.L.B., Columbia University Law School. Mr. Hoagland served as
Assistant Administrator for Development Finance and Private Enterprise in the U.S.
Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant to
AID and to the Government of Indonesia. Mr. Hoagland is the author of "Investment in
Indonesia Today," published by the Government of Indonesia, as well as the Introduction
for The Law of TransnationalBusiness Transactions.
1. The field of competition law presents the unique example of a legal institution imported into Europe from the United States. For better or for worse, the antitrust concepts
evolving in Europe today have their intellectual roots in the American antitrust law of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rowe, Preface to ENTrERPRISE LAW OF THE
80's: EUROPEAN AND AMEmCAN PERSPECTIES ON COMMrION AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

ix (F.M. Rowe, F.G. Jacobs & M.R. Joelson eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Rowe].
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All of the scheduled speakers presented papers or extended remarks.2
An additional group of knowledgeable participants gathered to offer comments, challenges, and supplemental discussion.3 It is important to note

the number and range of participants in this symposium in order to understand the distillation of experience embodied in both the papers
presented and the comments and discussion based on those papers.
A fine and stimulating range of issues was raised and considered. It
was not the group's purpose to arrive at operational solutions to pressing
problems, although suggestions for change were made, welcomed, and extensively considered. The participants, the acknowledged leaders of their
profession, were having a conversation which represented the informed,
sophisticated, sometimes humorous, sometimes world-weary, and regularly wry and witty observations of a skilled group of practitioners.
II.

WHO WILL DECIDE?

It is clear that antitrust law is a fundamental element of the economic and political structures of the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC). The most penetrating observations of this
symposium came from, and were stimulated by, the summaries of Frederick Rowe' and the questions asked by Jeremy F. Lever. 5 The issue which
Rowe and Lever identified, and which this reviewer takes to be the most
fundamental question in the field, is the political question of who should
decide the structure of the commercial world we live in. When a subject
becomes sufficiently funda mental and is covered by a set of regulations,
the jurisdiction of which has been given to certain administrative or judicial institutions of government, a question which must be asked from
time to time is whether authority has been lodged with the proper organs
of government. This is a question which does not arise exclusively in the
context of antitrust law but is one which must be answered satisfactorily
before any body of law or of regulations will be accepted by the society
burdened by them.
In the United States, antitrust authority was first delegated to the

2. These speakers were: Professor Michel Waelbroeck, Earl E. Pollock, John Temple
Lang, Professor Barry E. Hawk, Professor James A. Rahl, Willy Schlieder, Donald L. Holley, Ivo E. Schwartz, Kingman W. Brewster, Lord Richard Wilberforce, Professor Gordon
Bornte, Frederick M. Rowe, Allen C. Holmes, Professor Francis G. Jacobs, and Mark R.
Joelson.
3. This group included: Professor Arved Deringer, Professor Ren6 Joliet, Aurelio Pappalardo, Frits Salomonson, Jeremy F. Lever, Professor E.J. Mestmficker, Carl H. Amon, Dr.
Betty Bock, Ira M. Millstein, Valentine Korah, J.D. Keir, A.H. Hermann, Professor Basil
Yamey, Sir Alan Neale, J.P. Warner, Harvey M. Applebaum, John H. Morrison, and Douglas E. Rosenthal.
4. Rowe, supra note 1, at xi-xii; ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80's: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPEITION AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

177, 200 (F.M. Rowe, F.G. Ja-

cobs & M.R. Joelson eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ENTERPRISE LAW].

5.

ENTERPRISE LAW,

supra note 4, at 97, 190.
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courts." Later the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was also given authority over antitrust problems in an effort to launch an administrative
agency with the capacity to anticipate and prohibit damaging anticompetitive conduct.7 Neither of these delegations has been particularly successful. The FTC has become involved in so many dubious enterprises
that there have been times when it has come close to being abolished.8
The courts have become ensnared in elaborate discovery proceedings to
the point that the judicial system could break down from the sheer
weight of big antitrust cases.0 One British practitioner pointed out that
the United States was making its predicament unnecessarily worse by
such "errors" as allowing treble damages in antitrust cases, by permitting
contingent fees, and by not charging the losing party with some of the
winner's costs.10
III. THE BIG CASE
To place the problem of the "big" U.S. antitrust case somewhat in
context, a few specific facts may be useful. For example, in one set of
cases involving an alleged price-fixing cartel in the uranium industry,"1
one defendant, among many in the proceeding, has had to produce eight
million documents. This defendant has employed eighty-five lawyers and
107 paralegals in three different cities, and the lawyers and paralegals
have been working on these cases for about four years. Depositions were
taken of over 200 individuals, each deposition taking anywhere from onehalf day to forty-five days. Disputes about the discovery proceedings have
been appealed to the highest state courts ten times. A trial on the merits
has not yet, and may never be concluded.
When a U.S. defendant in one of these cases failed to produce certain
documents because of a blocking statute' in Canada, the state court attempted to force production of the documents and eventually issued a
final judgment on the merits against the American company for failure to
produce the documents which the law of Canada made it criminal to produce. The "big case" game has become so expansive that even a public
offering of shares in an antitrust claim was offered to the investing
public."

6. Id. at 219.
7. Id. at 217.
8. Id. at 224-27; Debate, The Federal Trade Commission Under Attack: Should the
Commission's Role be Changed?, 49 ANTrmuST L.J. 1481 (1980).
9. ENTERPMIE LAw, supra note 4, at 227-28.
10. Id. at 233.
11. United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). For a complete description of the proceedings, see the report
of the case at 629 P.2d 231.
12. A blocking statute makes it a crime for persons to hand over business records subpoenaed in foreign antitrust proceedings and, thus, prevents discovery. See [July-Dec.] ANTrrRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 993, at A-7 (Dec. 11, 1980).
13. ENTrPiusE LAW, supra note 4, at 185 n.37.
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The scope of this problem broadens when we consider the extent of
governmental participation in business in many countries of the world.
The American antitrust laws were adopted in the framework of an economy whose dominant participants were privately owned and operated enterprises. Now many participants in the international markets are entirely or predominantly owned or operated by a government. For these
government-owned enterprises, profit is only one of their complex of interrelated objectives, and applying antitrust laws becomes inappropriate.
It is not possible to bring an offending nation into court as a defendant in
a private antitrust action, although the American courts have opened the
door to actions by foreign governments against U.S. companies for damages under our antitrust laws. 4 The panelists in this publication have
pointed out this anomaly in the availability of the antitrust laws, and it
remains one of the major areas for future development. 5
IV. SHIFTING U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY
These papers were delivered in 1979. The Carter Administration was
still in office, and that Administration's policies were more or less comparable to the official U.S. antitrust policies pursued by Democratic administrations since 1946.1" The relatively aggressive pursuit of trade regulation enforcement mechanisms which characterized the Carter
Administration is not the policy of the Reagan Administration. The antitrust philosophy expressed by the present Attorney General, William
French Smith, represents a substantial reduction in reach and range for
the federal antitrust laws.' 7 The International Business Machines case
has been dismissed.'8 The American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
case has been settled.1" Mobil apparently thought it had a reasonable
chance of being permitted to acquire Marathon.2" We may well find that
the next symposium of this character will not be so much concerned with
the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws as it is with a debate
about simplification and dilution of the antitrust laws and the impact
upon the economy of the accelerating concentration of economic power
through mergers and acquisitions.
V.

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

Lawyers are trained primarily to search for facts to establish the ele14. Id. at 241; Comment, The Status of Foreign Sovereigns in Private Antitrust Actions, 11 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 81 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
15. ENTERPRISE LAW, supra note 4, at 224.

16. Id. at 221, 224-26.
17. See Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 151 (1981).
18. [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1047, at 88 (Jan. 14, 1982).

19. Id. at 82.
20. However, a preliminary injunction barring Mobil's acquisition of Marathon has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 3.
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ments of a claim and to argue the legal merits of claims. Lawyers know
the elements of a claim of breach of contract or of negligence. In dealing
with such claims they know what facts they have to find and what the
range of effective argument may be. However, when asked to determine
whether there was a conspiracy in restraint of trade or a monopoly or the
abuse of a monopoly, competent lawyers can become confused. The facts
do not readily trigger reactions based on fundamental values of right,
wrong, fairness and reasonableness. The effort to determine and regulate
the desired structure of the markets of a large, complex economy through
a judicial mechanism is one of the most questionable elements of the U.S.
antitrust philosophy. Should the courts be deciding how to restructure
the oil industry?"1 Should lawyers be deciding whether AT&T should be
one company or twenty-two?2 The judicial process appears to be a highly
inappropriate mechanism for structuring an economy, but Americans
would feel over-governed if the FTC or another administrative agency
were authorized to declare that it would be beneficial to have twenty-two
telephone companies where there had been one. In spite of the incongruity of determining the structure of one of our most essential service
industries by the decisions of the parties in a settlement conference, that
method does placate the American apprehensions about centralized planning, and this is an apprehension that is not likely to fade in today's political climate.
The papers presented at this symposium emphasize the fact that the
EEC antitrust system is more directly regulatory. Even though the substantive rules of EEC antitrust law were extensively adapted from American antitrust principles, their system of investigation and enforcement is
much more administrative in character. 2 Although judicial procedures
are employed at higher levels in the EEC, the EEC system regards the
regulation of monopolistic activity as an administrative process.24 As a
result, the EEC employs procedures which, although lacking in the due
process elements dear to the hearts of American lawyers, address more
openly the political, social, and public policy content of the inquiry involved in reaching conclusions with respect to antitrust matters brought
before the commissions.' 5

VI. THIRD WORLD
The symposium was a conference of American and European practitioners. One of the factual elements they recognized was the proliferation
of international trade and the extent to which the commercial world (in

21. The FTC recently dropped a case against Exxon and seven other oil companies.

The purpose of the case was to restructure the oil industry. [July-Dec.] ANTrrmuar
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1031, at A-28 (Sept. 17, 1981).
22. EmTRPusE LAW, supra note 4, at 225.
23. Id. at 39, 63.

24. Id. at 39-40.
25. Id. at 43.
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parallel to the political world) has become pluralistic rather than being
dominated by a few imperial trading giants.2" The implication of this condition seems to be, however, that the reconciliation of U.S. and European
antitrust laws is not such a dominant concern for the 1980's as one might
expect. The views on competition and monopoly of all countries of the
world will become significant to the establishment and preservation of
healthy trading and investment conditions in world commerce. As the
greater interdependence of the nations of the world becomes clearer, the
next symposium of this kind could well be planned as an effort to present
a global perspective.
VII.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The subjects of industrial organization and corporate governance receive relatively minor treatment in these papers, but there are some interesting insights. American enterprises have been criticized for the failure
to give the public interest a sufficient voice in corporate decisions which
affect the public at large."7 There are also those who believe that, with
respect to internal corporate governance, there should be a federal incorporating statute.28 Such a statute is desired in order to prevent interstate
competition to become the popular situs for incorporations, as this popularity usually results because states have adopted statutes lax toward corporate management."9 State statutes designed to induce corporations to
incorporate in that state are alleged to favor interests of control groups to
the detriment of the interests of minorities, employees and other groups.
While Americans are still trying to decide how much fiduciary and
social responsibility can be required of corporations, a different corporate
governance philosophy is emerging in Europe. The evolving European
view of corporate governance is that any business is a joint enterprise of
capital and labor.80 The responsibility of the board of directors is not only
to maximize the benefits accruing to the suppliers of capital but also to
maximize the benefits accruing to labor. The law in West Germany requires labor representation on the board of directors. 3 1 There is also labor
representation in France, although its voting power is less than in Germany." Consider by contrast the controversy that surrounded the placement of one labor representative president on the board of Chrysler Corporation." U.S. corporate law has not yet endorsed the concept that the
board of directors has a responsibility to give the interests of labor representation comparable to the interests of capital, but it may be that, in the

26. See id. at 86-94.
27. Id. at 125.

28. Id. at 126-27.
29. Id. at 123-24.

30. Id. at 112-16, 137.
31. Id. at 119.
32. Id. at 110.
33. Rowe, supra note 1, at x.
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pragmatic American style, a reconciliation will emerge through recognition that constructive solutions to problems between labor and management may well be lubricated by the non-compulsory inclusion of labor
representation on the board of directors.
VIII.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE

The theme of extraterritoriality recurs regularly in these papers. The
European nations continue to resent and challenge the efforts of American enforcement officials and plaintiffs to reach conduct which European
4
authorities regard as being beyond the reach of the American law.1
American antitrust enforcement officials have asserted for decades that
they are not attempting to reach extraterritorial conduct in any unusual
36
fashion." The controlling U.S. principle has been the effects doctrine.
This doctrine asserts that if someone is standing in a foreign country and
fires a bullet across the U.S. border which injures a U.S. citizen, the
United States should be able to assert jurisdiction over the perpetrator of
this assault, if it ever finds him or his property within U.S. borders, because he has caused a harmful effect in the United States which U.S. law
was designed to punish. In its simplified form this argument seems hard
to rebut, but problems arise from efforts at discovery and enforcement. A
conceptual attack on the effects doctrine, of which some European authorities are fond, was expressed in the unfortunate opinion of Justice
Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.3 7 The good justice
stated there that "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
' '8
determined wholly by the law of the country whefe the act is done.
Perhaps the shortcoming of this statement can be overcome by arguing
that an act is "done" in the place where its effects are felt. This is too glib
for analytical purposes, and it is necessary to explicitly disagree with this
statement of Justice Holmes in order to permit the application of U.S.
antitrust law in situations in which persons outside the borders of the
United States engage in anticompetitive conduct which has a significant
impact upon the internal markets of the United States. It should not be
possible for foreign trading concerns to acquire economic advantage in
U.S. domestic or foreign commerce through the use 'ofpricing and competition methods which would be unlawful if under taken within the United
States.
A reconciling doctrine may have been found in the case of
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,19 in which the court has
added to the mechanical effects doctrine the idea that, even if technical
jurisdiction can be found through application of the effects doctrine, the

34. ENTERPRISE LAW, supra note 4, at 220-21.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 221.
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Id. at 356.
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
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decision to assert juris diction should depend upon "international comity
and fairness."' 0 Professor Hawk does point out, however, that ironically
the European Commission appears to be adopting the effects doctrine at
the same time the United States may be developing a doctrine of balancing foreign interests and concerns with U.S. interests and concerns in a
fashion which
is less mechanical than what may be evolving as EEC
1
doctrine.'

An interesting facet of the comparison between U.S. and European
antitrust laws is developed by Frances G. Jacobs. His interesting paper'2
compares the two systems in the context of many issues of direct concern
to practicing lawyers: the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts;
the extent to which the European Court of Justice may review decisions
of the Commission on questions of fact; the extent to which the principles
of the European governing statutes may be enforced in the national
courts, particularly in private actions by plaintiffs seeking to use the legislation as a sword rather than as a shield to found a cause of action in
the national courts. Particularly on this latter point, the difference between the European and American conditions is substantial because in
the United States, but not in Europe, the prophylactic effect of a private
right of action has been relied upon heavily for the development of the
law and the enforcement of the principles of the antitrust laws. Ninetyfive percent of the antitrust cases filed in U.S. courts in 1978 are said to
have been private actions.'3 By contrast, and perhaps as an inheritance

from the civil law tradition and its reliance upon administrative mechanisms, the existence of a private right of action for this purpose in European courts is only beginning to be explored." Whether the European
courts will wish to begin hearing such cases will depend in part on how
horrified they may be at the impact of the "big case" upon caseloads and
judicial procedures in the U.S. courts.
IX.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The existence of state participation in the ownership of enterprises
will create problems in connection with antitrust enforcement because of
the existence of the sovereign immunity, sovereign compulsion, and the
act of state doctrines. "' Whether foreign governments will be able to defend the anticompetitive activities of their commercial instrumentalities
by asserting that the actions of these instrumentalities are acts of state"4
which may not be challenged in the courts, is an area with vast implica40. Id. at 613.
41. Ewrnpimsz LAw, supra note 4, at 44.

42. Id. at 204-15.
43. Id. at 185.
44. Id. at 213, 232-33.
45. See Comment, note 14 supra.
46. The act of state doctrine is accepted by U.S. courts and, according to the doctrine, a
U.S. court must refrain from examining the validity of the acts of a foreign state. Id. at 86.
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tions for the development of the antitrust law of the 1980's.
X.

BERNARD BARUCH

The breadth and depth of the issues involved here make it difficult to
imagine that only the courts will participate in the development of the
major principles of antitrust law. There is a continuing debate in all nations about the extent to which business and government should cooperate or merge. Even in the thinking of major American business leaders
there has never been unanimity on this subject, although the prevailing
stereotype of the American businessman is that he wants as little government as possible. The Reagan Administration has squarely lined itself up
with this approach. Nevertheless, the idea that the public good must be a
factor in corporate decisions has been with us for a long time.' 7 In spite of
his dominant position as a Wall Street figure, Bernard Baruch is said to
have "preferred voluntary cooperation between business and government."'" Viewing free competition as chaos, but resisting government
ownership of industries, he favored cartel-like arrangements to stabilize
prices and production.'"

XI.

ESSENCE OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST

LAW

The pithiest description of the national antitrust laws of western Europe was reported by Mr. Rosenthal, based on a recollection by Lloyd
Cutler: "Under German antitrust law, everything is prohibited unless expressly permitted; under British antitrust law, everything is permitted
unless expressly prohibited; and under French antitrust law, everything is
prohibited but there is always a way around it." 50
XII.

WARNING TO U.S. COUNSEL

One of the significant lessons of this volume for U.S. lawyers is that
antitrust law is not an exclusively U.S. product. As U.S. manufacturers
compete more effectively in European markets, and as exports increase,
more and more lawyers in all parts of the United States will be called
upon to advise regional clients with respect to foreign operations. The
existence of a form of antitrust regulation in Europe will require serious
consideration in addition to the consideration which U.S. lawyers normally give to the operation of U.S. antitrust principles upon their plans
for sales representation and product distribution. The objective of European Community law is not so much to maximize competition as it is to
minimize restraints upon trade between participating countries in the European Community.5" This difference is reflected in the detailed consider-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

ENTERPRIsz LAW, supra note 4, at 134.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1981, Book Review Section 22.
Id.
ERPRiemsE LAW, supra note 4, at 245.
Id. at 45.
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ation given to territorial restrictions in establishing systems of distributorships, in comparison with the absence of any controls over mergers and
acquisitions."
XIII.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the essential character of these papers is that of a snapshot
of sophisticated thinking about antitrust law in Europe and the United
States at a given moment in time. They do not represent a comprehensive
study nor a reference work for explicit counseling research. They do not
present the black letter law or the detailed requirements of any of the
statutes bearing on the subject. They assume the reader has most of that
knowledge and move on to survey the significant developments and implications for the 1980's. Because of the quality of the participants and the
openness with which they were able to approach these subjects, the papers are a stimulating and useful collection of readings for Atlantic community practitioners who are going to deal with the antitrust and corporate governance problems of the 1980's.

52. Id. at 45-46.

The Law of Transnational Business
Transactions
Reviewed by Peter M. Sussman*
NANDA, V. P.

(ed.),

THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS; Clark

Boardman Co., Ltd., New York, N.Y. (1981); $75.00 (practitioner's edition),
$15.00 (student edition); ISBN 0-87632-342-5, LC 81-2392; xxii, 13 chapters,
each separately paginated; footnotes, index, appendices. Introduction by Donald W. Hoagland.

The Law of TransnationalBusiness Transactions deals with subjects that traditionally have not been of concern to most practicing American lawyers. There have long been international law specialists in major
commercial centers such as New York, Chicago and San Francisco. To
most American attorneys in private practice, international law was, and
perhaps remains, an esoteric field. As Donald W. Hoagland makes clear in
his excellent introductory chapter, the interdependence of the nations of
the world is a fact of modern life. Consequently, more and more U.S.
attorneys, in all parts of the country, will be called upon to represent
clients in matters that raise international issues. These clients may be
American businessmen engaged in international trade or investment or
they may be foreigners involved in ventures in the United States. Such
representation will require a degree of understanding of international law
and of the international environment that has hitherto been demanded of
only a few specialists in the American legal profession.
Professor Nanda's volume on international commercial transactions
is well-timed. It meets the growing need for a better understanding of the
law and customs that govern international commercial transactions. The
timing is all the more fortunate because the existing legal literature in
this field is largely inadequate. While there are some good textbooks, such
as Steiner and Vagts' TransnationalLegal Problems,' they are generally
out of date. The exception is A. Lowenfeld's six-part series on international economic law,' three volumes of which were updated last year. The
*Peter M. Sussman is a partner at Erickson, Holmes, Nicholls, Kusic & Sussman in
Denver, Colorado. B.A., Queens College, New York; M.A., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Denver.
1. H.J. STEINER & D.F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLuMS (2d ed. 1979).
2. A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. I, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE
TRADE (2d ed. 1981); A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. II, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT (2d ed. 1981); A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. III, TRADE
CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS (2d ed. 1981); A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW, PT. IV, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1977); D.R. TILLINGHAST, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. V, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS (1978); A.F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. VI, PUBLIC REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL

TRADE (1978).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

Lowenfeld books, however, are definitely designed as teaching tools, and
they are not suitable for, nor are they intended to be, handbooks for the
practicing lawyer.
Professor Nanda's book is advertised as a handbook for the practicing attorney, but it is also available in a student edition. Thus, it seems
intended to serve two purposes. Whether one book can serve the needs of
both practicing lawyers and law students is debatable. A law student
must learn basic concepts to analyze problems and formulate the legally
relevant questions to which those problems give rise. The student must
also have some idea of how to find the answers to those questions, but he
is not required to know specific answers to detailed questions. Furthermore, such knowledge would not be particularly useful to the student
since the law is likely to change before he enters practice and is called
upon to advise clients. The practicing attorney, on the other hand, is
looking for specific, reliable, and up-to-date information when he consults
a legal handbook.
Several of the chapters in Professor Nanda's book provide the type of
information practicing attorneys need. Thus, there is an excellent chapter
entitled "United States Taxation of Foreign Investors" by H.K. Lidstone
and R.S. Rich, which provides essential guidance for the practitioner who
is called upon to represent a foreign investor. This chapter was partially
obsolete by the time the volume was published, however, since it discusses U.S. law only up to July 1980. Since that time Congress has passed
the Foreign Investment in Real Property Act' which imposes new reporting requirements and potential tax obligations on the foreign investor. It
is, of course, to be expected that there will be constant and rapid change
in the volatile field of international commerce. To the extent that The
Law of TransnationalBusiness Transactionsis a handbook, it will therefore need frequent updating. The publisher has indicated that periodic
updates will be issued for the looseleaf edition. No such service is available for the more reasonably priced student edition.
Other chapters that appear to be geared to satisfy the needs of the
practicing attorney are: "Foreign Business Organization" by R.B. Lake;
"Selected Clauses in Transnational Contracts" by M.S. Caldwell; "International Technology Transfers" by R.Y. Peters; "International Technology Transfer Agreements" by M. Bard and R.Y. Peters; "Foreign Natural
Resource Investment" by J.E. Horigan; "Forum-Selection and Choice-ofLaw Agreements in International Contracts" by Ved P. Nanda; "Antitrust Aspects of International Business Operations-U.S. and EEC Substantive Law" by T.L. Banks; and "International Boycotts" by S.J. Doyle.
On the other hand, many of the chapters such as "Jurisdictional
Problems in the Application of the Antitrust Laws" by D.K. Pansius,
"Enforcement of the European Community's Antitrust Laws-The Single
Enterprise Theory" by L. Heimke Filegar and L.L. Helling, and "Foreign

3. I.R.C. §§ 897, 6039C (1981 Supp.).
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Trade and Economic Injury-A Survey of U.S. Relief Mechanisms" by
P.S. Dempsey seem better suited for classroom use. The division of the
chapters into two distinct categories is necessarily somewhat arbitrary.
Some of the chapters fit into both categories, but most of them do not.
Although space does not permit a detailed review of each of the thirteen chapters, a few remarks are in order. R.B. Lake's chapter on foreign
business organizations is quite useful. It provides a brief overview of corporate organizations abroad. Also, it deals with the important subject of
international distributorships and provides a good basic form for a distributorship agreement. On the other hand, this chapter suffers more
than most from sloppy editing and proofreading, particularly with regard
to Table A' which lists the names used in certain foreign countries for
stock corporations and limited liability companies. There are printing errors in the entries for Belgium and Luxembourg, and the Italian names
for the two types of organizations are reversed.
M.S. Caldwell's chapter on selected contract clauses provides a very
good basic guide for lawyers who are not specialists in international commercial law. It touches briefly on arbitration, a subject that should have
been dealt with at greater length at some point in the volume. A number
of useful sample contract clauses are provided. This author would suggest
that Caldwell's apparent belief that a force majeure clause may be invoked because inflation drives up prices is probably not well-founded. Inflation cannot be regarded as wholly unforeseeable,' and provisions for
price increases can be inserted into commercial contracts.
The chapters on international technology transfer by R.Y. Peters and
M. Bard offer solid basic information required by a practicing lawyer
whose familiarity with the field is limited. These two chapters and the
extensive documentation that is appended to the second of the chapters
constitute an excellent starting point for an attorney desiring to arrange
an international technology transfer.
J.E. Horigan's chapter on foreign natural resource investment deals
with a politically sensitive subject. His point of view is that shared by
most people in the United States but by very few in the Third World or
perhaps even Canada. When control over natural resources is at stake,
the concept of sanctity of contract as it was thought to apply to foreign
investors has lost its force. To the American lawyer that may indeed seem
like a reversion to the "law of the jungle," but realistically American lawyers will have to adjust to this irreversible development. To show what
today's investor is up against, it might have been useful if Horigan had
cited some of the more recent UN resolutions dealing with this subject or

4.

THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL

BusNmsS

TRASACTIONS

2-48 (V.P. Nanda ed. 1981).

5. A force majeure clause used in a contract can generally be invoked only to protect
the promisor from contingencies beyond his control such as acts of God and government
actions. Id. at 4-16.
6. Foremost among these resolutions is G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(no. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). For a discussion of the Charter of Economic Rights
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if he had referred to Canada's new National Energy Program. 7

Professor Nanda's chapter on forum-selection and choice-of-law
agreements is an excellent guide to an extremely important aspect of international commercial law. It is hoped that this chapter will eventually
be expanded to cover other procedural aspects of transnational litigation.
In his chapter on antitrust, T.L. Banks undertakes the difficult task of
describing U.S. and EEC antitrust laws and their international effects.
The chapter provides solid information and analysis.
As indicated above, D.K. Pansius' chapter on jurisdictional problems
in the application of antitrust laws is broad enough in scope and sufficiently well written to serve as a teaching text. The chapter provides interesting insight into the practical limitations of conventional legal concepts when such concepts are applied to litigation which transcends
national boundaries. Pansius suggests, for instance, that it is not clear if
U.S. antitrust law applies to cartels such as OPEC. He contends that such
cartels might well be amenable to antitrust action under the commercial
activity exception to the act of state doctrine. The argument is legally
interesting, but it is of no practical consequence since no U.S. antitrust
judgment against OPEC would be enforceable given the political and economic realities of today's world. Futhermore, the current legal skirmishes
between the U.S. courts which are attempting to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction s and the British Government which maintains that such attempts infringe on British sovereignty, which culminated in the passage
of the Protection of Trading Interests Act by Parliament in March of
1980,' demonstrate that there are limits to the extent that our courts can
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust proceedings. In the long
run, the controversy that has arisen can be resolved only by governmentto-government negotiations.
The chapter on the European single enterprise theory by L. Heimke
Filegar and L.L. Helling sheds an interesting light on the legal devices
used by the Commission of the European Communities to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases. This chapter should be of particular importance to U.S. attorneys who represent multinational corpora-

and Duties of States, see Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
7. THE NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM 1980, Dep't of Energy, Mines and Resources (Ottawa, 1980). See generally W. DOBSON, CANADA'S ENERGY POLICY DEBATE (available from
C.D. Howe Institute, Montreal, 1981) (discusses the Canadian debate over the new federal
energy policy).
8. Extraterritorial discovery has been particularly problematic because discovery is crucial in U.S. antitrust cases, and foreign nations resent the efforts of U.S. courts to exercise
jurisdiction in their countries. As a result, they have enacted laivs precluding discovery by
U.S. plaintiffs. Id. at 10-51.
9. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, reprinted in 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND 11531A (4th ed. 1981 Cum. Supp.). For a general background discussion of American, British and European Community antitrust case law, see Extraterritorial Application of
Trade Laws, reprinted in 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS

OF ENGLAND

1531 (4th ed. 1977).
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tions with European subsidiaries.
Professor Dempsey's survey of U.S. relief mechanisms against economic injury caused by foreign trade deals with a topic that will inevitably grow in importance as the world economic situation deteriorates.
There is at the moment a retreat from the free trade principles enshrined
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) 10, and at least
a flirtation with protectionism. This tendency will be aggravated, in this
country and elsewhere, if the recession deepens. Professor Dempsey argues that U.S. industry is placed at a disadvantage because it is heavily
burdened by government regulation while our government's free trade
policies expose domestic industry to the full force of international competition. Hence, U.S. industry will have to avail itself of the relief mechanisms outlined in Professor Dempsey's chapter. It is questionable that
U.S. industry is as shackled as Professor Dempsey suggests. Many of the
competitors of our domestic industry operate in countries where the laws
regarding environmental protection, health and safety, wages and hours,
and employee benefits are far more stringent than they are in this country. This would suggest that our industrial decline may be due to internal
factors such as inadequate investment in new plants and equipment, wage
demands that have outpaced increases in productivity, and management
that is overly concerned with short-term profits. If such is the case, resort
to protective devices to shield U.S. industry against the effects of its
shortcomings would not be a cure for our economic ills. It would, in fact,
aggravate them.
S.J. Doyle's chapter on international boycotts is merely a description
of the Arab boycott of Israel and of the resultant U.S. antiboycott laws.
While it is a useful resume of the boycott and the relevant laws, this
chapter, like others in the book, evidences less than careful proofreading.1" The many spelling errors" in this book may be regarded as a nonsubstantive fault, but the errors are so numerous that they seriously detract from the content and undermine the book's claim to be regarded as
an important contribution to legal literature. An effort should be made to
correct these errors in the next edition of this work.
In summary, Professor Nanda's The Law of TransnationalBusiness
Transactions constitutes a not totally successful first step in the right
direction. Such a book is needed. What is lacking, however, is a focus. It
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat., Pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
11. Thus, footnote 1 on page 132 reads: "Arab League, General Principalsfor the Boycott of Israel (1972) [hereinafter cited as General Principals]."Also, the footnotes on pages
9-18 through 9-53 do not correspond to the numbers in the text.
12. Merely by way of example, chapter 12 contains references to "principle legal reme-

dies", "wrecking havoc", and "deternine." Foreign words fare less well. For instance, in
chapter 2, there are three spelling errors in Table B which deals with French business organizations. In addition, the accent marks that are essential in French are omitted entirely. In
chapter 9, there are frequent references to the Commission des Communautks europkennes,
usually in case citations, and it is misspelled every time.
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is unlikely that the book can serve both the practitioner and the student
well. If it is to be a practitioner's handbook, frequent updates must be
assured."3 In addition, the scope of the book might have to be enlarged.
Overall, the title of this volume promises more than it delivers.

13.
Release
entirely
curities

An update and expansion of the book, Release #1, appeared in August 1982. The
includes an expanded chapter 9, new material in chapter 10, a revised index, and an
new chapter by Harold S. Bloomenthal on International Capital Markets and SeRegulation.
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Book Notes
BOWMAN, M.J., EDUCATIONAL CHOICE AND LABOR MARKETS IN JAPAN;
University of Chicago Press, 5801 S. Ellis Ave., Chicago, IM. 60637 (1981);
$19.00; ISBN 0-226-06923-0, LC 80-25557; xvii, 367 pp.; footnotes, bibliography, index, appendices. Written with the collaboration of Hideo
Ikeda and Yasumasa Tomoda.
This book is a study of human resources, education, careers, and labor market structures in Japan. Both the data and analysis of this study
are unique. Their distinctiveness lies in the application of theoretical
frameworks from sociology and economics to the analysis of educational
and career decisions and in the use of the literature on decision-making
to illuminate how parents and children perceive investments in education.
The book is divided into five parts. Part I describes the Japanese
educational structure, the composition of the Japanese labor force, and
the theoretical and methodological bases of the study.
Part II is concerned with the decision, upon completion of lower-secondary school, to select and enroll in an upper-secondary school course of
study. Socioeconomic and geographical influences on the decision are analyzed. Changes in preferences between entry and graduation are also examined, and a model of this decision-making process is proposed.
Part III examines the decision, upon completion of upper-secondary
school, to pursue higher education or to enter the labor. market. The effects of the decision on parents, community background, occupational
goals, economic constraints, and income expectations are examined.
In Part IV, the postschool years are examined. Finally, in Part V the
author predicts how educational policies may shape Japanese life in the
future.
Mary Jean Bowman is Professor Emeritus in the Departments of Education and Economics at the University of Chicago. Hideo Ikeda is Professor of Education at Hiroshima University. Yasumasa Tomoda is Professor of Education at Osaka University.

CAMPBELL, D. (ed.), 3 COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK (1979); Sijthoff &
Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Nether-
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lands (1980); $47.50; ISBN 90-286-0340-9, LC 79-649337; v, 287 pp.;
footnotes.
The Center for International Legal Studies promotes international
legal education, research, information exchange and understanding
through the publication of the Comparative Law Yearbook. Research,
policies and opinions (not necessarily reflecting the policies or opinions of
the Center) deemed worthy of publication are found in the Yearbook.
Contributions to the 1979 volume include recent law reform in the
People's Republic of China, a comparative perspective on employee creditor's rights in collective proceedings, German merger controls and the oil
industry, international commercial arbitration and long-term contracts,
the Hague Sales Law, collective Western legal efforts concerning the suppression of terrorism, meaningful criteria of actionability in the law of
delict, transnational reach of U.S. antitrust laws, Polish constitutional development in the 1970's, Indian law of contempt, consideration in English
law of contract and its absence in Scottish law, the Sunday Times Case
in Great Britain, and Blohn v. Desser revisited.
Professor Dennis Campbell is Director of the Center for International
Legal Studies.

t
E., MERCENAIRES ET VOLONTAIRES INTERNATIONAUX EN DROIT
DES GENS; Editions de l'Universit6 de Bruxelles, Parc Leopold, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgique; 950 Belgian francs; ISBN 2-8004-0668-2; in French; 459
pp.; preface, table of contents, bibliography, annexes.
DAVID,

The object of this book is to research the international legal rules
which every state formally recognizes with respect to the engagement of
mercenaries overseas. The author has analyzed the laws and obligations
of states in different situations, including international armed conflict, internal insurrections, and peace time.
Specifically, the author focuses on the conduct of international mercenaries against another state or foreign population. Noting that there
have been very few studies in this field, the author raises a number of
questions in his book, such as: Does the use of mercenaries against a state
constitute foreign intervention?; Is this type of activity contrary to international law?; If so, are the violators of international law the mercenaries
themselves or the heads of state who tolerate or encourage this activity?;
What is the responsibility of the state which harbors them?; Do states
violate international law if they have aided the transport of mercenaries
to a country?; If a mercenary is captured, what should be done with him?;
Should he be treated as a prisoner of war, afforded exile, or should he be
extradited to a state which will accept him?
The author concludes that a state should oppose not only the recruitment of mercenaries but also their departure or movement. The author
also asserts that a state should punish mercenaries when they are found
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in the state's territory.
The author also provides an excellent historical analysis of the use of
mercenaries. The annex includes excerpts from several statutes which forbid mercenary activity and a contract of employment for potential
mercenaries.
Eric David is Professor of International Law at the Centre de droit
international de l'Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles (Centre Henri Rolin). He
has written extensively in the fields of international terrorism and humanitarian law.

Dupuy, R.J. (ed.), THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT; Sijthoff
& Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen san den Rijn, The Netherlands (1979); available in the United States from Sijthoff & Noordhoff
International Publishing Co., 1600 Research Blvd., Rockville, Md. 20850;
ISBN 90-2861028-6; xiii, 500 pp.; footnotes. Selected texts from a workshop organized by the Hague Academy of International Law which was
held July 27-29, 1978.
At this workshop, scholars and practitioners active in the fields of
economics, medicine, sociology, politics, and law explored the issues involved in the right to health as an international human right. Among the
questions discussed by the participants were: What are the international
standards which enshrine the right to health?; Are these standards adequately responsive to new issues which have arisen affecting the right to
health?; What are the means and methods which have been utilized up to
now to bring about the implementation of the right to health and what
lessons may be learned from the experience thus far?; What measures
may be taken to realize the right to health in areas of the world where it
is still illusory?; How can the medical profession and the population at
large be educated to have a spirit of respect for human rights?
This collection analyzes the essential elements of man's right to
health in his village, town, nation, and in the international community.
The articles also examine the possibilities for constructive action which
could lead to the implementation of a right to health adequate to meet
the needs of man and the world.
Professor Dupuy is the Secretary-General of the Hague Academy of
International Law. He is also a member of the European Commission on
Human Rights and the International Medical-Legal Commission of
Monaco.

t
FERRIS,

E.G. & LINCOLN, J.K. (eds.), LATIN AMERCAm FOREIGN POLI-

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

Westview Press, 5500 Central
Ave., Boulder, Co. 80301 (1981); $26.50 (cloth), $14.00 (paper); ISBN 086531-208-7 (cloth), ISBN 0-86531-284-2 (paper), LC 81-10296; xvii, 300
pp.; footnotes, index, bibliography, tables. Part of the Westview Special
Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean.
This volume represents a collection of essays grouped into four categories: perspectives on Latin American foreign policies and international
relations, Latin American global foreign policies, Latin American regional
foreign policies, and future directions for research on Latin American foreign policies.
The first section provides an assessment of the current state of research in the field and an overview of Latin American foreign policies and
the political determinants of those policies. Among the specific topics
touched upon are the relationship between the United States and Latin
America, the role of bureaucratic organizations and development plans,
and interdependence in the inter-American system.
CIES: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL DIMENSIONS;

Section two of the book examines the global policies of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Cuba. These essays represent different theoretical perspectives and provide a wealth of information for transnational comparisons.
Brazil's foreign policy is examined from the perspective of an advanced
developing country in a multipolar world. Mexico's foreign policy is examined from the perspective of a highly interdependent world. The essay
on Peru considers the external political and economic initiatives taken by
the country since 1975. Cuba's involvement in Africa and its possible
objectives are discussed in the final essay of the section.
Section three presents case studies of regional foreign policies in
Latin America. Among the topics addressed are: Venezuela, Brazil, and
the Amazon Basin; geopolitics and foreign policy in Argentina, Chile, and
Brazil; Bolivia and its access to the sea; Mexico's role as an emerging
power in the Caribbean region; Cuba's foreign policy with respect to the
Caribbean and Central America; and foreign policy in the English-speaking Caribbean countries.
The final section consists of a review of the recurring themes found
in the book and a proposed theory for the analysis of Latin American
foreign policy.
Elizabeth G. Ferris is a 1981-82 Fulbright Lecturer at the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico. She was formerly an assistant professor at Miami University in Ohio and has done extensive field work in
Latin America. She participated in the U.S. State Department ScholarDiplomat Program in 1979. Jennie K. Lincoln is Assistant Professor of
Political Science at Miami University in Ohio. She is also a research associate with the CREON Project at the Mershon Center of Ohio State
University.
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GRESSER, J., FUJIKURA, K., & MORISHIMA, A., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
JAPAN; The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Ma. (1981); $60.00; ISBN 0-262-

07076-6; xxi, 525 pp.; footnotes, index, appendices. Part of the Harvard
University Studies in East Asian Law series.
This book presents the first comprehensive assessment in any language of Japan's environmental law and policy. The book begins with an
historical summary of Japan's legal response to environmental problems.
World War II left Japan economically, socially, and politically destitute.
The major concern of the Japanese in the early postwar years was economic recovery, and it was assumed that industrial growth was good.
However, by the mid-1950's, people in different parts of the country began reporting strange diseases virtually unencountered in the past, and
during the 1960's, the victims formed protest groups. By the early 1970's,
many Japanese had come to view pollution in moral terms, and this view
of pollution shaped all subsequent Japanese judicial and administrative
policies.
Four judicial decisions shaped Japan's approach to environmental
protection. These four decisions are described in the second part of the
book which examines the role of the judiciary in the development of Japanese environmental law. In particular, the Japanese courts created new
legal rights and remedies such as a legal right to sunshine.
The third part of the book discusses Japanese environmental protection legislation and its administration. Two unique aspects of the Japanese environmental laws are the use of conciliation, mediation, and arbitration in the settlement of environmental disputes and the compensation
of victims for pollution-related injuries.
The final part of the book discusses Japan's record in the field of
international environmental protection. Despite its innovative domestic
performance, Japan has remained callous to the environmental consequences of her actions abroad. The authors explore this contradiction and
conclude the book with an appeal for Japan to improve its environmental
performance on a global level.

t
HOOLE, F.W.,

FRIEDHEIM,

R.L., HENNESSEY, T.M. (eds.), MAKING

OCEAN POLICY: THE POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGE-

Westview Press, 5500 Central Ave., Boulder, Co. 80301 (1981);
$23.75; ISBN 0-89158-966-X, LC 81-7418; xix, 291 pp.; footnotes, charts,
tables. Published under the auspices of the Institute for Marine and
Coastal Studies, University of Southern California, and the Center for
Ocean Management Studies, University of Rhode Island. Part of the
Westview Special Studies in Ocean Science and Policy.
This volume is about the making of U.S. ocean policy. It intends to
provide a perspective on contemporary U.S. ocean policy-making issues.
MENT;
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The book contains fourteen articles grouped into four main sections
which are: the history of U.S. ocean policy, ocean policy-making advocacy, ocean policy-making analysis, and the study of ocean policy and policy-making.
The history of U.S. ocean policy is described in the first section
which consists of one chapter. While the United States has a long history
in ocean affairs, it was not until around 1960 that there was a meaningful
ocean program. This first section details this development, but the bulk
of the section is devoted to a discussion of post-1960 events. Among the
topics dealt with are: the establishment of the Interagency Committee on
Oceanography, the development of a decade-long set of governmental
goals regarding ocean activities, the establishment in 1966 of the National
Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, the establishment of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) in 1970, and the gradual movement in the mid-1970's to the implementation of new programs by the already established organizations.
The second section of the book, dealing with ocean policy-making advocacy contains two articles. The first article in this section deals with the
current federal organizational structure and six proposals for reoganization. The second article offers a "functional" proposal for reorganization.
The purpose of this reorganization would be to minimize program and
organizational overlap.
The bulk of the book is in the third section on policy-making analysis. Among the topics dealt with in this section are: governmental reorganization problems; organization of federal, state, and local governments
to act together; critiques of existing ocean decision-making processes; the
application of management science methodologies to ocean policy-making; determination of the economic value of the ocean to the United
States; program implementation problems; seaport management; and the
policy-making process used to implement the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act of 1976.
The final section of the book contains two chapters and deals with
the study of ocean policy and policy-making. The prospects for ocean policy research and the various types of reports and projects currently being
pursued are discussed, and the question is asked: In what direction
should academic ocean policy and policy-making research efforts be
headed? A National Science Foundation workshop on the topic is
reviewed.

HOSSAIN,

K. (ed.), LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL Eco-

Frances Pinter Ltd., London, England (1980); available in
the United States from Nichols Publishing Co., P.O. Box 96, New York,
N.Y. 10024; $27.50; ISBN 0-89397-088-3, LC 80-12089; xii, 285 pp.; footNOMIC ORDER;
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notes, index.
The book primarily consists of papers presented at the Seminar on
the Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order held March 1517, 1979, at St. John's College, Oxford, England. Among the materials
added are an introduction in six parts and a number of individual
contributions.
The book is divided into four parts. Part I examines certain general
principles as they relate to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States. In Part II, transnational corporations and the transfer of technology are discussed. For instance, there are articles on UN efforts to regulate transnational corporations and on the transfer of technology to developing countries.
Part III explores the relationship between the law of the sea and the
new international economic order. Finally, Part IV examines the important topic of how sovereignty over natural resources relates to the new
international economic order. The articles in this part include one on
state responsibility for the nationalization of foreign-owned property and
one on the continuing validity of mineral development contracts.
Dr. Kamal Hossain is the Director of the Center for Research on the
New International Economic Order, located in Oxford, England.

t
HOYLE, M.S.W., THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE; The Laureate
Press, 10 Wandon Road, London S.W. 62 J.F., England (1981); $18.00
(paper), $27.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-907392-03-2 (paper), ISBN 0-907392-02-4
(cloth); xxi, 414 pp.; footnotes, index, table of cases, table of statutes,
appendices.
The book deals with the English law of international trade, and is
divided into eight chapters. The chapter "General Introduction" discusses various background details of international trade, while the chapter entitled "International Sale of Goods" covers basic English contract
law, the passing of risk and property, remedies available to the seller or
buyer, the Sale of Goods Act, and the Unfair Contract Act.
The chapter entitled "Finance of International Sales" examines the
methods used by buyers to pay sellers, settlement of debts, security, Bills
of Exchange, Foreign Exchange, Factoring, and Performance Guarantees.
The types of carriage, bills of lading, carrier liability, the Baltic Exchange, the General Average, and container transport are discussed in the
chapter "Carriage of Goods."
Chapter 5, "Marine Insurance," explains the importance of insurance
to trade and details the process of obtaining a policy and filing a claim.
Chapter 6, "Conflict of Laws and Procedure," deals with conflict of laws,
choice of forum, and choice of law. The seventh chapter, "Arbitration,"
describes the English Arbitration Acts and how foreign arbitration awards
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are enforced in England. Finally, the last chapter, "International Trade
Fraud," examines the main types of fraud and preventive measures.
Mark S.W. Hoyle is Barrister Lecturer at the Inns of Court School of
Law, London.

HOYLE, M.S.W. (ed.),

CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTERNA-

The Laureate Press, 10 Wandon Road, London S.W. 62
J.F., England (1981); $23.00 (paper), $37.50 (cloth); ISBN 0-907392-01-6
(paper), ISBN 0-907392-00-8 (cloth); vii, 282 pp.; glossary, appendix.
This is a companion reference book to The Law of International
Trade and contains the leading cases, statutes, conventions, rules, and
documents relevant to international trade.
TIONAL TRADE;

t
INsTITUT D'ETUDES EUROPAENNES, THE ROLE OF EUROPE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER; Editions de l'Universitk Libre de Brux-

elles, Parc Leopold, 1040 Brussels, Belgium (1979); 650 Belgian francs;
ISBN 2-8004-0698-4; 355 pp.; footnotes.
This book is a report of a colloquium sponsored by the Institut
d'Etudes Europ6ennes of the Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles which was
held October 13-14, 1978. The colloquium, conducted partly in English
and partly in French, covered the following topics: European relations
with the Arab oil-producing nations and how they affect the new international economic order; energy and the North-South dialogue, UNCTAD's
integrated program for commodities; commodity agreements; industrial
redeployment in the context of a global restructuring of industry; industrial redeployment and its social implications; and transfer of technology.
In each of the sessions of the colloquium, the positions of the industrialized countries and of the developing countries were presented on each
topic. A discussion followed these presentations. The participants in the
colloquium included scholars and politicians from industrialized and
third world countries. The last session of the colloquium was a round table discussion on the role of Europe in the new international economic
order.

t
LILLICH, R.B. (ed.), THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW; The Michie
Co., Charlottesville, Va. (1981); ISBN 087215355-X, LC 81-80716; xii, 164
pp.; footnotes, index. The Third Sokol Colloquium.
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This book contains four of the principle papers read at the Third
Sokol Colloquium held April 6-7, 1979, at the University of Virginia
School of Law. The first paper by Willis L.M. Reese discusses the Hague
Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages.
In the second paper, Richard E. Crouch examines recent developments in
family law in the United States. He observes that the United States' international position on children's rights bears no relationship to the status of children's rights in the United States. He points out that if the
proposed UN convention on the rights of the child were adopted, federal
laws would have to be enacted that would bring about major social
changes in the United States.
The third paper analyzes the child custody cases decided in the wake
of the adoption of Vietnamese war orphans by numerous families in the
United States. The U.S. courts almost universally decided these cases in
favor of the natural Vietnamese parents. The author, Thomas E. Carbonneau, feels this result was the correct result.
Finally, in the fourth paper, Harvey Schweitzer discusses the progress being made in drafting a U.N. convention on children's rights. The
current draft convention is examined in light of recent developments concerning children's rights and with regard to existing international human
rights instruments.
Richard B. Lillich is Howard W. Smith Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and President of the Procedural Aspects
of International Law Institute.

LILLICH,

R.B. (ed.),

INTERNATIONAL

ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: EN-

FORCING UNITED STATES LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY;

The Michie Co.,

Charlottesville, Va. (1981); ISBN 0-87215-388-6, LC 81-82457; ix, 227 pp.;
footnotes, index. The Fourth Sokol Colloquium.
This fourth volume in the Gustave Sokol Program in Private International Law, which was established at the University of Virginia School of
Law in 1976, has a different emphasis from its predecessors. While the
three preceding volumes have emphasized topics in private international
law not receiving adequate attention in regular law school curriculums,
this volume focuses on the problems of criminal procedure in an international context, reflecting a Colloquium decision that the line between
public and private international problems ought not to be viewed as a
clear one.
The subject matter is presented in three chapters. Chapter 1, which
is entitled "Obtaining People and Evidence from Abroad through Formal
Legal Processes," analyzes the question of how one nation can obtain people from other nations against whom it claims the right to enforce its
laws. Here, the "power" concepts of extradition and rendition are dis-
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cussed in relation to the limitations on a country's power, such as constitutional restraints and the political offense doctrine. The problems in obtaining foreign evidence are instructively illuminated in a discussion of
the Uranium Cartel cases (the Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts cases), wherein the Canadian and British refusals to comply with letters interrogatory issued by Westinghouse are discussed
against the "balancing of interest approach" and the "jurisdictional rule
of reason" laid down in the Timberlane Products and Mannington Mills
cases and section 40 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States.
Chapter 2, which is entitled "Direct United States Enforcement on
the Seas and Abroad," analyzes the attempts of the United States to extraterritorially expand its direct enforcement power. Discussed here are
the constitutional limits on the manner in which direct enforcement is
attempted by U.S. foreign officials. A two-pronged test is proposed for
defining the degree of U.S. participation that invokes the constitutional
protections required by the Bill of Rights. Also discussed are selected jurisdictional and evidentiary issues associated with the enforcement of
U.S. laws at sea.
Chapter 3, "Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad Through Treaties," discusses the various U.S. treaties on the Execution of Penal Sentences and
the Exchange of Prisoners and analyzes them in relation to the concomitant constitutional issues they raise.
Richard B. Lillich is Howard W. Smith Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and President of the Procedural Aspects
of International Law Institute.

f
MATHIJSEN, P.S.R.F., A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW; Sweet
& Maxwell, 11 New Fetter Lane, London (1980); available in the United
States from The Carswell Co., Ltd., Agincourt, Ont.; ISBN 0-421-25900-0
(cloth), ISBN 0-421-25910-9 (paper); xxxiii, 256 pp.; footnotes, table of
cases, appendices containing European treaties, Community secondary
legislation, United Kingdom legislation. Third edition with special
forward.
The book presents an overview of the current state of European
Community law, viewing the evolution of that law as one factor in the
continuing development of the European Community. The book is structured to provide an understanding of the history, organs, and structures
of the EEC legal system. The author feels that such an understanding is
essential to comprehend Community-Member State relationships as well
as substantive Community policies.

Accordingly, the first three chapters of the book are devoted to a
brief review of the major elements of Community law, a discussion of the
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historical development of the Community, and an extensive examination
of Community organs and institutions. The examination of Community
organs and institutions highlights the European Parliament, the Council
and the Commission of the European Communities, and the Court of Justice. It also provides descriptive information on several other Community
bodies.
Substantive Community acts and policies are detailed in the final
four chapters of the book. Chapter four discusses the promulgation and
enforcement of Community acts. The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community are examined in
chapter five, and the sixth chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the
objectives and activities of the European Economic Community. The
book concludes with an analysis of the emerging legal order of the
Community.
P.S.R.F. Mathijsen is Professor of Law at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and is Director-General of the Commission of the
European Communities.

t
MOSKOWITZ, M., THE ROOTS AND REACHES OF UNITED NATIONS
TIONS AND DECISIONS; Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers,

AcAl-

phen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1980); $28.50; ISBN 90-286-0140-6,
LC 80-51741; x, 210 pp.; footnotes.
The author holds what is a widely-felt concern for the current moral,
political, and intellectual integrity of the United Nations. He expresses
disillusionment with the dichotomy between UN goals and ideals and UN
practice and performance. Concerted efforts must be made to bring simplistic UN problem-solving procedures into conformity with the complex
realities of present-day international relationships.
By way of illustrating his thesis, the author presents several case
studies of issues which have confronted the United Nations. These issues
and the way the United Nations has dealt with them have contributed
much toward shaping the permanent character of the United Nations and
will continue to impact on future UN development.
The first of these issues to be discussed in anti-colonialism and selfdetermination, especially as addressed in the UN Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. South African racial policy has been another dominant issue in the
United Nations and one which illustrates the inability of the United Nations to put its goals into practice and to resolve international conflicts.
The experience of the United Nations in dealing with human rights violations in Chile is yet another example of the organization's ineffectiveness
in this regard.
A large portion of the book is devoted to an analysis of the handling
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of the Middle East dilemma by the United Nations. The analysis identifies Zionism as a factor which further complicated UN efforts to devise a
plan of action that would resolve the Middle East conflict. The section
suggests that possible collusion between Israel and South Africa may have
arisen because the South Africans equate Zionism with racism.
In his conclusion, the author reviews current defects of the United
Nations and recommends needed changes and improvements if the
United Nations is to be able to resolve the problems it faces.
Moses Moskowitz is Secretary-General of the Consultative Council of
Jewish Organization which is an organization in consultative status with
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, Council of Europe, UNESCO and other intergovernmental bodies. He has also written
three books on international human rights.

t
DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND
EXPERIENCE WITH CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO OPERATIONS IN SHARES AND BONDS; OECD, 2 rue Andr6-Pascal, 75775 Paris

(OECD),

CEDEX 16, France (1980); available in the United States from OECD
Publications and Information Center, Suite 1207, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave.,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006; $7.00; ISBN 92-64-12138-2; 64 pp.; annex,
tables, foreword.
This report summarizes the recent work of the OECD's Committee
on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions. This Committee reviewed the experiences of OECD member countries since 1960 in applying
or removing controls on international portfolio operations in shares and
bonds. The objective of their review was to assess the role and effectiveness of controls on international portfolio operations in contributing to
the relevant policy objectives of member countries.
The international portfolio operations in shares and bonds that are
the subject of this study include all operations between residents and
nonresidents in the primary and secondary markets involving equity or
fixed-interest securities, except money market instruments and collective
investment securities. The methods of control, where these operations are
regulated, vary considerably among the member countries. The methods
range from individual, case-by-case authorization procedures, to measures

designed to influence market conditions in order to provide incentives or
disincentives for residents or nonresidents as market participants, to regulations on only certain aspects of such transactions. The tables in the
report summarize the existing controls on international portfolio operations. Four basic categories of controls are distinguished: individual authorizations; administrative regulations and practices; taxes, duties and
other charges; and special currency markets.
The main body of the report reviews the experience of member coun-
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tries with various controls on international portfolio operations. These experiences are divided into three broad groups: those where temporary
measures were taken to meet an urgent need; those where permanent
measures were maintained but applied with flexibility; and those using
permanent restrictions with only. limited flexibility. Within each broad
group, controls were further subdivided into those on outflows and inflows and into those applied to outstanding securities or to new issues.
For each group of measures, the experiences of member countries are
presented, discussed, assessed, and compared. The focus of the analysis is
on the effectiveness of the measures in contributing to the countries' desired policy goals.
The OECD was established pursuant to a convention signed in Paris
in December, 1960. The convention provides that the OECD shall promote policies designed to achieve the highest sustainable economic
growth and employment and a rising standard of living in member countries while maintaining financial stability, and, thus, to contribute to the
development of the world economy. OECD members include the United
States and most other western nations.

t
ORGANSKI, A.F.K. & KUGLER, J., THE WAR LEDGER; University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 60637 (1980); $6.50; ISBN 0-226-63280-6, LC 7923366; xi, 292 pp.; footnotes, bibliography, appendices, tables, figures,
index.

In this book, the authors frame their study by posing four questions:
Why do major wars begin?; What accounts for victory or defeat in war?;
How do victory and defeat influence the recovery of the combatants?; Are
the rules governing conflicts between nations the same since the advent of
nuclear weapons?
Based on their investigations, the authors find that such traditional
theories as the balance of power and collective security system fall short
of adequately explaining how international conflicts erupt. Their rigorous
analysis leads to the conclusion that the "power-transition" theory, predicated on political, economic, and social growth, is more accurate. This
theory states that it is the differential rate of growth of the two most
powerful nations in the system-the dominant state and the challenger-that destabilizes the system and precipitates world wars.
The authors examine successful predictions of who will prevail in a
war and find that whether a country will prevail or not depends not only
on the power potential of a nation but on the capability of its political
system to mobilize its resources-the "political capacity indicator." They
also isolate national growth as the deciding factor in a nation's recovery
in the aftermath of a major conflict. Although with victory, national capabilities may increase or decrease, and with defeat, losses can be enormous,
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this study notes that in less than twenty years, losers recoup their losses
and all combatants find themselves in the same position they would have
occupied had there never been a war.
In the last section, the authors test their thesis in the nuclear weapons context and find that arsenals of these weapons, unexpectedly, have
not changed the structure of power on which international politics rests.
In addition, deterrence theory is determined to be an unreliable model for
predicting the behavior of participants in nuclear confrontation.
A.F.K. Organski is Professor of Political Science and Program Director at the Center for Politcal Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Jacek Kugler is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University, and Faculty Associate in the Center for Political
Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

t
RUDDEN, B. & WYATT, D. (eds.), BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS; Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX26DP England (1980); available
in the United States from Oxford University Press, New York, N.Y.;
$37.50; ISBN 0-19-876119-8, xv, 301 pp.

The editors have selected from the Treaty of Rome the basic and
durable rules pertaining to fundamental freedoms in the European Community. Part I of the text presents the entire EEC treaty including
amendments, as well as the major institutional Community acts such as
the Decisions on Direct Elections and the Declaration on Fundamental
Rights. The section ends with the Greek Accession Treaty and the main
transitional provisions of the Act of Accession.
Part II is a selection of secondary legislation and documents, including the Common Agricultural Policy, Freedom of Movement for Workers,
Social Security for Migrants, the Right of Establishment, and the Freedom to Provide Services and Social Policy. Part III is a compilation of
United Kingdom sources including a number of enactments and statutory
instruments on topics ranging from employment to the cinema and from
energy to seeds. The treaty material is taken from the Treaty Series
presented to Parliament. The secondary material is taken from the Official Journal of the European Communities.

SHAW, T.M. (ed.), ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR AFRICA; Westview Press,
Inc., 5500 Central Ave., Boulder, Co. 80301 (1982); $30.00 (cloth), $14.00
(paper); ISBN 0-89158-769-1 (cloth), ISBN 0-86531-247-8 (paper), LC 8111469; xxiii, 365 pp.; list of tables and figures, appendices, selected bibliography, footnotes, index, biographical list of contributors. Part of West-
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view Special Studies on Africa.
This volume is one of several contemporary efforts to improve the
quality of information and projection about the world's most underdeveloped region. A basic premise of the book is that future studies, even
though tentative and somewhat unreliable, do inform people of the
choices among policy options and provide an indication of the likely effects of such decisions. Quality of information and projection are crucial
to enable Africa to begin to master its own destiny and to leave behind
the global inequality and dependence. The book's contents have been
prepared so that the people of Africa could begin to recognize and deal
with the implications of the alternative projections and scenarios characteristic of future studies.
The book contains the views of ten contributors on the choice Africa
faces between continued incorporation into the world system and disengagement therefrom. Topics include supranationalism, economic cooperation schemes, basic needs strategy and physical quality of life indices,
computer culture and nuclear power, decolonization or dependency, development and economic growth to the year 2000, and forecasts and alternative scenarios for Africa.
Timothy M. Shaw was recently Visiting Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Ife, Nigeria. He previously taught at
Makerere University, Uganda, The University of Zambia, and Carleton
University, Ottawa. He has written extensively in the field of African
studies.

t
WEIS, P., NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW;
Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The
Netherlands (1977); available in the United States from Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1600 Research Blvd., Rockville, Md. 20850; ISBN 90-2860329-8, LC 97-89781; xii, 337 pp.; footnotes, appendices, bibliography,
index.
This treatise is a revised edition of the book which was published in
1955. It is divided into four parts and examines nationality law through a
combination of doctrinal analyses and an examination of legislative, judicial and governmental practice in a number of states as well as a number
of international tribunals.
Part I is entitled "The Conception of Nationality." Nationality is defined and then distinguished from citizenship and the French concept of
ressortissants.Part I focuses on distinguishing the concept of nationality
as a term in international law and as a term in municipal law.
Part II, "Municipal Law and International Law," examines the application of nationality law in municipal and international tribunals and is
highlighted by a discussion of the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent
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Court of International Justice in the Nationality Decrees in Tunis and
Morocco Case. Part II goes on to discuss the relationship between municipal law and international law in the field of nationality.
Part III, "The Public International Law of Nationality," addresses
the effect of international nationality law on the individual. It discusses
acquisition of nationality, loss of nationality, effects of territorial transfers on nationality, conflicts of rules, plural nationality, and problems of
proof of nationality.
Part IV, "Summary and Conclusions," offers a statement on the present status of nationality law in practice and theory. It then suggests the
need for the development of a more cohesive international nationality law
under the guidance of the United Nations and its agencies.
Dr. Paul Weis is Honorary Professor at the University of Vienna and
was, until 1977, Lecturer in Law at the University of Zurich. He has held
numerous UN administrative posts and is presently Honorary Consultant
to the High Commissioner on Refugees.

t
ZURAWICKI,

L., MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN THE WEST AND EAST;

Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The
Netherlands (1979); available in the United States from Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1600 Research Blvd., Rockville, Md. 20850; ISBN 90-2860419-7, LC 89-779; xi, 207 pp.; footnotes, bibliography, index, appendices,
case studies.
The book consists of six chapters which are entitled: "Theories of the
MNE (Multinational Enterprise)," "The Impact of MNEs upon the International Specialization of Production and Trade," "Multinationals and
the Economic Sovereignty of States," "The International Character of Socialist Common Enterprises," "The Role of MNEs and SCEs (Socialist
Common Enterprises) in East-West Relations," and "The Prospects for
East-West-South Cooperation".
The book discusses the economic reasons for the viability of MNEs,
the methods of and motives for their expansion, and the MNEs manipulation of their product supplies to alter their market share in a foreign
country, as well as the mutual links between MNEs and the harmonious
collaboration of MNEs in certain markets. The book also addresses
problems MNEs present for trade unions, conflicts between MNEs and
host states, conflicts between host states and source countries for MNE
capital, and the need to establish international standards and regulations
regarding the scope of MNE activities.
The activities of the socialist counterparts of MNEs, the SCEs, are
also examined. The main difference between MNEs and SCEs is that
SCEs contribute to the political and economic integration of the socialist
countries. However, due to the advanced technology and strong financial
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and competitive position of the MNEs, SCEs prefer MNEs as partners in
transactions with the West. The author hypothesizes that this collaboration offers interesting possibilities for common undertakings involving
MNEs, SCEs, and Third World nations, and that such undertakings
would be mutually beneficial.
Dr. Leon Zurawicki is a lecturer at the University of Warsaw.
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